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Traditional theories of cognition assume that motor action is executed  in an 
all-or-none  fashion,  and  has  little  importance  for  understanding  cognitive 
representation  and  processing.  A  series  of  experiments  and  simulations 
presented here challenges this assumption. A relatively higher-order cognitive 
process, categorization, is shown to have graded effects that are reﬂected in 
manual  motor  output,  measured  through  streaming  x-y  coordinates  from 
mouse  trajectories.  Two  simulations  show  that  these  effects  are  likely 
generated from a system in which cognition and action interact ﬂuidly. Finally, 
theoretical  implications  of  these  experiments  are  drawn  out.  Symbolic 
dynamics is introduced, a potential means for reconciling both traditional and 
continuous accounts of cognition. A broad philosophical discussion follows, in 
which an integrative and pluralistic  approach  to cognition is proposed and 
brieﬂy discussed.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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viiiCHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Body and Mind
Broader Relevance
This dissertation addresses two broad concerns in cognitive science. The ﬁrst 
is pervasive in debate, the second not so much at all. The ﬁrst is a key concern 
about  how  cognitive  processes  unfold  in  time.  This  mostly centers  on  the 
dispute about the relative discreteness, or continuity, of cognitive states and 
processing.  One  traditional  line  of  thought  sees  the  cognitive  system,  in 
achieving  some  information-processing  goal,  transition  through  discrete 
representational states, much like a digital computer. Another, growing out of 
a long but more recently relevant history, sees the cognitive system smoothly 
move through  probabilistic  representational  states,  more  like  the  ﬂow of  a 
dynamical system. Such a dispute might be described as pursuing the matters 
of  fact  about  cognitive  representation  and  process  (as  Hume,  1748/1967, 
famously noted about certain classes  of knowledge; or, recently, as used by 
Quine, 1960). In other words, the debate seeks to deﬁnitively state the nature 
of the cognitive system by ﬁguring out how it actually, in reality, functions. The 
ultimate description resulting from this debate is hoped to be exactly that: the 
ultimate, end-of-discussion, characterization of cognitive processing.
The  second  concern  is  arguably  more  broad,  and  seeks  to  compare 
these  descriptive  schemes  in  another,  wider  descriptive  framework.  The 
concern  is  thus  metatheoretical.  By  employing  some  novel  concepts  from 
dynamical systems mathematics, these descriptive schemes may in fact end up 
being less competing than the ﬁrst debate recommends. Instead, both discrete 
1and continuous descriptions may serve important functions depending on the 
cognitive  phenomena  under  investigation.  Such  a  pragmatist  approach  to 
theoretical  descriptions  relies  on  the  varying  units  of  analysis  available  in 
cognitive representation and process (as Skinner, 1938, describes in uncovering 
functional  units  of  behavior,  or  Dewey  &  Bentley,  1949,  on  designating 
appropriate units of action; see Palmer, 2003, for a review). In other words, 
depending on the units of “mind/brain” selected  for study (for example in 
language:  words,  sentences,  conversation,  etc.),  discrete  descriptions  or 
continuous  descriptions may serve to better predict  and explain  systematic 
relationships among the behavioral variables under study. 
In what follows, I trace a selective history of philosophical and scientiﬁc 
investigations of cognition, and how strong historical  trends have led to the 
ﬁrst debate. This selective survey lays out the fundamental  questions about 
the matters of fact of cognition, the answers to which seek to discover the real 
nature of cognitive representation and process. The ﬁrst few sections  of the 
following discussion set the context for the empirical and computational work 
presented  in  subsequent  chapters.  Following  this,  I  offer  some  brief 
preliminary reﬂections on the second broad concern. How might conceptual 
advances mitigate or change the nature of this debate? This sets the stage for 
later theoretical chapters, in which such a discussion is engaged directly. 
To begin this historical survey, I consider the relationship between the 
body and the mind. The strongest historical trend in both the philosophy and 
science of the mind is to consider these two entities as quite distinct: Thinking 
is a species different from the body, and both are subject to differing courses of 
study. This historical dichotomy, laid out below by selective survey, has been 
recently challenged in cognitive science. 
2Action and cognition
For at least two decades, there has been a prominent movement in cognitive 
science to broaden the role of the body in theories of cognition (e.g., Ballard, 
Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997; Dreyfus, 1972, 1992; 
Glenberg  &  Robertson,  2000;  Lakoff  &  Johnson,  1999;  Rizzolatti,  Riggio, 
Dascola, & Umilta, 1987; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992). The movement 
contrasts  with  the  traditional  focus  in  cognitive  psychology  of  studying 
cognitive  processing,  such as  memory,  language,  and  categorization,  as  in-
principle separable from the perceptual  and  motor systems  associated with 
them (e.g., Carey, 1985; Chomsky, 1966, 2000; Fodor, 1975, 1983, 2000; Marr, 
1982; Pinker, 1997; Putnam, 1960). 
For example, explaining how we process a sentence’s meaning may be 
couched in terms of propositional structures. When the sentence “I swung the 
hammer” is processed, the structures that the cognitive system manipulates 
are  thought  to  be  language-like  elements  themselves,  stored,  encoded, 
represented, etc.  as information structures that  have  been stripped  of  their 
perceptual-motor content (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2000). In other words, hearing the 
word  “hammer,” once reaching a stage that can be called  word processing, 
involves accessing semantic feature lists such as is weighty or is long that are 
encoded  as  semantic  predicates.  These  predicates,  “language  of  thought” 
descriptors,  do  not  carry  the  perceptual  (the  way  you  might  sense  the 
weightiness of the object) or motor (the way you might hold or play with it) 
information about the hammer -- they are just encoded  feature descriptions 
(e.g., Katz & Fodor, 1963). 
3This traditional  perspective is being challenged, and some argue that 
these  “amodal”  representations  do  not  properly  characterize  cognitive 
processing.  Instead,  these  information  structures  might  make  use  of  the 
perceptual-motor,  “modal,”  content  that  is  relevant  to  the  features  (e.g.,  a 
perceptual-symbol system, Barsalou, 1999). In the case of motor information, 
one source of evidence for this challenge has been to investigate how action-
relevant variables modulate cognitive processing. Experiments conducted by 
Tucker and Ellis (1998), for example, show that the recognition of an artifact 
(e.g., a coffee mug) is inﬂuenced by responding conditions (e.g., with the right 
hand) when the handle of the mug is compatible with these conditions (i.e., it 
is recognized faster). A similar effect is seen in sentence processing. Glenberg 
and  Kaschak  (2002)  demonstrate  that  responding  conditions  (e.g.,  pulling 
towards or pushing away) can inﬂuence judging the sensibility of sentences 
containing  compatible  descriptions  (e.g.,  close  the  drawer).  These  ﬁndings 
(along  with  others  reviewed  below)  support  the  position  that  motor 
information is somehow being incorporated into cognitive processing -- if that 
were not the case, the actual characteristics of the required action would have 
no bearing whatsoever on the speed or reliability of the decision. Both of these 
examples reveal how the parameters of action can feedback into the cognitive 
processing relevant to the experimental task. 
Such results are interesting because action is often assumed to be the 
point at which cognition stops. From a traditional perspective, understanding 
the word “hammer” works by amodal information processing, and depending 
on the required task response, executes a particular action the characteristics 
of  which  will  not  have  any  bearing  on  processing,  nor  contain  anything 
resembling processing itself. For regal  cognitive processes such  as memory, 
4language, and categorization, action can be seen as relatively irrelevant. The 
movements marshaled  by motor processes  are just a  minor “design issue.” 
Hook  up  any  machinery  you  want,  its  functioning  will  be  slave  to  the 
decisions made by these processes.
Despite  the  growing  evidence  adduced  by  the  perceptual-motor 
movement, the reigning attitude is just that: Action is not much relevant to 
cognition. The upshot of this attitude, only a slight caricature of the theoretical 
status quo, is that action phenomena have become a lesser-studied aspect of 
human psychology. Why would decades of theorizing in cognitive psychology 
proceed without regard to output processes? Recently, Rosenbaum (2005) has 
proposed six hypotheses that may account for the relatively low status action 
has in psychology. Two of these hypotheses are particularly apt here. 
The  ﬁrst  he  dubs  the  “too-hard-to-study”  hypothesis.  One  possible 
explanation for the lack of attention is that action and motor control are too 
complex  and  variable  to  study  at  any  level  beyond  the  barest  detail. 
Rosenbaum  dismisses  this  explanation --  the history of psychology reveals 
innumerable  cases  in  which  sufﬁcient  curiosity  drove  innovation.  This 
innovation  opens  both  technical  and  conceptual  routes  to  understanding 
phenomena that interest experimentalists. 
The second hypothesis, “think-before-you-act,” is one that Rosenbaum 
feels more successfully accounts for the neglect: All interesting psychological 
phenomena have come and gone by the time action is executed. He notes that 
perception and  cognition enjoy a higher status than action because they are 
more  often  associated  with  intelligent  behavior.  Perceptual  processes  like 
visual object recognition, or cognitive ones like categorization, can presumably 
be studied  without any thought of their associated motor accompaniments. 
5While he sees this hypothesis as a more plausible explanation for neglecting 
action, he contends that action has served many important functions  in the 
study  of  both  perception  and  cognition  (such  as  embodied  sentence 
processing, described previously). The short shrift is thus undeserved. 
It is likely that both hypotheses explain some of the neglect of action in 
cognitive science. Both are historically tied to two closely related assumptions 
about how we decide on the subject matter of psychology, and the means by 
which it is studied. The basis for “think-before-you-act” is likely born of a very 
long  tradition  in  western  philosophy  and  science  about  the  nature  of  the 
human  faculty  for  thinking.  It  has  provided  entrenched  but  sometimes 
implicit  approaches  to  specifying  the  subject  matter  of  psychology.  These 
approaches have placed emphasis on behavior that appears irrelevant to its 
precise physical manifestation, and can supposedly be studied independently 
of the body through which  this  behavior takes  place.  Problem solving, for 
example, just happens to have a lot more to do with your cranial contents than 
your ﬁngernails -- moreover, the function of cranial contents can be couched in 
a computational  vocabulary explaining this behavior  without regard  to the 
physical instantiation of the cranial contents themselves (more on this below).
The basis for “too-hard-to-study” may be argued to be, at least in the 
emerging sciences of the mind, an implication of “think-before-you-act.” This   
second hypothesis recommends that there are only certain manners in which 
the subject matter can be studied. The approach typically precludes data that 
are inherently related physical properties of action (particularly because such a 
data source is too noisy and multifarious; see below). Rosenbaum notes a few 
cases  in  which  dependent  measures  drawn  from  action  reveal  cognitive 
processes, thus substantiating that action gets a short shrift. Without a detailed 
6consideration of his examples and their implications, however, his point may 
be misinterpreted as trivial: Any behavioral experimentation must involve an 
action-based  dependent  measure  somehow  (i.e.,  the  observables).  The 
inﬂuence  of  these  “too-hard-to-study”  and  “think-before-you-act”  bases  is 
rather more speciﬁc -- the dynamic or “internal” characteristics of a response 
are considered unimportant to the study of cognition. The subject matter of 
psychology  cannot  have  much  to  do  with  detailed  dynamic  response 
characteristics,  because  these  characteristics  cannot  reﬂect  the  processes 
suggested  for study by the “think-before-you-act”  hypothesis.  Thus,  at  the 
very point at which action is initiated, thinking is over, and the separate world 
of action has begun.
Below I give a selective historical survey justifying this interpretation of 
the theoretical status quo: The view that what psychologists study -- thinking, 
reasoning, remembering, etc. -- takes place before action is initiated, and can 
proceed  even  without  any  action  at  all.  Thus,  how  psychologists  study 
thinking  cannot  involve  action  inherently.  In  other  words:  Thinking  can 
happen  without  a  body.  Or  at  least,  the  body  is  trivial,  being  only  an 
encasement  of  the thinking  mind.  How  did  we  get  here? The next  section 
reveals that this attitude emerges from a long and strong intellectual tradition. 
Laying  out the tradition might begin  with the seemingly simplest question 
about cognitive science’s subject matter: Where does thinking take place?
The “wheres” and wares of thinking
With little hesitation, most people would point to their head if asked “Where 
does  thinking  happen?”  Notwithstanding  the  occasional  humor  about 
7individual differences in this location, sincere respondents would supply this 
answer  even  when  they  have  little  familiarity  with  the  relevant  sciences. 
Discoveries  of  brain  function  are now comfortably tucked  into the broader 
public knowledge about cognitive function. Such knowledge is perhaps taken 
for granted, given that thought was once thought to take place in the heart 
(French,  1978;  but maybe  it  has  something  to do  with  it,  Clark,  Naritoku, 
Smith,  Browning, &  Jensen,  1999), and  the  brain  was once thought to be a 
sophisticated cooling device (e.g., Aristotle’s “radiator theory”; maybe it was, 
Fialkowski, 1986). 
This question about the “wheres” of thought is possibly the easiest of 
all  to  answer.  The  “whats,  hows,  and  whys”  are  considerably  more 
complicated. This is not just because locating is a more intuitive or concrete 
task -- the answer also comes from a strong basis in evidence. Paralysis does 
not  extinguish  thought.  When  even  the  senses  are  drastically  diminished, 
there can be normal  capacity for thought, or sometimes a seemingly greater 
than  normal  capacity (e.g.,  Keller,  1903).  We  can  talk  ourselves  through  a 
problem  without  seeming  to  move  a  muscle.  These  and  many  other 
observations naturally motivate the conclusion that the wider body does not 
harbor  thinking.  Such  a  conclusion  is  fairly  obvious  when  intuitive 
assumptions about the (perhaps) more important questions are adopted -- the 
whats and  hows and  whys  of  thinking. These  more troublesome questions 
have answers that might inﬂuence the response to where thinking happens. 
What  thinking  is,  how  it  happens,  and  why,  seem  to  have  a  certain 
epistemological primacy over the wheres of thinking. Once one has some of 
their answers, they may recommend differing emphases on cranial contents, 
and their host body. 
8Probably the most prominent and  so-far successful  approach to what 
thinking is derives from the metaphor of a computing machine. Some have 
incorrectly asserted that this idea is unfashionable (e.g., Pinker, 1997). It is in 
fact born of a long and inﬂuential intellectual lineage. The notion that a logical 
computing  machine  characterizes human  thinking  has,  some would  argue, 
changed somewhat in form, but mostly in content, since at least Aristotle (e.g., 
Barendregt,  1997;  Bochenski,  1951;  Lukasiewicz,  1951;  Rayside  & 
Kontogiannis, 2001). Aristotle’s and other ancient ideas of human reasoning 
look  very  much  like  the  propositional  structures  manipulated  by  an 
information-processing  module  of  recent  conception  (Fodor,  1983;  Pinker, 
1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Given the Hellenic roots  of symbolic logic, 
and the central role of symbolic logic in the emergence of computing, it should 
come as little surprise that such a system as the Aristotelian syllogism is not 
far  from  production  rules  employed  by  symbolic  cognitive  models  (e.g., 
Anderson,  1993;  Schank  &  Abelson,  1977).  These  ancient  systems  of  logic 
waited for thousands of years until Boole and others (Kneale, 1948) to ﬁnd an 
explicit  formalization.  This  symbolic  logic,  with  its  discrete  structures  and 
operations,  has  become perhaps the central  focus of  information-processing 
approaches to cognitive processes (Anderson, 1980; Anderson & Bower, 1973; 
Bechtel, Abrahamsen, & Graham, 1998; Neisser, 1967, 1976; Newell, Shaw, & 
Simon,  1958).  The  inﬂuence  of  Aristotle  and  other  ancient  logicians  thus 
served  to  frame  the  nature  of  human  reason.  This  tradition,  ancient  and 
robust, thus underlies the current computational approach to the mind.
“Classical”  cognitive science was born of this metaphor for thinking. 
Both conceptual and technical innovation in the twentieth-century permitted 
the  development  of  systems  whose  behavior  resembled  human  reasoning 
9(Newell,  Shaw,  &  Simon,  1958).  For  example,  Newell  and  Simon  (1956) 
developed a  famous  system that proved  logical  theorems, sometimes more 
elegantly than humans (Bechtel, et al., 1998). This system would not have been 
possible without the conceptual  contributions  of  Turing and  von Neumann 
(Anderson,  1980;  Bechtel,  et  al.,  1998),  and  their  subsequent  application  in 
implemented computing systems. These intelligent computing systems, in a 
very  real  sense,  are  the  progeny  of  this  ancient  conception  of  human 
reasoning, one that has existed uninterrupted from Aristotle to Chomsky. One 
could argue that it has always been the reigning metaphor, turned into science 
with the advent of computing systems, and cognitive science (see Smith, 1991, 
for a collection of relevant papers). 
This  line of thinking about  thinking has  often  accompanied  another 
prominent line of thought. Another related historical trend concerns the role of 
the  body  and  environment  underlying  thinking:  They  are  of  limited 
importance. A prominent and again Hellenic example of this is Plato’s theory 
of forms.  The central  theory  of  Plato’s  holds  that the  world  of  perceptual 
objects is changing and illusory -- that some other realm of objects, the realm 
of immutable eternal  forms, is the  only  genuine reality. In  fact,  we cannot 
perceive these forms in the sensory sense, but only through operation of the 
intellect can we be aware of them. The realm of forms is the unchanging basis 
or “blueprint” for the ephemeral world of things (Edman, 1928; Stokes, 2002). 
As  Plato’s  famous  allegory of the cave  illustrates, the realm of  forms casts 
shadows into the perceptible world, which are imperfect representations of 
these eternal forms. The eyes are imprisoned by these worldly representations, 
but the intelligent mind  can escape them by recollection  of forms  or ideas. 
Imagine the back of a cave, towards which numerous prisoners are forced to 
10face. Light from a ﬁre, behind the prisoners, is cast onto this cave wall, and 
between it and the prisoners puppeteers act out sequences of events that the 
prisoners can recognize. The prisoners mistake the shadows for the true realm. 
There  is  a  realm  representing  the  actual  nature  of  the  shadows,  and  the 
shadows are mere imperfect projections from this realm onto the cave wall.
This allegory starkly captures some modern intuitions of the role of the 
body  and  environment  in  cognitive  processing.  Consider  for  example 
Chomsky’s well-known linguistic dichotomy, now referred to as E-language 
and I-language (Chomsky, 1986). E-language refers to language as manifested 
in  the  world  of  linguistic  experience  -- it  is  messy,  ﬁlled  with  false  starts, 
grammatical errors, and so on (Chomsky, 1965). I-language, by contrast, is our 
unsullied  implicit  knowledge  of  language.  I-language  starts  its  life  as  a 
universal  and genetically prescribed  device that  can sift through  the messy 
external language, and descend onto a stable state (which is simply a speciﬁed 
variation of the universal initial state, or universal grammar). The relationship 
between  Plato  and  Chomsky is  no coincidence.  Descartes,  another  thinker 
who emphasized the same limitations of sensory experience and  the role of 
some immutable creator and the mind’s capacity for his (or her) detection, is 
the namesake of one of Chomsky’s well-known volumes (Chomsky, 1966).
Chomsky’s arguments that our language faculty is an independent and 
innate  subsystem  contributed  to  a  powerful  theoretical  trend  in  cognitive 
science.  The  trend  is  best  illustrated  by Fodor’s  inﬂuential  framework for 
cognition (Fodor, 1983), which has served as a powerful theoretical guide for 
the developing years of cognitive science (Applebaum, 1998). The trend in fact 
imports  the  independence  of  language  (from  the  world  of  experience  or 
performance)  into  other  cognitive  architectures:  The  whole  mind  actually 
11consists  of  distinctly  separable  subsystems  that  not  only  can  be  studied 
independently,  but  in  fact  operate  largely  independently  except  for  a  few 
conveniently  designed  interfaces.  Fodor  now  notes  that  there  are  inherent 
limitations to this perspective, but contends that it remains the most successful 
and hopeful perspective on cognition (Fodor, 2000), and numerous researchers 
have pressed its usefulness (Carey, 1985; Marcus, 2001; Pinker, 1997; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992).
There is a strong relationship between these two trends -- thinking as 
computation, and the realm of perceptual-motor experience as ill-suited for it. 
By conceiving of thinking as proceeding through logical computation, systems 
have long been couched in terms of language-like symbols whose origin, such 
as through learning, seems difﬁcult to explain. Some have suggested radical 
nativist proposals about semantics  to accommodate this (e.g., Fodor,  1981). 
The  realm  of  perceptual-motor  experience  seems  quite  distant  from  these 
informational  structures -- and  are relegated to “transductor” and “effector” 
processes that don’t inherently participate in central processing (Fodor, 1983). 
What  is  thinking,  then?  The  long  intellectual  tradition  surveyed 
selectively here shows a prominent role for discrete, logical computation over 
symbols and their relations. In addition, this nature of thinking recommends a 
lesser role for perceptual-motor processes -- the cognitive “realm of forms” is 
discretely bounded by its input and output, processes that independently sort 
out the messy realm of experience. The brain is now known to be the wheres 
of thinking. It now provides the physical substrate of the cognitive realm of 
forms, housed in a body whose functions are slavishly devoted to this central 
realm. 
12Recasting the “whats” and “hows” of thinking
When distinguished  discretely from the bodily input-output  machinery, the 
computational  procedures  underlying  cognitive  processes  give  way  to  the 
property of multiple realizability: Computational procedures are expressed in 
descriptive systems  that can  be  realized in any hardware.  This functionalist 
approach to cognition -- conceiving thinking just as the appropriate mediation 
of input and output (Putnam, 1967) -- does not lend itself to concern with the 
precise  physical  substrate  of  that  input-output  mediation.  As  long  as  the 
causal  relations  are  preserved  between  internal  cognitive  states  so  as  to 
generate reliable input-output relations, it in fact does not matter how they are 
physically realized. As oft-noted, thinking as computation can occur in silicon-
based  or  carbon-based  creatures,  or  perhaps,  even  instantiated  by  entire 
populations  of  individuals  (Block,  1980,  who  uses  this  example  to  argue 
against  functionalism),  or perhaps  exhibited  at an  excruciatingly  long time 
scale by trees and plants (Dennett, 1996). 
Functionalism  has  been  frequently  challenged  (e.g.,  Block,  1980; 
Churchland, 1986) -- very often under the guise of debates regarding “symbol 
grounding.” One of the most famous critiques is Searle’s well-known thought 
experiment (Searle, 1984), in which a functionalist conception of intelligence is 
shown to be unintuitive. Another is to note that while multiple realizability of 
may be true of abstract computation generally, it becomes false when we settle 
on a more speciﬁc model system (e.g., human cognition, chimp cognition, etc.; 
see also Bitterman, 1960, who argues that such a speciﬁc approach is ideal in 
animal learning and behavior). In other words, human cognition is physically 
realized,  and  information-processing  in  humans  can  be  identiﬁed  with 
13particular  physical  processes  (Bechtel  &  Mundale,  1999).  For  example,  the 
operation of the visual system can be understood in terms of simple and more 
complex feature processing in speciﬁc neural hardware.
Another way of accomplishing a critique of functionalism is to recast 
the  whats  and  hows  of  thinking,  placing  them  not  in  an  abstract 
computational framework that hopes to capture intelligent human behavior as 
we  see  it  fully  developed  in  adulthood,  but  rather  in  a  framework  that 
visualizes  the  evolution  or  development  of  this  behavior. An  evolutionary 
perspective is perhaps  particularly effective in accomplishing this recasting. 
Braitenberg’s (1984) celebrated thought experiment helps with this.
The  thought  experiment  works  this  way.  Imagine  designing  a  very 
simple machine or vehicle, equipped with, to begin, a sensor and a motor. The 
sensor is designed to activate the motor in the presence of some stimulus, such 
as a light. As a consequence, the vehicle will move towards this light source.
Imagine  adding two  sensors,  one on  either  side  of  the  front  of  the 
vehicle (much like headlights), and two motors (much like back tires). The left 
sensor  is  attached  to  the  left  motor,  and  the  right  sensor  and  motor  are 
attached (one-to-one parallel connections). In the presence of light, the vehicle 
will now move away from the stimulus, since the closest sensor-motor pair to 
the stimulus will cause the vehicle to veer away.
Now  imagine  making  further  modiﬁcations  to  the  vehicles.  For 
example, try moving the left motor to the right side (and the right to the left 
side),  while  maintaining  their  original  connections  (this  could  be 
accomplished  by  crossing  the  connections,  instead).  This  time,  the  closest 
sensor will cause the opposite motor to activate, bringing the vehicle closer to 
the light.
14Braitenberg continues in this line, making gradual modiﬁcations to the 
vehicles  to cause  them  to  generate  more  and  more  complex  behavior.  He 
argues  that through the law of “downhill  design,  and uphill  analysis,”  we 
might  start  attributing  complex  internal  processes  to  these  creatures.  For 
example, the above vehicles  exemplify the rudiments of fear and attraction. 
Addition of novel components, such as associative neural hardware, remains 
intrinsically intertwined in the sensory and motor machinery of the vehicles. 
While  the  internal  workings  become  more  complex,  the behaviors  become 
even more so -- and what can appear a relatively simple modiﬁcation to the 
inner workings of the vehicles, can suddenly appear ruminative, passionate, 
affectionate, etc. 
The  resulting  interpretation  of  uphill  analysis  is  not  necessarily  a 
mischaracterization.  In  fact,  Braitenberg’s  likely  original  motivation  is  to 
reveal how our own or other creatures’ complex behavior may be the result of 
only small  and  simple design  modiﬁcations (such  as through  evolution or 
development).  This  is  just what  such  things as  “desire”  and  “hunger” and 
“affection” might be: “Let the problem of the mind dissolve in your mind.” (p. 
1)
To  make  the  point  relevant  to  current  discussion,  we  can  focus  on 
Braitenberg’s  initial,  simplest  vehicle.  This  vehicle,  exhibiting  the  simplest 
kind  of  attraction to a stimulus,  is  composed  just  of  perceptual  and motor 
components  --  and  of  course  a  needed  external  stimulus  to  generate  its 
behavior.  The  system  is  closed  not  by  an  abstract  rule  that  describes  or 
explains the system, but is only fully accounted for by the closed system of 
stimulus-sensor-motor that feed into each other continuously. The “thoughts” 
15of this vehicle are in fact nothing but the interaction between perception and 
motor systems in the context of the external stimulus.
While  the  vehicles  become  more  complex,  one  recognizes  that 
“thinking”  is  always  the  mediation  of  sensor  and  motor  components, 
producing complicated  behavior patterns.  Classical computational  cognitive 
science recommends  employing a  computation-based vocabulary to explain 
the  behavior  of  these  vehicles.  This  descriptive  system  may  work. 
Nevertheless, Braitenberg’s experiments show that rules are only descriptively 
employed  post  hoc  -- through the uphill  route of analysis --  to subsequent 
vehicles.  The  matter  of  fact  of  subsequent  vehicular  cognitive  processes  is 
simply the small but important modiﬁcations to the mediation of perceptual-
motor  systems.  The  “thinking”  is  thus  never  torn  from  concern  with 
perception  and  action.  Each  subsequent  addition  or  modiﬁcation  must 
maintain how the previous instantiations accomplished this mediation.
Mental processing in the most advanced vehicles may in fact look like 
the  ruminative  behaviors  of  human  beings.  Nevertheless,  because  we 
designed  these vehicles, we  recognize that  “thinking”  is  only conveniently 
described  as  a  set  of  rules,  when  we  know  that  thinking  is  actually  the 
“complexiﬁcation”  of  perceptual-motor  mediation  --  the  internal  workings 
may  become  more  complex,  but  they  are  from  the  outset  designed  to 
appropriately  generate  mediation  between  the  speciﬁc  perceptual  and  motor 
systems composing the creatures. 
This example serves to recast what “thinking” is in design terms -- or, if 
you like, in terms of surprisingly small modiﬁcations to an organism through 
the  course  of  evolutionary  or  developmental  change.  Despite  its  potential 
intuitive power, it suffers some limitations. First, the notion of design may be a 
16substantial  simpliﬁcation  (Gould, 2002;  but  see  Dennett,  1995).  Secondly, it 
does not supply a structured  argument for maintaining a deep  connectivity 
between the body and  the central  processes of thought. It simply serves to 
“pump  the  intuition”  (Dennett,  1988)  about  how  the  systems  underlying 
complex behavior are ever intertwined in perceptual-motor processes. Despite 
this,  something  not  unlike  it  has  formed  the  basis  of  Brooks’  well-known 
research  program  for  artiﬁcial  intelligence  (Brooks,  1995).  The  thought 
experiment may therefore carry some strong intuitive force, while not having 
a complete absence of applicability.
Continuity of perceptual-motor processes and thinking: Chapters 2-5
The  separation  of  mind  and  body  can  be  saved  even  in  this  scenario  by 
proposing predictions about the evolution of the internal mediating processes. 
The separation predicts that evolutionary changes led to centralized thinking 
processes  that  become  gradually  modularized,  and  independent  of  input-
output  mechanisms.  Thus  in  the Braitenberg thought  experiment,  one may 
simply say that, through a sufﬁciently large number of vehicle generations, we 
may obtain a modular architecture, in which the original sensors and motors 
are discretely distinct from central processing. The human cognitive system 
could be such an architecture.
But this  recasting of  what thinking is, and  how  it  occurs in the real 
world  and  changes  over  evolutionary  time,  suggests  another  radical 
perspective on information ﬂow from perceptual processes into motor action. 
If  one  accepts  a  strong  interpretation  of  Braitenberg’s  experiment,  the 
vehicular  evolution  never  “severs”  perception  and  action  from  cognition.   
17Adjustment  of  the  vehicles’  perception-action  mediation  may  develop 
centralized  thinking  processes  that  remain  inherently  tied  to  information 
about  perception  and  action.  Thus,  subtle  characteristics  of  the input  to  a 
vehicle “echo” all the way into motor processes. The idea behind this has been 
called the “continuity of mind” (Spivey, 2006), and is further supported by a 
consideration of the very machinery on which our cognitive system is based: 
The dynamic ﬂow of stimulus energy (e.g., Gibson, 1979), the dynamical and 
fractal  nature of  neural  ﬁring patterns  (e.g.,  Teich, 1989),  and  the  complex 
interplay with continuously changing motor output (Kelso, 1996). Cognition 
might live in this continuity, and  the idea that the body’s input and  output 
processes are severed from the cognitive processes is a ﬁction that has so far 
conveniently served explanation, but is of only limited importance as we focus 
on the continuous, temporal, dynamic nature of cognitive processing.
The  next  four  chapters  of  this  work  seek  to  support  this  radical 
suggestion  of  the  continuity  between  perceptual-motor  processes  and 
cognition, even in a relatively complex cognitive process. In other words, even 
in a Braitenberg vehicle that has reached a very high level  of sophistication, 
the  cognitive  process  generates  motor  movements  that  reﬂect  the  internal 
processing itself: Action  has  not  been severed completely from the internal 
states of the cognitive process. The subsequent chapters do this by focusing on 
the  ﬂow  of  information  from  cognitive  processing  into  action.  Chapter  2 
shows  that  a  high-level  cognitive  process  like  categorization  has  this 
characteristic. Animal  exemplars  of  either  very high  (e.g., cat) or low (e.g., 
whale)  typicality  are  categorized  into  their  superordinate  classes  (i.e., 
mammals). In previous categorization research (reviewed in Chapters 2 and 
4), atypical animals result in slower, less efﬁcient categorization, while more 
18typical  animals  are  quite  readily  categorized.  This  graded  nature  of 
categorization  is  explored  in a  very simple task that  tracks  manual  output 
through  mouse  movements.  Even  after  the  action  has  been  initiated,  four 
experiments  in Chapter 2  reveal  that in  both pictures and  words of animal 
exemplars, motor output itself is graded in this manner: The typicality-based 
effects of categorization are also exhibited in action processes. 
In Chapter 3, some discussion about the role of models in theories is 
discussed,  and  provides  some  theoretical  justiﬁcation  for  developing  a 
computational model of this cognition-action ﬂow of information. Chapter 4 
bears  this out,  and  presents  two simulations  which seek to articulate what 
kind of relationship between cognition and action can produce such graded 
motor  output.  A  prediction  generated  by  the  second  simulation  is 
substantiated in Chapter 5. Typicality gradients among large classes of animal 
exemplars  are  also  revealed  in  motor  output,  showing  that  the  ﬂow  of 
information  into  action  exhibits  these  ﬁner-grained  patterns  of  cognitive 
processing.
The  implications  of  this  research  address  the  theoretical  discussion 
presented  above.  Because  cognitive  processing  is  being  reﬂected  in  action 
processes, it seems that some version of the continuity of mind thesis is the 
“matter of fact” of cognition. The separation of mind and body, while so-far 
useful for a variety of processes, cannot be true under deeper scrutiny of the 
temporal dynamics of perception, action, and cognition. 
19Matters of fact and units of analysis: Chapters 6-7
The ﬁnal two chapters of this work aim to evaluate the nature of this debate 
more broadly. While computational  conceptions of  cognition, and  powerful 
intuitive arguments about continuity, have both been compelling to varying 
numbers of researchers over the decades, the matters of fact of cognition are 
relevant  to  a  very  broad  range  of  domains,  from  memory  to language  to 
perception. This  complexity  precludes  a ﬁnal  decision about which  system 
best  captures  cognitive matters of fact. The last two chapters  consider how 
conciliation  or  competition  between  descriptive  systems  may  be  better 
explored.
Chapter  6  lays  out  the  area  of  symbolic  dynamics  for  conceptual 
purposes  in  cognitive  science.  While  categorization  may  exhibit  this 
gradedness,  the  discrete  and  serial  theoretical  framework  continues  most 
successfully to address other higher-order cognition processes (e.g., problem 
solving).  This  chapter showcases  the  mathematical  framework of  symbolic 
dynamics as a potential means of reconciling debate between these theoretical 
extremes. This set of tools, used  in  a  variety  of physical  and  mathematical 
sciences,  offers  a  formal  terrain  that  can  incorporate  both  discrete  and 
continuous  accounts  of  cognitive processing.  This  mathematical  framework 
may serve to formally adjudicate between them, or indeed  reveal  that both 
kinds of representation are important for explaining cognitive processes.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with an extensive discussion of the 
philosophical  and  theoretical implications of both the research presented in 
Chapters  2-5,  and  the  proposals  for  symbolic  dynamics  in  Chapter  6.  I 
consider a few ways in which the “matters of fact” may reach a consensus. 
20Three  such  possibilities  are  discussed,  guided  partly  by  issues  in  the 
philosophy of science. First, the matters of fact of cognition will  always be 
“underdetermined” given any or all the evidence available. In other words, 
there will always be disputes about how cognition actually, in reality, works. 
We will not enjoy the satisfaction of a consensus. The second possible outcome 
is that cognitive science will be happy with the plurality of models -- both in 
number and kind -- in its various subdomains. This contentment will permit 
matters  of  fact  to  simply  be  relevant  to  the  successful  model  in  a  given 
domain.  Such  a  “metaphysical  pluralism”  urges  that  matters  of  fact  are 
obtained  across  a whole  range  of  domains  of  inquiry.  The third  draws  on 
Chapters 2-5, and argues for continuity based on an “enhanced reductionism.”
Instead of embracing any one of these approaches, I will argue that all 
three are not very satisfying. I present a fourth option in which this debate 
regarding matters of fact can be reduced to units of analysis, and the goals of a 
particular  analysis  over  those  units.  Again  drawing  on  discussion  in  the 
philosophy of science, I will be somewhat dismissive of matters of fact, and 
propose  a  pragmatic  solution.  The  goals  of  cognitive  science  are  not  to 
discover  matters  of fact,  but to solve particular problems within  particular 
domains. The upshot: Matters of fact don’t matter.
21CHAPTER TWO
Graded Motor Responses in the Time Course of 
Categorizing Atypical Exemplars 
 Introduction
The  past  few  decades  have  seen  a  transition  from  classical  set  theoretic 
accounts  of  categorization,  wherein  cognitive  processes  and  categories  are 
seen as discretely bounded with unique membership, into the development of 
nuanced theories of fuzzy categories and their interrelationships. For example, 
Reed  (1972),  Rosch  (1975;  1973),  and  Rips,  Shoben,  and  Smith  (1973) 
challenged  the classical  conception of category structure early on, revealing 
that more graded semantic-space effects are readily observable, and not easily 
accountable  in  terms  of  classical  conceptions  (e.g.,  Bruner,  Goodnow,  & 
Austin, 1956; Collins & Quillian, 1969). The emerging probabilistic prototype 
framework has also faced challenges from alternative accounts. An exemplar-
based theory of categories is often argued to account for a wider set of data 
(Medin  &  Schaffer,  1978;  Nosofsky,  1988,  1992;  Medin  &  Ross,  1989;  see 
recently, Storms, 2005; see Smith, 2002, for an opposing perspective). Aspects 
of these similarity-based  accounts, both  prototype  and  exemplar,  have  also 
been suggested to ﬁgure into a theory-based theory of category structure in 
our cognitive system (Medin, 1989; Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Medin, 1985; see, 
e.g.,  Heit,  1994;  Burnett,  Medin,  Ross,  &  Blok,  2005  and  Lynch,  Coley,  & 
Medin,  2000).  Despite  this  multiple  branching  of  theoretical  directions, 
experimental  methodologies  had  remained  largely unchanged.  The  upshot, 
until recently, is that the time course of  processing  in categorization had  been 
22underexplored, compared to the development of theories regarding the static 
representation of category knowledge.  
There is a growing body of research devoting itself to this question. The 
time course of categorization phenomena has begun to receive some attention, 
from perceptual categorization (Ashby, Boynton, & Lee, 1994; Lamberts, 1995, 
2000;  Nosofsky  &  Palmeri,  1997),  to  categorical  perception  of  speech 
(McMurray & Spivey, 1999; McMurray, Tanenhaus, Aslin, & Spivey, 2003) and 
lexical  processing  (e.g.,  Cree,  McRae,  &  McNorgan,  1999).  Most  of  these 
experiments  have  made  use  of  reaction-time  measures.    For  example, 
Lamberts (2000) introduces an information-accumulation account of speeded 
classiﬁcation of objects (see also Ashby et al., 1994; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). 
These investigations of the time course of categorization seek to supplement 
research  that  has  generally  placed  more  emphasis  on  the  outcome  of  the 
process, rather than its continuous temporal dynamics (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 
1997).  Decision  models  of  categorization,  like  Lamberts’  (2000,  2002)  and 
Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997), uncover the time course of the process leading 
up to the button-press response.
It is possible, however, that the motor output of the decision process 
itself  also  exhibits  graded  effects  over time,  providing  further information 
about  the continuous  nature of the  process.  For example,  McMurray et al. 
(2003) used eye-movement data to investigate the graded temporal dynamics 
of speech sound classiﬁcation over the course of several hundred milliseconds. 
Similarly,  Nederhouser  and  Spivey  (2004)  used  eye-movement  patterns  to 
show  competition  between  alternative  taxonomic  classiﬁcations  of  atypical 
animals.  When given a toy whale to categorize by dropping it in either the 
“ﬁsh”  bucket  or  the  “mammal”  bucket,  participants  frequently  ﬁxated  the 
23“ﬁsh” bucket ﬁrst, before then ﬁxating the “mammal” bucket for guiding the 
hand  movement.  These  kinds  of  eye  movement  data  represent  “micro-
decisions”  that  are  tentative  intermediate  emissions  from  a  categorization 
process that is extended in time (Richardson, Dale, & Spivey, in press; see also 
Rehder & Hoffman, in press).
Motor  responses  of  this  kind  epitomize  what  is  often  considered 
“output” from cognitive processes, the outcome of a pipeline from perceptual 
processes,  through  association cortex,  into premotor regions, then collapsed 
into individual manual and oculomotor choice behaviors. More recent work 
on manual and oculomotor movements suggests that these manual processes 
are  contiguous  with  cognitive  processes  (Gold  &  Shadlen,  2001;  Shin  & 
Rosenbaum, 2002). The eye-movement patterns themselves offer an unusually 
early glimpse into partially-active “micro-decisions” in motor output (cf. Gold 
& Shadlen, 2000; Magnuson, 2005). Unfortunately, the ballistic quality of most 
saccades  prevents  them from  being  able  to  exhibit  truly  graded  effects  of 
partially  activated  representations.  On  any  given  trial,  participants  either 
ﬁxate the competing object or they don’t.  The eye movement data are usually 
not able to show continuous attraction effects within a trial (but cf. Doyle & 
Walker,  2001).  In  contrast,  non-ballistic  arm  movements  regularly  involve 
curvature  that  reveals  continuous  attraction  effects  (Goodale,  Pélisson,  & 
Prablanc, 1986). In fact, continuous manual motor output has been studied for 
the very  purpose of providing a  variety of  clues  about  graded  underlying 
cognitive processes within individual trials. For example, Abrams and Balota 
(1991;  see  also Coles,  Gratton,  Bashore, Eriksen,  & Donchin, 1985)  used  an 
arbitrary  manual  response  task  (pulling a  handle to  the  right  or  left) in  a 
lexical decision and recognition memory test. The frequency of lexical items 
24and strength of recognition memory were strongly associated with a shorter 
time spent pulling the handle to its limit (i.e., greater force and  velocity of 
pull), independent of the latency of response onset. The authors recommend 
that anticipation components of response preparation and force and velocity 
parameters  of  motor  execution  must  ﬁgure  into  our  understanding  of 
cognitive  processing.  Similarly,  Spivey,  Grosjean,  and  Knoblich  (2005) used 
computer-mouse trajectories to study spoken word recognition. In individual 
trials, subjects heard instructions such as “Click the candle,” and selected one 
of two objects in two corners of a computer monitor. Trials in which the two 
objects  had  similar-sounding  names  (e.g.,  a  candle  and  a  candy)  revealed 
mouse-movement trajectories that exhibited signiﬁcant attraction toward the 
competing  object,  compared  to  control  trials  (e.g.,  a  candle  and  a  spoon). 
Computer-mouse  trajectories  thereby  revealed  continuous  dynamic  partial 
activation  of  multiple  competing  representations  during  real-time  spoken 
word  recognition  (see  also Allopenna,  Magnuson,  &  Tanenhaus,  1998,  for 
related eye-movement results).  
The  time  course  of  categorization  is  a  suitable  model  system  for 
understanding the interaction among different processes as cognition unfolds 
(e.g.,  memory  and  attention;  see  Lamberts,  2000,  for  a  discussion).  For 
example,  feature-sampling  models  of  the  time  course  of  categorization 
contribute  to  understanding  not  simply  categorization  outcomes,  but  also 
predictive or  explanatory systems  accounting for reaction-time measures in 
these  studies,  and  how  these  measures  reﬂect  perceptual  information 
accumulation used in categorization (e.g., Lamberts, 2000, 2002). In the present 
case, four experiments reveal that categorization as a cognitive process ﬂows 
into, rather than collapses onto, the effectors responsible for manual action. 
25The  goal  of the current paper  is to demonstrate, via  continuous  computer-
mouse trajectories, that graded representations of this kind are also involved 
in  the  real-time  taxonomic  categorization  of  animal  names  and  animal 
pictures. It is suggested that the temporal dynamics of matching a category 
exemplar  to  one  of  its  potential  categories  exhibits  a  degree  of 
“granularity” (Miller, 1982; Miller & Ulrich, 2003) that may be problematic for 
a discrete representational account of the categorization process. We present 
four experiments tracking continuous manual motor output during lexical and 
perceptual  categorization  of  atypical  exemplars.  This  work  adds  a  new 
methodology to the study of the time course of categorization, and contributes 
to  further  specifying  the  processes  by  which  the  mind  settles  onto  one 
categorical  response  versus  another.  These  experiments  illustrate  how  the 
gradual accumulation of evidence for a given category is not solely composed 
of  that  category’s  representation  transitioning  from  zero  activation  to  full 
activation. As in many complex dynamical systems, there is also competition 
from alternative category representations that are partially active at the same 
time.  Much  like  a  dynamical  system  continuously  traversing  its  high-
dimensional  semantic  space  over  time,  the  trajectory  of  the  categorization 
process reveals that multiple categories (attractor basins) are nearly visited as 
the system eventually settles into a unique outcome-based response. 
Experiment 1
Typicality  has  become  one  of  the  most  thoroughly  studied  aspects  of 
categories  and  concepts  since  the  transition  from  classical  perspectives 
(Medin,  1989;  Murphy,  2002).  The  empirical  drive  towards  non-classical 
26accounts of categories was guided by studies of membership and  typicality 
judgments  and  corresponding  reaction-time  measures  (e.g.,  McCloskey  & 
Glucksberg, 1978; Rips et al., 1973; Rosch, 1975). Category members deemed 
more  typical  are  recognized  faster  (Rips  et  al.,  1973),  more  consistently 
(McCloskey &  Glucksberg, 1978), have many features in common (Rosch & 
Mervis,  1975),  and  can  even  result  in  facilitated  language  comprehension 
(Garrod & Sanford, 1977; see Murphy, 2002, chapter 2, for a review of these 
and  other  robust  results).  Recent  research  on  categories  and  concepts  has 
continued this emphasis (e.g., Burnett et al., 2005; Estes, 2003; Murphy & Ross, 
2005; Op de Beeck and Wagemans, 2002; Smith, 2002; Verbeemen, Storms, & 
Verguts,  2003).  For  example,  Burnett  et  al.  (2005)  revealed  that  typicality 
ratings  of  various ﬁsh  species  are  guided  by knowledge-level  expectations 
regarding  ﬁsh,  rather  than a  simple notion  of  category centrality (see  also 
Lynch, et al., 2000).  Smith (2002) recently used expected patterns of typicality 
across  category members as a focal  point for theoretical debate, such as the 
effectiveness of exemplar-based perspectives. Typicality is thus central to our 
categorizing capacities, but  also useful  as a  crucial  measure for comparing 
opposing theories.
In  the  following  4  experiments,  we  utilize  an  animal  stimulus  set 
(words  and  pictures)  whose  elements  differ  in  typicality.  We  used  a  small 
stimulus set of well-known animals that are either highly typical members of a 
category (dog  as mammal), or those widely regarded  as  atypical  (penguin as 
bird). In this ﬁrst experiment, we recorded continuous manual responses in a 
categorization task. Participants performed a simple judgment: After seeing an 
animal word, participants clicked on one of two category labels to which the 
animal belongs. Some trials involved animals of an atypical nature – such as a 
27whale, which has several properties that suggest another category label (ﬁsh), 
potentially causing  competition  with  the correct  label  (mammal).  Just  as  in 
Spivey et al. (2005), echoes of a competitive categorization process should be 
reﬂected in continuous mouse movements. In other words, when categorizing 
whale as mammal, participants’ mouse trajectories should gravitate toward the 
competing category (ﬁsh) more so than when categorizing a typical exemplar 
label, such as cat.
Participants
41 undergraduate participants signed up for this experiment for extra credit in 
their psychology classes. All participants in this and subsequent experiments 
used their right hand to perform the task.
Materials
Word stimuli were presented using PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, 
Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Participants were faced with the task of choosing the 
appropriate category for each animal word, presented in text on the monitor.   
These categories included  pairings  of  the  following: mammal, reptile,  bird, 
ﬁsh, amphibian, and insect.
There were two within-subject conditions. In control trials, the animal 
words  were  typical  category  members  (e.g.,  cat  as  mammal).    In  the 
experimental  trials,  they were  atypical  category  members  (e.g.,  penguin  as 
bird), and both the correct category name and the featurally-similar competing 
category  name  were  presented  (bird  and  ﬁsh,  respectively).   Although  we 
28assume that typicality of category membership is a graded parameter, the two-
condition  design  of  these  studies  required  that  we  keep  within-group 
variation among stimulus  items to a minimum (particularly in  the  atypical 
animal condition).  Therefore, only 6 highly atypical animals were used in the 
atypical  condition,  with  other  merely  moderately  atypical  animals  being 
excluded from the design.  As typical category members are easier to generate, 
13 highly-typical animals were used for the control condition (see Table 2.1).
Procedure
Participants  were  presented  with  two  different  animal  category  names, 
randomly assigned  to one of the upper corners of a computer screen. After 
2000 ms, a moment to see the category options, the text “Click Here” appeared 
in the bottom center of the screen. The participants were instructed to click 
ﬁrst on that text and wait for an animal word to appear in its place, then to 
click on the upper (left or right) category name that was appropriate for that 
animal. Participants were provided with three practice trials before beginning 
the 19 target trials.  All trials were presented in random order.  
It  was  predicted  that,  in  the  experimental  trials,  mouse  movement 
trajectories would show evidence of competition between the categories.  This 
competition is revealed by analysis of mouse-movement trajectory divergence: 
Atypical animal trials should have movement trajectories that reveal a slight 
bias  towards  the  competing  category  (e.g.,  with  whale,  a  slight  attraction 
toward the category ﬁsh) when compared to control trials. Data for testing this 
prediction  were  collected  by  recording  x  and  y  coordinates  of  mouse-
movement  trajectories.  Due  to  occasional  skipped  samples,  PsyScope’s 
29sampling rate averages approximately 42 Hz. As a result, each trial  collects 
about 40-80 mouse-position data points. 
Data Analysis
Numerous  analyses  were  conducted  on  these  rich  trajectory data.  First,  to 
enable averaging of full trajectories from multiple trials, all trajectories were 
normalized to 101 time steps, and were translated to begin at an x,y coordinate 
of  (0,  0).  These  “time-normalized”  trajectories  can  be  compared  between 
typical and atypical conditions. Divergence of the two averaged trajectories is 
established by signiﬁcant differences between the x-coordinates. 
This ﬁrst analysis provides information regarding the overall shape of 
the trajectories in both trial types. In addition to this time-normalized analysis, 
a  “space-normalized”  analysis  was  run  in  which  beginning  and  end 
coordinates of each trial were normalized to (0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively. Real 
time information  was  retained  by computing x,y coordinates as  they travel 
from 0 to 1 in time bins of 0-500, 500-1000, and 1000-1500 ms. This provides a 
window  onto the movement in real  time from start to ﬁnish of a trial, and 
includes enough data in each time bin to permit an additional statistical test of 
the difference between trial conditions by subjecting these bins to a repeated-
measures ANOVA.
Finally, a number of properties of the trajectories were computed and 
compared  between conditions: mouse-movement  initiation  time,  movement 
duration, total  categorization response time, distance traveled in pixels, and 
direction in degrees  of the ﬁrst pair of mouse movement samples. This last 
measure, initial movement direction in degrees, offers insight into early stages 
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Atypical
Eel (ﬁsh; reptile; mammal) Whale (mammal; ﬁsh; bird)
Sea lion (mammal; ﬁsh; reptile) Penguin (bird; ﬁsh; mammal)
Butterﬂy (insect; bird; reptile) Bat (mammal; bird; reptile)
Typical
Cat (mammal; reptile)  Dog (mammal; insect)
Horse (mammal; bird)  Goldﬁsh (ﬁsh; amphibian)
Salmon (ﬁsh; mammal)  Alligator (reptile; mammal), 
Rabbit (mammal; reptile)  Lion (mammal; ﬁsh)
Hawk (bird; reptile)  Rattlesnake (reptile; amphibian)
Sparrow (bird; mammal)  Shark (ﬁsh; mammal)
Chameleon (reptile; insect)
Table 2.1: Atypical and typical animals/words in Experiments. In parentheses 
are the  response  options  given  to  the  participants,  with  correct  categories 
italicized. Bold options in atypical trials indicate non-competing labels used in 
Experiments 2 and 4.of  the  trial.  For  example,  it  is  possible  that  participants  are  strategically 
moving the mouse cursor along the vertical on all trials before turning in the 
direction of the target category. Angle information on initial movement will 
reveal  whether  this  is  the  case.  Such  a  strategy  would  cause  that  initial 
movement from (0, 0) not to be signiﬁcantly different from 0 off the vertical in 
both typical and atypical conditions. 
These ﬁnal  measures were supplemented by two further analyses: a) 
tests of bimodality in the distribution of trajectory curvatures, and b) a time 
series  analysis  to  explore  the  complexity  of  the  resultant  trajectories.  As 
discussed in Spivey et al. (2005), any pattern of competition seen in atypical 
trials may in fact be the result of an averaged bimodal distribution. If half of 
the correct trials involved movement straight toward the target, and the other 
half  involved  movement  straight  toward  the  competitor,  followed  by  a 
corrective movement toward the target, the average of all trials could appear 
as a graded curvature toward the competitor – when in fact it would be better 
described as the result of a number of trials with rather discrete errors that 
were  corrected  mid-ﬂight.  To  approach  this  problem,  each  trial’s  area  (in 
pixels)  was  computed  between  the  actual  trajectory  and  a  straight  line 
connecting  the  start  and  end  points.  A  distributional  analysis  of  this  area 
should  show  bimodality  if  the  averaged  trajectory’s  apparent  graded 
curvature  is  actually  due  to  occasional  discrete  errors  that  get  sharply 
corrected partway through the movement.  Finally, sample entropy (Richman 
& Moorman, 2000) was used to discern whether atypical trajectories are more 
“complex”  than  typical  trajectories  (see Feldman &  Crutchﬁeld,  1998, for  a 
discussion of complexity measures and their advantages and problems). If the 
competing  category in  the  atypical  trials  is  acting  as  a  substantial  second 
32attractor on the dynamics of manual output, then this stress should be evident 
as  less  smoothness  in  the  trajectories.  Atypical  trials  should  show  more 
complexity, because two attractor forces are acting on them. Sample entropy 
gives a larger value the more “complex” or irregular a time series.  Further 
detail on this measure is presented below.
Results 
Participants  categorized  atypical  exemplars  with 90%  accuracy,  and  typical 
exemplars with 95% accuracy, a signiﬁcant difference (p <  .05). Only correct 
trials were used in the following analyses. All incorrect trials were removed 
from analysis in this and subsequent experiments.
Time-normalized analysis
In this analysis, t-tests were conducted to compare the difference between the 
x-coordinate  values  for  typical  and  atypical  trials  to  zero,  at  each  of  101 
interpolated time-steps throughout the trajectories (see Fig. 2.1A).  Rightward 
and  leftward  responses  were  pooled  to  maximize  statistical  power.   The 
relevant  null  hypothesis  was  that  the  difference  between  the  atypical  and 
typical trajectories’ x-coordinate at any given time step (out of 101) should be 
0.  As a more conservative test, in this and subsequent experiments, a reliable 
divergence  was  deﬁned  as  a  minimum  of  8  consecutive  time  slices  in 
sequence, in which the normalized trajectory differences were signiﬁcant at a 
criterion of p < .05.  This criterion was established by performing a Bootstrap 
of 10,000 simulated experiments of the same mean and standard deviation (see 
Appendix).  Signiﬁcant divergence between trajectories is thus observed when 
33there  is  a  substantial  sequence  of  consecutive  signiﬁcant  t-tests  between 
atypical  and  typical  x-coordinates.   In  this  experiment,  the  trajectories 
exhibited signiﬁcant differences in x-coordinates for 38 consecutive time slices, 
from the 47th to 85th time steps (p’s < .05). 
As an additional statistical test, we computed pooled bins from these 
time-normalized trajectories and conducted a 2 (typical vs. atypical) x 3 (1-33, 
34-67, 68-101 step bins) repeated-measures ANOVA. This test reveals a strong 
effect of trial type (F(1,40) = 21.8, MSe = 1824.8, p < .001), main effect of bin (F
(2,39) = 861.1, MSe = 1916.5, p < .001) and a signiﬁcant interaction (F(2,39) = 
6.2,  MSe  =  783.7,  p  <  .01).  To  reveal  what  portions  of  the  trajectory  are 
exhibiting this divergence, we conducted planned comparisons between trial 
types within each bin. These show a signiﬁcant difference between trial types 
in the second and third bins (p’s < .001). Thus, by the second and ﬁnal third of 
the  time-normalized  trajectories,  atypical  categorization  is  exhibiting 
signiﬁcant divergence in x-coordinate from typical categorization. 
Space-normalized analysis
Fig.  2.1B  shows  a  graph  of  the  trajectories,  from  leftward  and  rightward 
movements, in separate conditions in terms of time bins and normalized pixel 
coordinates.  While the previous analysis preserved raw space and normalized 
time into 101 bins, this analysis preserved real  time and  normalized  spatial 
coordinates  of the mouse from (0, 0) to (1, 1), and pooled these values into 
three time bins: 0-500, 500-1000, and 1000-1500 ms. Once again, absolute left 
and right values of the x-coordinate were pooled for statistical comparison.  A 
similar 2 (trial type) x 3 (time bin) repeated-measures ANOVA was used.  This 
revealed a strong effect of trial type (F(1,37) = 52.3, MSe = .031, p < .001), time 
34bin (F(2,36) = 168.0, MSe = .041, p < .001), and a signiﬁcant interaction between 
time bin and trial type (F(2,36) = 5.2, MSe = .030, p < .05).  Once again, planned 
comparisons were run between types at each time bin to detect what portion 
of the trajectories had signiﬁcant divergence. The difference between the trial 
types was signiﬁcant at every time bin (p’s < .01). 
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Figure 2.1: A) Mean  time-normalized mouse-movement  trajectories  in 
Experiment 1, separated for left- and right-ward responses to the correct 
target.   Atypical  trials  (solid lines) indicate an attraction  towards the 
competing category on the opposite side of the computer screen in the 
101  time  steps.  B)  Mean  mouse-movement  trajectories  in  space-
normalized analyses, with x,y coordinates traveling from (0, 0) to (-1/1, 
1) in time bins: 0-500, 500-1000, and 1000-1500 ms. Atypical trials (solid 
lines) reveal slower movement towards target. Additional measures
The movement duration for atypical trials was 1573 ms, compared to 1338 ms 
for typical trials (t(40) = 3.8, p < .001).  Total categorization time (from animal 
word  onset  to ﬁnal  mouse-click)  for  atypical  animals  was  greater  than for 
typical trials, with 1997 ms and 1807 ms respectively (t(40) = 3.0, p < .01).  Total 
distance traveled also differed signiﬁcantly (atypical: 894 pixels vs. typical: 831 
pixels, t(40) = 3.0, p < .01). Curiously, movement initiation latency showed an 
opposite  pattern,  but was  only marginally signiﬁcant  (atypical:  424 ms  vs. 
typical: 470 ms, t(40) = -1.8, p = .09). An analysis of the initial direction of the 
mouse trajectory, from position (0, 0), extracted a measure in degrees from the 
vertical (from the start-click event).  The typical  trials exhibited a signiﬁcant 
positive angle (toward the target) in a one-sample t-test (null hypothesis that 
degrees are different from 0), with a value of 6.0º, t(40) = 2.6, p < .05.  Atypical 
trials in fact exhibited a slight negative angle (toward the competitor), with -.
99º, but this was not signiﬁcant. 
Item-based  repeated-measures  ANOVAs  were  also  run  using  these 
same  measures.  Both  movement  duration  and  distance  were  marginally 
signiﬁcant in the expected direction (F(1,17) = 3.2, 2.0, MSe = 72125.3, 7685.4, p 
= .09, .08, respectively), with means of atypical trajectories slower in time and 
longer in distance to reach their target. Neither movement initiation latency 
nor  total  response  time  was  signiﬁcant.  These  results  may  be  difﬁcult  to 
interpret  due  to  the  size  of  the  stimulus  set.  However,  the  marginal 
signiﬁcance is  suggestive that  the effects  in the  expected  direction may be 
signiﬁcant with a larger set, while the movement initiation latency is not likely 
to be (F(1,17) =  .8, p =  .38).  Initial angle of movement from vertical  in fact 
shows a marginal difference between conditions in an item-based analysis (F
36(1,17) = 3.4, MSe = 54.3, p = .08), with the typical trials again showing the only 
signiﬁcant difference from 0º at 6.6º, t(12) = 3.1, p < .01.
Two additional analyses were used to reveal more characteristics of the 
trajectories.  First, as  in Spivey et  al.  (2005), we  explored  the  nature  of  the 
distribution  of  curvature  across  all  trajectories.  The  pattern  of  divergence 
(from a straight line) in atypical trials could, in principle, have simply been a 
reﬂection  of  an  averaged  bimodal  distribution.  In  contrast,  there  is  no 
theoretical reason to expect such bimodality in the typical trials. The trial data 
used was the area between the actual trajectory and a straight line from (0, 0) 
to the ﬁnal  click (see Spivey et al., 2005). All  trials across participants  were 
used in order to have sufﬁcient numbers for the statistical test. All area values 
were  converted  into  z-scores,  and  subjected  to  distributional  analyses.  A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  for  a  difference  in  distribution  revealed  no 
difference between typical and atypical trajectories (χ2 = 1.9, p = .79; see Fig. 
2.2).  In  addition,  computed  bimodality  coefﬁcients  for  both  typical  and 
atypical trials were in the unimodal range of <.555 (see Spivey et al., 2005). 
While  typical  (.536)  and  atypical  (.535)  were  close  to  this  cutoff  at  which 
concerns about bimodality may arise, the values are in fact almost identical to 
each other. These results indicate that even if bimodality were a concern, it is 
not exclusive to the atypical trials. 
Finally,  we explored  the  complexity  of  the trajectories  using  a  time  series 
analysis  giving  an  entropy-based  value.  Sample  entropy  (Richman  & 
Moorman, 2000) is computed by comparing windows of size m from a time 
series. A given window is said to be similar to another if their distance is less 
than some  value r, known as the  tolerance. This  is  given  by the following 
37equation, in which two windows (w1 and w2) of size m have a distance equal to 
the maximal difference between paired elements composing them, with w1(i) 
representing the i-th element of window w1:
Sample entropy  is  then  computed  by  taking  the difference  between 
averaged  natural  logarithms  of  counted  similarities  at  size  m  and  m+1.  If, 
when window size is increased, the average number of similarities is similar, 
this value will be low. Conversely, with a higher difference between counts in 
m and m+1, it is less likely that windows similar to each other with size m will 
again be similar at m+1, indicating more irregularity in the time series. For this 
analysis,  we  used  the  time  series  of  a  trial’s  normalized  x-coordinate 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage distribution histogram of z-scores for area in pixels 
in atypical (solid grey distribution) and typical (black outlined distribution) 
superimposed.  Distribution  analysis  reveals  no  signiﬁcant  difference 
between these distributions.ﬂuctuations.  This  time  series  represents  the  extent  to  which  horizontal 
movement is ﬂuctuating towards  one category label or back to the other. A 
range of window sizes was used (2-10), along with a tolerance of .2 multiplied 
by  the  standard  deviation  of  all  x-coordinate  ﬂuctuations  (xt+1  -  xt)  in 
normalized  trajectories.  Across  all  values  for  m,  mean  sample  entropy  is 
numerically greater (indicating higher complexity) in atypical trajectories than 
in  typical  trajectories.  These  differences  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  or 
marginally signiﬁcant when m has the values 3 through 6. 
Discussion
Results  indicate that the process of categorization exhibited  nonlinear time-
course  effects  in  mouse-movement  trajectories.  Trajectories  revealed 
signiﬁcant  attraction  toward  the competing category  name  in  the  atypical-
animal  condition,  when  compared  to  the  typical-animal  condition.   
Interestingly,  the  movement-initiation  latency  did  not  generate  signiﬁcant 
differences,  though  measures  based  on  the  manual  motion  itself  revealed 
spatial divergence between atypical and typical trajectories and a difference in 
categorization time.  We therefore conclude that the manual output from the 
categorization process is reﬂective of a cognitive temporal dynamics wherein 
the  mapping  of  exemplar  to  category  evolves  nonlinearly  over  time  (cf. 
Lamberts, 2000). 
39Experiment 2
The same animal names were used in this second experiment.  However, in 
the atypical-animal condition, the alternative (incorrect) response option was 
not the taxonomic class that shares similar properties with the label’s referent.   
To explore whether the graded attraction effect in computer-mouse trajectories 
is in part due to competition between strongly activated categories, or if the 
manual  curvature  is  solely  a  result  of  uncertainty  in  the  match  between 
atypical  animal  words  and  their  correct  categorization,  we  altered  the 
response  options  for  those  trials.    For  example,  whereas  the  previous 
experimental trials used the categories ﬁsh and mammal for the atypical animal 
whale, the present experiment used an alternative (incorrect) category that did 
not share features with the animal word (e.g., bird and mammal for whale).  If 
the mouse trajectories for the atypical trials show equal curvature toward the 
incorrect response option (as in Experiment 1), this  would suggest that the 
curvatures  we  are  observing  are  merely  due  to  a  slow  accumulation  of 
evidence  for the atypical  animal  being categorized as  its  correct taxonomic 
class;  if  this  curvature is  reduced, it  would  suggest  that the  differences  in 
Experiment 1  are due in  part to a dynamic  attraction  effect  exerted by the 
featurally-similar competing category. 
Participants
41  undergraduate  participants  in  this  experiment  received  extra  credit  for 
psychology classes.
40Materials and Procedure
This experiment used the same technique and same words as the ﬁrst, but the 
atypical-animal condition no longer involved competing categories.  Instead, 
the  correct  category  was  paired  with  a  non-competing  one  (e.g.,  whale  = 
mammal or bird).  The control trials were the same as in Experiment 1 (see Table 
2.1).  
Results 
Participants  categorized  atypical  exemplars  with 92%  accuracy,  and  typical 
exemplars with 98% accuracy (p < .01). Again, only correct trials were used in 
the analysis.
Time-normalized analysis
Normalized trajectories revealed a single sequence of 8 t-tests (p’s < .05), from 
the 72nd  to 79th  time step, showing atypical-typical  x-coordinate differences 
that were reliably greater than zero (see Fig. 2.3A).  Although signiﬁcant, this 
brief divergence between  atypical  and  typical  trajectories  is  a  substantially 
diminished sequence compared to the previous experiment’s 38 consecutive 
time steps with signiﬁcant differences. Again, as an additional statistical test, 
pooled bins from these time-normalized trajectories were used in a 2 (typical 
vs. atypical) x 3 (1-33, 34-67, 68-101 time steps) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
There was no signiﬁcant effect of trial type (F(1,40) = 2.2, MSe = 1341.2, p = .
14), but a signiﬁcant main effect of bin (F(2,39) = 1147.7, MSe = 1289.0, p < .
001), and a signiﬁcant interaction (F(2,39) = 4.0, MSe = 617.4, p < .05). While 
41 
there  was  no main  effect  of  trial  type,  comparisons  did  show  a signiﬁcant 
difference between typical and atypical conditions at the third time bin (p < .
05).
Space-normalized analysis
There was a main effect of time bin (F(2,35) = 340.1, MSe = .035, p < .001), but 
no signiﬁcant effect of trial type, or interaction between trial type and time bin 
(see Fig. 2.3B).
42
Figure  2.3:  A)  Mean  time-normalized  mouse-movement  trajectories  in 
Experiment 2, separated  for left- and right-ward responses to the correct 
target.  Atypical trials (solid lines) reveal a diminished attraction towards 
the competing category. B) Space-normalized time bins show no signiﬁcant 
differences between trial types (atypical in solid lines).Additional measures
No signiﬁcant differences were found in movement initiation latency (416 ms 
atypical vs. 403 ms typical, t(40) = .6, p = .6). However, there were signiﬁcant 
effects  of  total  response  time  (1840  ms  vs.  1718  ms,  t(40)=2.5,  p  <  .05), 
movement duration (1424 ms vs.  1315 ms, t(40)=3.8,  p <  .05), and  distance 
traveled (836 pixels  vs. 780 pixels, t(40)=2.3, p < .05).  Initial movement angle 
showed  no signiﬁcant  effects.  Interestingly, both  were positive towards  the 
target category (3.1 vs. 2.25 in atypical and typical trials, respectively). In item-
based  repeated-measures  ANOVAs,  only  total  response  time  and  distance 
traveled were signiﬁcant (F(1,17) = 4.7, 9.9, MSe =  20023.7, 1990.5, respectively, 
p’s < .05). Neither movement initiation latency nor movement duration was 
signiﬁcant. There were no signiﬁcant results in initial angle. 
As  before,  a  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  did  not  show  a  signiﬁcant 
difference  in  the  distribution  of  trajectory  curvatures  between  typical  and 
atypical trials (χ2 = 1.8, p = .80). Bimodality coefﬁcients were again similar, and 
below .555 (.546 and .549). Finally, sample entropy analyses did not show any 
signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant differences using window sizes of 2-10. 
The greatly reduced trajectory attraction effects during categorization 
with non-competitive alternative categories suggests that the spatial attraction 
effects in Experiment 1 were not due merely to the inherent atypicality of the 
label’s referent.  The featural similarity between the animal and the (incorrect) 
alternative category – present in Experiment 1 and absent in Experiment 2 – 
played  a  substantial  role  in  eliciting  curvature  in  the  computer-mouse 
trajectory.  When differential divergence between the average time-normalized 
trajectory for atypical animals and the average trajectory for typical animals is 
plotted  over  time  for  Experiment  1  and  for  Experiment  2  (Fig.  2.4),  the 
43competitive  alternative  categories  in  Experiment  1  clearly  show  a  much 
stronger  attraction  effect  than the  non-competitive  alternative categories  in 
Experiment 2.  These trajectories differ signiﬁcantly for 19 time slices, from the 
57th to 75th time steps (p’s < .05). In addition, when atypical-animal trials from 
these experiments are compared using space-normalized time bins, there is a 
main effect of experiment (F(1,75) = 5.8, MSe = .096, p < .05) and an interaction 
between  experiment  and  bin  (F(2,74)  =  3.4,  MSe  =  .039,  p  <  .05).  These 
differences  suggest  that  Experiment  1’s  effects  were  strengthened  by  the 
presence of competitor labels.
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Figure 2.4: Mean total divergence (atypical trial – typical trial x-coordinates) 
for Experiments  1 and  2.   Experiment 1  (solid  line) exhibits  signiﬁcantly 
more divergence.
 Discussion
Interestingly,  and  perhaps  surprisingly,  non-competing alternative  category 
labels in Experiment 2 still induced some signiﬁcant, albeit small, attraction. 
For  example,  when faced  with  possible  responses  mammal  and  bird for the 
examplar  whale,  participants’  trajectories  in  Experiment  2  showed  some 
signiﬁcant  attraction  toward  the  putatively non-competing label  bird.  Why 
should this be?  The answer may lie in the between-category similarity.
In  addition  to  considering  the  match  between  an  exemplar  and  a 
potential  category, we  must  also consider the similarity between categories 
themselves (cf. Storms, 2005). Although one may initially assume that the non-
competing alternative categories of Experiment 2 should remove the patterns 
of  competition  seen  in  Experiment  1,  there  actually  remains  substantial 
between-category  similarity  among  the  correct  and  alternative  category 
responses.  For example, in addition to whale being a good match for mammal, 
and  a  partial  match  for  ﬁsh,  it  also has  a  moderate  amount  of  ﬁt  to bird.   
Whales  and  birds  both move,  breathe, and  eat. They both  have eyes, skin, 
muscles, bones, lungs, a brain, a heart, etc.  Thus, even our “non-competing” 
category labels in Experiment 2 still share a number of similar features with 
the target stimulus, since they are all  in the superordinate-level  category of 
animals.  Even such minor similarity appears to be sufﬁcient to produce some 
mild  attraction  effects  in  the  mouse-movement  trajectories.  Based  on  the 
combined  results  of  these  ﬁrst  two  experiments,  we  suggest  that  mouse 
movement curvature reﬂects a competition process wherein partially active 
categories  pull  the  state  of  the  cognitive  system  toward  their  respective 
attractor  basins.   Dynamic  properties  of  the  resulting  nonlinear  mental 
45trajectory are emitted  in  the continuous manual output  of computer-mouse 
movement. As in many classic categorization studies (e.g., Rosch, 1973; Rips et 
al., 1973), we were able to induce these effects with atypical category members 
presented in lexical form. 
Indeed, the initial process of visual word recognition may also exhibit 
some attractor dynamics of its own (e.g., Hinton & Shallice, 1991; McRae, de 
Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Rueckl, 2002). Because initial processing in the trials of 
both Experiments 1 and 2 involve lexical recognition, the competitive process 
following  them  is  attributable  to  the  process  of  categorization.  Some 
additional  dynamics  therefore  take  place  following  this  word  recognition 
phase, in the time course of mapping lexical processing onto a categorization 
response.  These  experiments  reveal  that  even  the  manual  output  of  this 
mapping reﬂects the partially active representations underlying it. 
Experiment 3
In the next two experiments, participants categorized  pictures of our animal 
set,  rather  than  lexical  items.  Numerous  studies  have  considered  the 
distinction  between  processing  pictures  and  words,  and  the  relationship 
between  this  processing  and  a  proposed  core  conceptual  representation 
underlying them. Early on, for example, Snodgrass (1984) argued that pictorial 
and  verbal  codes  have  separate  functions  and  distinct  neurophysiological 
realization,  rather than  being  mere  surface  forms  for  a  central  underlying 
concept  representation  (see  also  Paivio,  1991).  More  recently,  numerous 
studies have explored the efﬁciency with which picture vs. word stimuli are 
categorized, with most showing a small but signiﬁcant advantage for pictorial 
46stimuli  (e.g.,  Job,  Rumiati,  &  Lotto,  1992;  Snodgrass  &  McCullough,  1986; 
Viswanathan  &  Childers,  2003).  For  example,  Viswanathan  and  Childers 
(2003)  demonstrated  a  processing advantage for  pictorial  stimuli  in  a  task 
where participants judged whether two stimuli  were members  of the same 
category.  The  authors  suggest  that  visual  stimuli  induce  simultaneous 
processing  of  category-relevant  visual  features  and  of  their  categories  or 
concepts. Thus, the accumulation of featural-match information may be faster 
and  more robust  with  pictures  than with lexical  presentation  alone,  which 
relies only on conceptual information acquired through orthographic input.
This discussion  suggests  a  few predictions for Experiments 3  and  4, 
using  visual  stimuli.  First,  typical-animal  picture  trials  will  likely  be 
categorized  faster  and  more  efﬁciently  than  typical-animal  lexical  trials. 
Previous research suggests this processing advantage for visual examplars. In 
addition, because visual stimulus features simultaneously act with conceptual 
activation,  there may in fact be more competition  for atypical picture trials 
(Experiment 3) than there was for atypical word trials (Experiment 1). Visual 
features of atypical  animals  often provide some partial  match to competing 
categories.  For example, whale images  offer visual  information  that  greatly 
resembles ﬁsh. The  atypical  functional  features  of  the concept whale,  along 
with  potentially  misleading  perceptual  information,  could  increase  the 
attraction exhibited in mouse-movement trajectories (Experiment 3 compared 
to Experiment 1). Finally, this prediction regarding atypical competitive trials 
using  pictures,  and  the  previous  discussion  of  moderate  similarity  even 
between non-competitive categories and exemplars, suggests that substantial 
competition  should  be  seen  in  conditions  with  non-competitive  category 
alternatives  when  pictorial  stimuli  are  used  (Experiment  4  compared  to 
47Experiment 2). If misleading visual features cause more equivocal information 
to be partially active on atypical-animal trials, even when the category label is 
supposedly non-competing, it should take more time for the correct category 
to reach maximal activation. 
Participants
45  Cornell  undergraduates  participated  in  this  experiment  to  receive  extra 
credit for their psychology classes.
Materials and Procedure
The picture stimuli were color images of approximately equal size, collected 
from the Internet.  Images were chosen to be easily identiﬁable. For example, 
goldﬁsh (and whale) images were from a side-angle view. All atypical photos 
were whole-body images of the animals. None of the animal  pictures  were 
miscategorized  persistently  in  Experiments  3  and  4.  Besides  employing 
pictures  rather  than  words,  the  following  two  experiments  use  the  same 
materials and procedures as the previous two.
Results 
48Accuracy rate for atypical animals was 96%, and for typical animals was 99% 
(p = .078). Once again, all incorrect trials were discarded before analysis.
Time-normalized analysis
As  seen  in  Fig.  2.5A,  the  atypical-animal  trials  elicited  substantially  more 
curved  computer-mouse  trajectories  than  did  the  typical-animal  trials. 
Collapsed across leftward and rightward trajectories, t-tests revealed atypical-
typical x-coordinate differences that were signiﬁcantly greater than zero (p < .
05)  across  61  consecutive  time  steps,  from  the  26th  to  87th  slices.  This  is 
considerably larger than the 38 from Experiment 1. In the repeated-measures 
ANOVA with binned  time steps, there was  a  signiﬁcant main effect of trial 
type (F(1,44) = 34.5, MSe = 2012.5, p < .001), bin (F(2,43) = 1773.6, MSe = 1475.3, 
p  <  .001),  and  interaction (F(2,43) =  14.7,  MSe =  1007.6, p  < .001).  Planned 
comparisons  show  that,  in  all  three  normalized  time  bins,  atypical  trials 
diverged in the x-coordinate from typical trials (p’s < .05), exhibiting attraction 
to the competing response category.
Space-normalized analysis
By normalizing coordinates to travel from origin (0,0) to (1,1), the three real-
time bins reveal a robust main effect of trial type (F(1,43) = 45.6, MSe = .056, p 
<  .001), time bin (F(2,42) =  289.1, MSe = .028,  p < .001),  and an  interaction 
between trial type and time bin (F(2,42) = 8.1, MSe = .034, p = .001). Planned 
comparisons show that all three time bins (0-500, 500-1000, and 1000-1500 ms) 
contain signiﬁcantly different mean x-coordinates for the atypical- and typical-
animal trials (p’s < .001).
49Additional measures
The difference between movement initiation latencies was signiﬁcant and in 
the  expected  direction  (440  ms  for  atypical  animals  vs.  383  ms  for  typical 
animals, t(44) = 2.5, p < .05).  There was also a signiﬁcant difference between 
the two conditions in the total time taken to perform the categorization (2150 
ms vs. 1560 ms, t(44) = 5.2, p < .001).  Movement duration differed signiﬁcantly 
(1710 ms vs. 1177 ms, t(44) = 7.7, p < .001), and total distance traveled differed 
signiﬁcantly as  well  (1017 pixels  vs.  830  pixels,  t(44) =  5.4,  p  <  .001). Item 
analyses for all measures revealed signiﬁcant differences between typical and 
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Figure  2.5:  A)  Mean  time-normalized  mouse-movement  trajectories  in 
Experiment 3, separated for left- and right-ward responses to the correct 
target.   Atypical  picture  trials  (solid  lines)  indicate  strong  divergence 
towards the competing category. B) Space-normalized time bins show a 
strong attraction, and  slower progress towards  target  for atypical trials 
(solid lines).atypical  stimuli  (p’s  <  .01).   In  contrast  to  Experiment  1,  every  dependent 
measure  showed  a  strong  reliable  difference  between  atypical  and  typical 
conditions.
Analysis  of initial  direction in degrees shows a signiﬁcant difference 
between atypical and typical trials (t(44) = 2.1, p < .05), with atypical trials in 
fact  showing a  negative angle (towards  competitor; -2.98) and  typical  trials 
showing a signiﬁcant positive angle of 4.5 towards the correct category (t(44) = 
2.1, p < .05). The negative angle of atypical trials was not signiﬁcantly different 
from 0 (t(44) = -.94, p = .35). 
Distribution analysis with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test again shows 
that  curvatures  for  atypical  and  typical  trajectories  did  not  have  different 
distributions  (χ2  =  .94,  p  =  .97).  Bimodality  coefﬁcients  were  similar  and 
below  .555  (.503  and  .457,  for  atypical  and  typical,  respectively).  Sample 
entropy measures  showed  much  stronger effects than  Experiment 1  and  2. 
Again using window sizes of 2-10, and .2 times the standard deviation of all x-
coordinate ﬂuctuations across trials as the tolerance, atypical trials consistently 
showed reliably higher sample entropy in all window sizes (p’s < .05).
Discussion
Results indicate that the process of categorizing pictures of animals exhibited 
temporally  dynamic  spatial  attraction  effects  in  the  mouse-movement 
trajectories.  In fact, the perceptual ambiguity of the atypical animals seemed 
to induce greater competition effects, in  both trajectory and  time measures, 
than did the lexical stimuli, as predicted above.  In Experiment 1 (with animal 
words), the spatial divergence between atypical-animal trajectories and typical-
51animal trajectories was signiﬁcant for 38 consecutive normalized time slices, 
whereas  in  the  present  experiment  (with  animal  pictures),  the  spatial 
divergence  was  signiﬁcant  for  61  consecutive  normalized  time  slices.   
Moreover,  the atypicałtypical  differences  in  total  response time,  movement 
duration, and movement distance were also greater in the present experiment 
than they were in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 4
Just  as  Experiment  1  (with  animal  words)  had  its  control  comparison  in 
Experiment 2, using less-competitive alternative response options, Experiment 
3 (with animal pictures) has its control comparison in the present experiment.   
In Experiment 4, the taxonomic class response options were the same as in 
Experiment 2, e.g., mammal and bird for the exemplar whale, but the exemplar 
was presented as a picture instead of a word.  Thus, the alternative (incorrect) 
category in the  atypical-animal  condition here  (e.g.,  bird)  had  less  featural 
match to the exemplar (e.g., whale) than the one in Experiment 3 had (e.g., 
ﬁsh). However, the poor match between the salient visual properties of the 
picture and the correct category response (e.g., whales do not look much like 
mammals) may cause the correct category to be somewhat less competitive in 
the categorization process than it is when exemplars are presented as words.   
With  closer  relative  competitiveness  of  the  two  categories,  the  alternative 
(incorrect) category response may be able to exert a more substantial  spatial 
attraction effect than was seen in Experiment 2.
52Participants
39 undergraduate participants signed up for this experiment for extra credit in 
their psychology classes.
Materials and Procedure
This experiment used the same technique and same pictures as Experiment 3, 
but  the  experimental  (atypical-animal)  condition  involved  less  competitive 
categories.  The same non-competing response options from Experiment 2 (see 
Table 2.1) were employed here. 
Results 
Accuracy rate for atypical animals was 94%, and for typical animals was 97% 
(p = .58). Once again, all incorrect trials were discarded before analysis.
Time-normalized analysis
Analysis  of  mean  trajectories  in  combined  left  and  right  trajectories  again 
showed  differences in x-coordinates that were signiﬁcantly greater than zero 
across 66 consecutive time steps, from the 28th to the 94th slices (p’s < .05; see 
Fig. 2.6A). A binned repeated-measures ANOVA as in previous experiments 
showed  a highly signiﬁcant main  effect of trial  type (F(1,38)  = 17.0,  MSe = 
1538.6,  p  <  .001),  bin  (F(2,37)  =  2401.5,  MSe  =  1134.8,  p  <  .001),  and  an 
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interaction with time step bin (F(2,37) = 7.8, MSe = 589.6, p < .001). Planned 
comparisons show signiﬁcant  differences between trial  types  in  the  second 
and third normalized time bins (p’s < .01).
Space-normalized analysis
Fig. 2.6B  shows  space-normalized trajectories  in the three real time bins. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA included a signiﬁcant effect of trial type (F(1,36) = 
28.7, MSe = .047, p < .001), time bin (F(2,35) = 739.0, MSe = .016, p < .001), and 
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Figure  2.6:  A)  Mean  time-normalized  mouse-movement  trajectories  in 
Experiment 4.  Atypical picture trials (solid lines) also reveal a signiﬁcant 
attraction towards the competing category. B) Space-normalized time bins 
again  show  a  strong  but  diminished  attraction,  and  slower  progress 
towards target for atypical trials (solid lines).an interaction between trial type and bin (F(2,35) = 9.1, MSe = .017, p = .001). 
All three bins show a signiﬁcant difference between trial types (p’s < .05). 
Additional measures
There was  no  signiﬁcant  difference  in  initiation  latencies  between  the two 
condition (392  ms atypical  vs.  349 ms  typical, t(38)  =  1.6,  p =  .12).   As  in 
Experiment 3, there was a signiﬁcant difference between the two conditions in 
the total time taken to perform the categorization (1813 ms vs. 1461 ms, t(38) = 
5.2, p < .001).  Both movement duration (1421 ms vs. 1112 ms, t(38) = 4.8, p <. 
001), and  total  distance traveled were  signiﬁcantly greater in  atypical  trials 
(806 pixels vs. 747 pixels, t(38) = 3.3, p < .01). Initial angle from (0, 0) for typical 
trials was at 4.9, signiﬁcantly greater than 0 (t(38) = 2.1, p < .05), while atypical 
trials  were  again  slightly  negative  (-1.7),  but  not  signiﬁcant.  Item-based 
analyses  showed  the  same  patterns  of  signiﬁcance  (p’s  <  .05),  though 
movement initiation latency showed a marginal signiﬁcance (t(17) = 8.7, p = .
07).  Finally,  a  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  showed  no  signiﬁcant  difference 
between  typical  and  atypical  curvature  distributions  (χ2  =  1.1,  p  =  1.0). 
Interestingly, bimodality coefﬁcients were both near but greater than .555 (.584 
and  .597 for  atypical  and  typical, respectively). The value for  typical  trials, 
however, is greater than for atypical trials.  Thus, if each of these distributions 
was  genuinely  the  result  of  two  independent  classes  of  motor-movement 
trajectories  (those  that  started  out  correct,  and  those  that  were  sharply 
corrected  in  mid-ﬂight),  this  bimodality cannot  be  attributed  solely  to  the 
atypicality of the whale, seal, penguin, etc. – even the typical animal pictures 
elicited this pattern.  Finally, just as in Experiment 2, sample entropy showed 
no signiﬁcant differences between atypical and typical trials. As Experiments 1 
55and 3 showed reliably greater sample entropy for atypical trials compared to 
typical  trials,  this  measure  may  be  a  critical  indicator  of    the  difference 
between  competitive  and  non-competitive  category  trials.    When  both 
category response options are substantially competitive (Experiments 1 and 3), 
the mouse-movement trajectories exhibit a conspicuous complexity that may 
be due to the nonlinear dynamics inherent in an attractor landscape that has 
multiple strong attractor basins. 
Discussion
Using visual images of exemplars, a non-competitive alternative category still 
induced  considerable  curvature  in  the  mouse-movement  trajectory.  When 
divergence  between  the  average  trajectory  for  atypical  animals  and  the 
average trajectory for typical  animals is plotted over time for Experiment 3 
and  for  Experiment  4  together  (see  Fig.  2.7),  the  competitive  alternative 
categories in Experiment 3 show a numerically stronger attraction effect than 
the non-competitive alternative categories in Experiment 4.  However, the two 
atypical-animal  trajectories  from  Experiment  3  and  4  do  not  exhibit  a 
signiﬁcant  difference  for  more  than  8  consecutive  normalized  time  steps. 
Nevertheless, when doing independent samples t-tests of the outcome-based 
dependent measures of the experimental trials from Experiments 3 and 4, total 
response time (t(82)=2.6, p < .05), total time in motion (t(82)=2.5, p < .05), and 
distance  traveled  (t(82)=4.8,  p  <  .001)  all  indicated  that  when  the incorrect 
alternative category was competitive (e.g,. ﬁsh for the whale picture), mouse-
movement was slower and more extensive than when the incorrect alternative 
category  was  non-competitive (e.g.,  bird  for  the  whale  picture).  Item-based 
56comparisons between atypical trials between Experiments 3 and 4 also show a 
signiﬁcant difference for distance in the expected direction (t(5) = 6.2, p < .01).
Thus,  although  not  quite  as  much  as  in  Experiment  3,  images  of 
atypical animals in Experiment 4 did induce computer-mouse trajectories that 
exhibited  spatial  attraction toward an incorrect category label  more so than 
trajectories  for  typical  animals.  When  words  were  used  with  this  non-
competitive  arrangement  instead  of  images,  in  Experiment  2,  a  much 
diminished  trajectory  curvature  was  observed,  as  was  compared  to  its 
corresponding  competing-label  scenario  in  Experiment  1.  As  one  simple 
explanation for this strengthened  attraction  in  the non-competing labels  in 
Experiment  4  (as  compared  to  Experiment  3),  the  divergence  between 
trajectories  may  be  the  result  of  a  reduced  featural  match  of  the  correct 
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Figure 2.7: Mean total divergence (atypical trial – typical trial x-coordinates) 
for  Experiments  3  and  4.   Experiment  3  (solid  line)  exhibits  greater 
divergence, though not signiﬁcant for 8 time steps (see text for details).
 category with  the visual  properties of the atypical  exemplar, rendering the 
alternative  category’s  meager  competitiveness  relatively  more  substantial. 
When one then compares Experiment 4 with Experiment 3, the exceptionally 
long  mouse  movements  (in  time  and  space)  for  atypical-animal  trials  in 
Experiment 3 can be seen as due to that same reduced competitiveness of the 
correct  category  combined  with  a  considerable  competitiveness  of  the 
alternative  category,  resulting  in  a  particularly  lasting  and  laborious 
competition between the categories.
General Discussion
The  lexical  stimuli  in Experiment  1 revealed  that categories  in  competition 
lead to a dynamic spatial  attraction of the resultant mouse trajectories. This 
competition diminishes, but  does  not go away,  when the  featurally-similar 
alternative category is replaced  by a less-competitive alternative category in 
Experiment  2.  Interestingly,  this  pattern  changes  when  using  image-based 
stimuli in Experiments 3 and 4. Images of atypical exemplars produce robust 
mouse-trajectory  attraction  toward  both  highly-competitive  alternative 
categories  and  less-competitive  categories  alike.  These results  offer further 
insight into the nature of categorization. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
time course of categorization has only recently been rigorously explored (e.g., 
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Lamberts, 2000).  Like Abrams and Balota’s (1991) 
results with lexical decision and recall memory, these results further suggest 
that manual responses themselves may be reﬂective of a continuous, dynamic 
process  of  categorization  underlying  participant  performance  in  these 
experiments. 
58Importantly, these ﬁndings may extend  the information-accumulation 
theory of Lamberts (2000) and the exemplar random-walk model of Nosofsky 
and Palmeri (1997). These theories may in fact predict the above results. For 
example,  the  Nosofsky  and  Palmeri  random-walk  model  involves  a  race 
among exemplars governed by their similarity to a test item. In our case, right 
vs. left response boxes (competing categories) attract the continuous manual 
movement in accord with the extent to which they ﬁt the exemplar presented. 
Depending on how its  representations  are mapped onto motor output, this 
race could result in a substantial pull toward highly competitive alternative 
categories (as in Experiments 1 and 3), and somewhat less of a pull with less-
competitive alternative categories. This basic ﬁnding that continuous, graded 
processing of the exemplars during categorization ﬂows into the effectors can 
be  seen  as  an  extension  of  an  iterative  sequential-sampling,  information-
accumulation perspective. While the perspective of both Lamberts (2000) and 
Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) is applied largely to the process leading up to a 
discrete categorization response, our results suggest that the response is itself 
a component of this continuous, probabilistic processing. A full synthesis may 
accompany future experiments that overcome some limitations of the current 
ones. For example, it must be acknowledged that the current research employs 
a small stimulus set. Future experiments may further bridge the various levels 
of the categorization  process  (from perception to response  preparation and 
production)  through  more  extensive  stimulus  sets.  While  the  current 
experiments serve as an initial demonstration of these patterns using a small 
set of  commonly known animals, there remain numerous issues  to explore. 
These might include the resolution of item-by-item typicality, frequency, and 
other variables and their concomitant effects on continuous output. Despite 
59the present limitations, these experiments demonstrate a potentially fruitful 
avenue for eventually mapping out an uninterrupted explanatory landscape 
from perceptual input to motor output.
Classical  perspectives  on  cognitive  processing  as  organized  into 
discrete serial stages would likely predict that only noise would account for 
graded  output  patterns  in tasks  such  as  taxonomic  categorizing – and  that 
mean trajectories should in fact simply indicate the target response. While the 
current results are particularly strong for recommending against this purely 
serial perspective on the process of categorization, we would argue that they 
also have broader theoretical signiﬁcance regarding representational issues in 
cognitive theories. Throughout the cognitive sciences, debate continues over 
the nature of conceptual representation.  A central dichotomy in this debate is 
the format of representation, and related processing-ﬂow issues, that underlie 
cognition.  On one side of this debate, representations are largely characterized 
as  discrete  and  symbolic,  and  undergo  computational  or  algorithmic 
manipulation  akin  to  a  Turing  machine  (e.g.,  Fodor,  2000;  Dietrich  & 
Markman,  2003;  Marcus,  2001; Pinker,  1997).   On  another side, there  are  a 
variety of proposals that see representational states as  probabilistic, graded 
informational  states  that  either  undergo  computational  manipulation 
(Massaro, 1989, 1998), or are part and parcel of a system that blends content 
and process in its operation (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisis, 
&  Plunkett, 1996; Port &  Van Gelder, 1995; Rumelhart &  McClelland,  1986; 
Spivey & Dale, 2004).  This dichotomy only approximates the rich spectrum of 
opinion  in  cognitive science (cf.  hybrid  systems such as  those by Young & 
Lewis, 1999; Sun, 1997). Nevertheless, debate tends to focus on the extent to 
60which each format of representation contributes most to our understanding of 
cognition. 
A range  of  behavioral data is typically adduced to support  one and 
challenge the other. A classic example of phenomena interpreted as supporting 
the  existence  of  discrete-symbolic  representations  is  the  very  act  of 
categorization  itself:  “It  follows…that  if  a  system  categorizes,  then  it  has 
discrete  representations”  (Dietrich &  Markman,  2003, p.  102). For  example, 
early research on categorical perception of speech sounds not only ﬁt perfectly 
into  the  traditional  perspective  on  symbolic  computation,  but  also  led  to 
proposals that  there exist  specialized  processes  of this sort for speech  (see 
Massaro, 1998  for a  review).  Categorization  is  but  one  property  of  several 
behaviors  that  animals  exhibit  that  have  been  proposed  to  support  the 
centrality  (or  at  least  existence)  of  discrete-symbolic  representations  in 
cognition (for other properties, see Dietrich & Markman, 2003; Marcus, 2001). 
It has, however, been of central importance for understanding our cognitive 
architecture.
Related to recent research (e.g., McMurray et al., 2003; Nederhouser & 
Spivey, 2004), lexical and perceptual categorization in the present experiments 
revealed graded response patterns in participants’ mouse trajectories (see also 
Spivey et al., 2005).   As in Abrams and Balota (1991), it seems that the time 
course of categorization is reﬂected in the manual output from the process. In 
particular, given our results that competing category labels generate greater 
trajectory curvature, slower time measures, and longer trajectory excursions, 
this temporally sensitive deviation in motor output suggests partially active 
states underlying the time course of categorization. The upshot for cognitive 
representation  is  subtle,  but  important.   If  discrete  representational  states 
61underlie cognition at some point following perceptual processing, then there 
must still exist some “granularity” of information, in Miller’s (1982) sense, by 
the time this process is being converted into motor output. If this is granted, 
then there is a limit on the discreteness imputed to the representational states 
underlying categorization. Discrete representational perspectives may indeed 
account for these kinds of results by allowing differing levels of granularity in 
representational discreteness. Indeed, further pursuing the line of research in 
Miller (1982;  see  also Miller &  Ulrich, 2003)  may reconcile these theoretical 
perspectives  by ﬁnding a  common  ground  between purely continuous and 
purely  discrete  representations  (cf.  Dale  &  Spivey,  in  press).  This  would 
involve  specifying  how  reﬁned  the  granularity  is  at  various  stages  of 
processing. 
These  studies  demonstrate  that  echoes  of  continuous  (non-discrete) 
informational  states can be observed in the dynamic  properties of resultant 
motoric  responses  –  granularity  evident  even  in  the  manual  output.  Any 
postulated  discrete  representational  states  mediating  sensors  and  effectors 
must  carry  at  least  some  relevant  information  from early  graded  states  in 
order for the motor output to mimic the continuity of the sensory input. In 
other  words,  while  reaction  times  and  accuracy  measures  may  reveal 
information  about  the  decision  process  during  discrete,  algorithmic 
processing,  the  graded  manual  output  from  the  system  observed  here 
indicates that even when these discrete decision processes collapse onto the 
effectors, there remains some granularity. 
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In order to establish a basis for our criterion used in the multiple t-tests on 
time-normalized trajectories, we conducted simulations akin to the Bootstrap 
method (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). The mean and standard deviation of each 
of 101  time steps  in  atypical  and  typical  trajectories  in  Experiment 1  were 
recorded.  Next,  10,000  simulated  “experiments”  were  computed  using  the 
same  mean  and  standard  deviation.  In  other  words,  in  each  of  these 
simulations,  we constructed  41  model  participants  (N  in  Experiment  1) by 
constructing atypical and typical trajectories from these time-step means and 
standard deviations. Within each trial  type, each time step (out of 101) was 
sampled  from a  normal  distribution with  the mean and standard deviation 
from the time steps of the actual mean trajectories, thus preserving the non-
independence  between  time  steps.  We  then  ran  t-tests  within  each  of  the 
10,000 simulations for each time step (101 time steps, and N =  41). Of these 
10,000,  we  recorded  the  frequency  with  which  sequences  of  signiﬁcant 
differences occurred. Simulations revealed signiﬁcantly different  sequences of 
6, 7, and 8 time steps with a percentage of 3%, 1%, and .5%, respectively (see 
Table 2.2). A sequence of 8 consecutive signiﬁcant t-tests is thus produced by 
chance in these simulations with less than .01 probability, and was selected as 
a conservative measure. This simulation therefore recommends a criterion of 8 
consecutive  signiﬁcantly  different  timesteps  for  discerning  whether  the 
interdependent  time  steps  in  our  experiments  have  sequences  that  exceed 
what  would  occur  by  chance  alone.  This  criterion  was  also  used  in 
Experiments 2-4.
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simulated experiments
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On Resilience and Versatility: 
The Theory-Model Distinction and Connectionism
Introduction: Of Ideals and Details
Political  and  social  ideals  swirl  into  the  world,  vanish  just  as  easily,  and 
routinely  reappear  in  novel  forms  under  different  historical  circumstances.   
The  way  these  ideals  are  applied  can  differ  widely  within  and  across 
generations.  Whatever the success of these applications, the ideals are often 
resiliently held by those who adopt them, largely because the practical details 
of ideals manifest themselves in versatile ways.  
In some respects, a scientiﬁc theoretical framework has the properties of 
political and social ideals.  A set of theoretical ideals in any discipline may fall 
out  of  favor,  only  to  reappear  with  the  advent  of  new  conceptual, 
mathematical,  or  technical  tools.   In  some  cases,  these  ideals  may  simply 
reappear by a kind of reinvention of the theoretical wheel.  When the details of 
theoretical  ideals  are  worked  out,  a  theorist  is  resilient  in  the  face  of 
drawbacks or preliminary failures, because the details can be elaborated with 
considerable versatility.
In  what  follows,  we  argue  that  scientists  generally,  and  cognitive 
scientists in particular, harbor two personalities.   The resilient theorist is one 
who sticks by her theoretical ideals, encouraging the interpretation of worldly 
phenomena in terms of a particular set of constructs and operations among 
them.  The versatile modeler uses these ideals and models aspects of the world 
after them.  The versatility with which these ideals are applied encourages the 
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close  kin,  and  both  may  inhabit  a  single  scientist.   Though  very  similar 
observations  were a  focus  of  the  latter-half  of  last-century’s  philosophy of 
science, we aim to ﬂesh out the consequences of these personalities and apply 
them, as an important conceptual basis, to debates in cognitive science.1
In  the  ﬁrst  part  of  this  paper,  we  provide  intuitive  and  historical 
support for the distinction between theories and models.  The distinction as 
drawn is not trivial, and  we describe certain consequences that importantly 
underlie the pursuits of resilient theorists and versatile modelers.  
In  the  second  part,  we  show  how  disregard  for  the  theory-model 
distinction  can  lead  to  misdirected  criticism  of  robust  cognitive  scientiﬁc 
frameworks.  We  assail  arguments  against  connectionism  in  an  attempt  to 
show that ignoring the distinction and its consequences leads to some unfair 
assessments of connectionist theory.   Finally, we describe the ways in which 
connectionist modelers have encoded semantic representations in models, and 
how  this  illustrates  the  distinction,  its  consequences,  and  the  way 
connectionism satisﬁes a number of conceptual constraints.
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1 In fact, what we are arguing has appeared in the philosophy of science as a 
reaction to the Received View (Bechtel, 1988) of scientiﬁc explanation and 
change.  Many philosophers of science have noted the steadfastness of 
theorists, and the latitude with which the theorists may approach data (to 
name a few, Kuhn, 1963; Quine & Ullian, 1970; Lakatos, 1978).Resilient Theorists, Versatile Modelers
The term “theory” is indeed vague.  From a Greek word roughly translated “a 
looking at” or “viewing,” it has been used in a variety of ways since at least 
1674,  when  it  appears  in  Dryden’s line  “Your  theories are here  to practice 
brought, As in mechanic operations wrought.”  This usage of the word, as a 
system  of  ideas  or  methods,  is  now  its  sole  import  in  modern  English.   
“Theory” in this sense appears, for example, in popular scientiﬁc press when 
Darwinian evolution is labeled “just a theory” by creationists (or, “intelligent 
design” theorists), or more peculiarly, when a friend claims to have developed 
a “theory” about how cats exert their telepathic powers over humans.  It is 
crucial to point out that beyond these casual and cursory notes, we will not 
consider the assorted  colloquial  uses of “theory” and “model.”  Instead, we 
wish to compare theories and  models as  explanatory entities both intuitively 
and with respect to the history of psychology.  More importantly, the goal of 
this section is not to offer a deﬁnition for the terms “theory” and “model,” but 
to  elaborate  the  objects  of  concern  for  resilient  theorists  and  versatile 
modelers, the difference between these objects, and their respective properties 
(e.g.,  Gould,  2002,  urges  a  curious  reiﬁcation  or  “objectiﬁcation”  of  these 
explanatory objects).
To begin, consider the observation, made by a number of philosophers 
of  science  (e.g.,  Kuhn,  1963;  Lakatos,  1978),  that  all  scientiﬁc  research  is 
conducted  in  the context  of a  particular theoretical  framework -- otherwise 
known  as  the  property  of  “theory-ladenness.”   For  example,  for  Lakatos 
(1978), this framework is a research programme, in which broad principles and 
problem-solving  machinery  are  combined  to  engender  active  and  resilient 
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frameworks  are not necessarily equivalent,  but  overlap  considerably in the 
way  they  characterize  motivational  forces  in  scientiﬁc  research,  and  are 
commonly supported  by providing numerous examples from the history of 
science.
One  purpose  of  a  framework’s  broad  principles  is  to  guide speciﬁc 
research questions.  There exist, and can be observed readily in the history of 
science, speciﬁc  research  projects  or  goals within  any particular theoretical 
framework.  The notion that these projects occur within a framework simply 
means  that  they  incorporate  the framework’s  principles  to explore  a  more 
detailed range of phenomena.  This observation is important in the history of 
science.  Even recently, speciﬁc research pursuits may make discoveries about 
the details that can cause change in the general principles (as some seek for 
evolutionary theory, for example).  Also, because details can be worked out in 
a variety of ways, there can be multiple projects consistent with a framework 
but which compete to account for overlapping phenomena (discussed  further 
below).   These  considerations  suggest  that  general  principles  cannot  alone 
characterize an entire body of scientiﬁc research.  Broad theoretical principles 
constrain research pursuits, but these pursuits seek to press the principles into 
service for approaching more detailed phenomena.
Such  notions  as  a  paradigm,  research  programme,  and  theoretical 
framework evidently form a more abstract class of explanatory entity than the 
speciﬁc projects they bring about.  These explanatory entities, or theories, are a 
collection of broad and common principles that guide and deﬁne a research 
community.   But  such  broader explanatory entities  should  not  be confused 
with the detailed investigations they underlie.  The more speciﬁc and detailed 
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instantiate  theoretical  principles,  and  elucidate  their  involvement  in  the 
subject matter under investigation (e.g., Cartwright, 1999, discusses myth and 
model in scientiﬁc explanation -- akin to theory and model, discussed here).2
This distinction is borne out when we consider the various theories that 
have shaped the history of psychology.  For example, Freudian psychoanalysis 
is characterized by a general set of theoretical principles.  However, the ways 
in  which  these  are  instantiated  and  applied  to  speciﬁc  psychological 
phenomena  can  be  considerably  more  complex.   For  example,  Freudian 
principles could be used to explain why women ﬁddle with their purse, or the 
existence  of  arms  proliferation  (in  the  amusing  manner one would  expect; 
Leahey,  2001).   Interestingly,  given  Popper’s  famous  arguments  against  it, 
psychoanalysis  may  offer  such  lax  guidance  that  many  Freudian  models, 
mutually incompatible with one another, could be easily concocted to explain 
the same behavior.  
Another major  trend  in  the history  of  psychology,  the  experimental 
analysis of behavior (known commonly by its moniker “radical behaviorism”), 
included  a  robust  and  small  set  of  theoretical  principles  that  formed  the 
dominant  framework  in  North  America  for  over  20  years.    Within  this 
framework,  there exist individual  models  for a  wide range  of  phenomena, 
such as the emergence of object words in child language (Horne & Lowe, 1996 
and Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001 present competing accounts).  
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2 We understand that this usage of the terms may appear awkward, but the 
distinction as expressed will serve later discussion concerning cognitive 
science.  In this way, Freudian stories, animal learning models, and 
computational models are all ``models’’ that instantiate theoretical ideals.As  for the cognitive sciences, for example, Newell, Shaw, and  Simon 
(1958) articulated a set of principles for cognition long ago that are instantiated 
relatively faithfully by a wide range of individual explanatory models.  
Even a cursory glance at the history of psychology suggests that the 
distinction  between  these  explanatory  entities,  though  perhaps  itself 
somewhat  vague  upon  closer  examination,  can  be  exempliﬁed  clearly  by 
major theoretical  and  historical  trends.   In fact, within each  example,  there 
continue  to  exist  resilient  theorists  who  lobby  for  their  ideals.   Freudian 
psychoanalysis  not  only  persists  in  popular  culture,  but  continues  to  be 
applied  clinically  despite  its  apparent  drawbacks.   Also,  the  progeny  of 
Skinner’s behaviorism still conducts research in bastions throughout the US 
and  Europe.   Finally, and  relevant  to the  focus of this paper,  the symbolic 
approach to cognitive science emerged as a majority party after the decline of 
behaviorism, and is engaged in extended debate with a new set of ideals that 
re-emerged two decades ago: connectionism.
 
Consequences of the Distinction
 
The distinction between theory and model so far discussed may appear rather 
obvious, and one may wonder whether there is justiﬁcation for elucidating it.   
In trying to convince the reader otherwise, we argue that the distinction is not 
a trivial semantic quibble, but that it has a number of important consequences.   
These consequences provide conceptual support for the resilient theorist, and 
justify the versatility of modeling.  And as we later illustrate, recognizing this 
distinction and its consequences may provide a valuable conceptual basis to 
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sciences.
 
Underdetermination of the Details
The  underdetermination  of  scientiﬁc  theory  by  empirical  data  has  been 
recognized for decades (Bechtel, 1988).  But there is a kind underdetermination 
that goes in the opposite direction.   There may exist mutually incompatible 
models for a single set of phenomena, yet be entirely consonant with broad 
theoretical  principles.    The  distinction  implies  this  underdetermination 
because theories guide research concerns, but models work out the details in 
considerably more versatile ways.  This is particularly true of theories whose 
principles  lack  complete  mathematical  formalization  (such  as  Freudian 
psychology; see Meehl, 1998, for a discussion).  
Evidential Relationship
The  underdetermination  of  model  by  theory  suggests  another  crucial 
consequence of  the  distinction:   The evidential  relationship  between theory 
and model is more complex than sometimes assumed.  As we contend below, 
discussion in cognitive science can too easily assume that a prominent and 
widely applied theoretical framework is especially disadvantaged by a small 
set of inadequate models.
Theories lacking mathematical formalization bear a relationship to their 
models  much  as  they  would  to  the  experiments  conducted  within  them.3   
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providing a window onto the interaction of variables in the real world in 
terms of the theoretical principles that motivate it.Parallel to the demise of the “critical experiment” notion in the history and 
philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1963; Putnam, 1973), it is also true of modeling: 
An inadequate model can be remedied by a suitable reorganizing of premises 
or auxiliary hypotheses.   In short, models can  be revamped and improved.   
According to many thinkers, this is a characteristic of all theories and is not a 
“ﬂaw,”  because  in  some  cases  resilience  to  anomalies  is  a  natural  trait  of 
productive scientiﬁc theories (Lakatos, 1978).
Constrained Versatility
Another consequence of the distinction is the nature of constraints on models.   
The obvious constraint is the set of broad theoretical principles the model is 
presumed to instantiate.  These theoretical constraints provide the overarching 
direction for the nature of modeling questions and methodologies.  However, 
a model is also constrained by the phenomena under study.  These veridicality 
constraints  govern  the  way  in  which  some  of  a  model’s  parameters  are 
included,  manipulated,  and  interpreted.4   A variety  of  perspectives  in  the 
philosophy  of  science  lend  support  to  such  a  source  of  constraints.   For 
example,  van  Fraassen  (1980)  argues  that  the  role of  scientiﬁc  theory and 
modeling as a whole is to ``save the phenomena,’’ meaning a model should 
capture established aspects of the observable world.
Because  models  are  about  worldly  details,  they  are  naturally 
constrained by experimental  data.   Along with broad principles motivating 
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4 These veridicality constraints would subsume all the criteria suggested by 
Christiansen and Chater (2001) to evaluate connectionist models: data contact, 
task veridicality, and input representativeness.  Each criterion involves the 
extent to which the model faithfully captures properties of the world.them, they are pressed by two sets of forces.  In this sense, a model is much 
like a mapping between theoretical principles and the experimental data. But 
theoretical and veridicality constraints interact along multiple dimensions, so 
even theory and data together underdetermine mappings or models.
In  addition,  these  constraints  suggest  a  way  of  describing  the 
parameters  incorporated  into modeling.   On one hand, there  is  a  complex 
parametric  space  that  underlies  the  methodology  suggested  by  theoretical 
constraints.   On  the  other,  you  have  a  set  of  parameters  that  satisfy  the 
veridicality constraints: They are representative of the variables observed or 
inferred  in  behavioral  data.   Although  this  further  distinction  between 
veridical  and  non-veridical  (not constrained  by data) parameters may seem 
elusive  or  abstruse,  we  exemplify  this  discussion  in  the  next  section  by 
considering connectionist theory and modeling.
Though  we  will  not  outline  the  ideals  of  connectionist  theory 
conclusively,  there  are  a  few  criteria  that  stand  out  in  the  history  of  the 
approach.   We paraphrase Smolensky’s recent list (2001, p. 320), as a rather 
lucid and historically motivated version of connectionist theoretical principles: 
mental representation as distributed patterns of activity, mental processes as 
parallel  transformation  of  these  patterns,  and  knowledge  as  interaction  of 
innate  learning rules,  architectural  features, and  modiﬁcation  of  connection 
strengths.    These  principles  motivate  and  constrain  individual  models 
developed for speciﬁc phenomena.  Though models do not always meet these 
particular  criteria,  these  ideals  provide  the  primary  theoretical  shape  of 
connectionism, and the models it motivates.
In the  next section, we consider criticisms of connectionist theory, and 
discuss  how  some  of  these  criticisms  fail  to heed  the  distinction  between 
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criticism of connectionist theory itself.  Following that, we present an example 
of progress in connectionist modeling that illustrates the nature of constraints 
on models.
Connectionist Theory and Models
A  number  of  critics  fail  to  notice  the  crucial  distinction  between  resilient 
theorist  and  versatile  modeler,  attitudes  that  likely  motivate  most 
theoretically-minded  cognitive  scientists.    Even  more  pronounced,  their 
consequences  can  go  unheeded  in  important  theoretical  debates  about 
connectionist theory.  In this section we consider just a few recent examples of 
this oversight.
Criticism of Connectionism
Failure to Heed the Distinction
There are a number  of recent direct and  indirect criticisms  of connectionist 
theory that fail  to observe  the  distinction  between theory and  model.   For 
example, Green (1998) argues that connectionist models cannot be theories of 
cognition.    Given  our  discussion  above,  individual  connectionist  models 
clearly are not theories of cognition.  His more recent arguments (Green, 2001) 
attack  the  nature  of  parameters  available  to  connectionist  modelers.   He 
argues that, because the parameters are interpretable neither as higher-order 
cognitive states nor brain states, they cannot be adequate models of cognitive 
processes.  However, the constraints on models discussed above indicate that 
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parameters  of  their  models.   In  fact,  the  notion  of  veridicality  constraints 
suggests that most important to simulated phenomena are those parameters 
that represent some feature of the behavioral  data that can be meaningfully 
manipulated or observed as a dependent variable in a simulation.  Besides, the 
interpretability  of  elements  of  connectionist  models  (e.g.,  the  function  of 
hidden layer activity) is perfectly amenable to a variety of analyses providing 
clues about function (Clark, 1990; Bishop, 1995).  Connectionist models are not 
black boxes, because with clever technical  analyses, their operation is being 
illuminated more clearly.
Roberts  and  Pashler  (2000)  also confound  theories  and  models.   In 
indirect criticism of some models, they use the terms “theory” and “model” 
interchangeably,  and  do  not  pay  regard  to  the  two  levels  of  explanation 
prominent in the history of psychology.  Roberts and Pashler argue that data-
ﬁtting  practices  in  computational  or  mathematical  models  are  poorly 
represented  and  largely  uninﬂuential  in  the  history  and  philosophy  of 
science.5  However, it is important to point out that recognizing the distinction 
between  theory  and  model  indicates  that  bad  modeling  practice  does  not 
reﬂect  on  theory.   Our discussion  suggests  that  theory  can  motivate  good 
modeling practices, in which veridicality constraints are met with a variety of 
meaningful parameters, whose manipulation is perfectly reasonable.6
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between data-ﬁtting as bad modeling practice, and ﬁtting-data, a property of 
any good scientiﬁc model.
6 An excellent example of justiﬁed data-ﬁtting with parameters can be seen in 
Dell and colleagues’ work (Dell, Lawler, Harris & Gordon, 2004).Roberts and  Pashler do offer some important  methodological  points 
about  parameter  manipulation  to  meet  veridicality  constraints.   However, 
although  they  do  not  level  criticism  against  connectionism  directly,  or 
computational models per se, there are recent cases in which  the distinction 
and all three consequences are not made clear, and result in an unfair critique 
of  connectionist  theory.    Marcus  (2001)  offers  a  long  examination  of 
connectionist theory and models, with the bold goal of integrating promising 
features  of  connectionism  into  a  classical  cognitive  science.   Despite  this 
seemingly productive  goal, he  neglects  the  distinction  between  theory and 
model, thereby overlooking their evidential relationship, and concludes that a 
whole  class  of  connectionist  model  is  inadequate for  explaining  cognition.   
Moreover, Marcus fails to notice the unique veridicality constraints to which   
each model is subjected.  Some of his attacks on individual models are based 
on subjecting them to tasks at which they were not designed to succeed.    If 
some behavioral task is not included in the model’s intended constraints, it is 
unreasonable to expect the model to perform them, let alone to conclude from 
a  handful  of  such  demonstrations  that  the  class  of  model  is  inadequate 
altogether for any purpose.
To summarize, a number of criticisms  of connectionist models fail to 
make  the  distinction  between  theory  and  model,  thereby  overlooking  the 
important consequences of this distinction.  This has resulted in a number of 
unfair appraisals  of  connectionist theory, and  we think  that  the conceptual 
basis  offered  in  the  ﬁrst  section  may  help  focus  further  debate.   In  the 
following  section,  we  illustrate  that  connectionism  satisﬁes  aspects  of  this 
conceptual  basis through  the various  ways  in which  its  versatile modelers 
encode semantic representations.
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Psycholinguistics is an active area of research in which connectionist theory 
has exerted  signiﬁcant impact.   As a ﬁnal discussion, we will  consider this 
development  with  respect  to  semantics,  considered  an  essential  aspect  of 
language by philosophers and psychologists  for centuries.   The notion that 
semantics  can  be  ignored  in  linguistic  analyses  is  in  obsolescence.    For 
example, even recent formal syntactic theories rely to some extent on semantic 
verb  categorization  principles  for  sentence  structure  (Lasnik,  2002).   
Connectionist  psycholinguistic  models  often  incorporate  semantic 
representations to some extent.  In this section, we consider the ways in which 
theoretical  and  veridicality  constraints  have  impinged  upon  these 
representations.
We  illustrate  here  that  connectionist  models  using  semantic 
representations  range  from  drastic  idealizations  faithful  to  theoretical 
constraints, to scaled-up systems permitting the satisfaction of more complex 
veridicality  constraints.   This  would  satisfy  what  Steedman  (2001)  calls  a 
“project  for  a  scientiﬁc  psycholinguistics,”  in  which  the  explanation  of 
learning language would start earlier in initial perceptuo-motor learning.  In 
fact,  semantics,  he  claims,  is  grasped  so  poorly  because  the  primitives  of 
language are “grounded  in very obscure  ways  in  our physical,  social, and 
intellectual  interactions with the real world.” (p. 364)   Connectionist models 
are vastly improving their approach  to  these veridicality constraints,  while 
still  maintaining  connectionist  ideals.    We  ﬁrst  discuss  some  clear 
idealizations, then move on to the improvements.
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Oliphant  (2002).   In  his  simulation,  a  population  of  Hebbian  networks 
reconcile an atomic semantic meaning with a set of available signals.  Indeed, 
this is even an idealization upon the principle of distributed representations 
described by Smolensky earlier.  However, this idealization permits Oliphant 
to speculate on the emerging learnability of communication systems,  rather 
than their becoming more innately circumscribed.   But this approach by no 
means approaches Steedman’s semantic desiderata.
Another method of encoding lexical semantics is by groups of features.   
Plaut  and  Gonnerman  (2000)  illustrate  this  by  using  randomly  generated 
features.   Their  model  is  an  excellent application  of  this  idealization: Their 
representational system is well-controlled and can effectively test the products 
of different kinds of morphological systems.  Other modelers handpick their 
features  (e.g.,  Hinton  &  Shallice,  1991).   This  method  permits  control  over 
lexical semantics, but lacks further veridicality: The features are at the whim of 
the modelers’  semantic  intuitions.   An  improvement  over this  approach  is 
achieved  by  McRae,  de  Sa,  and  Seidenberg  (1997),  in  which  they  canvas 
hundreds of study participants for features of lexical items.  The result is a list 
of 9,618  features  composing  unique  semantic  vectors  for  190  words.   This 
approach permits modelers to use the intuition of native speakers to generate 
feature  lists,  but  fails  to  approach  the  speciﬁc  perceptuo-motor  issues 
Steedman addresses.
Most  recently,  Plaut  (2002)  has  offered  a  promising  model  that 
incorporates  many  of  the  features  of  Steedman’s  project,  meets  the  broad 
theoretical  ideals  of  connectionism,  and  involves  expansive  satisfaction  of 
veridicality constraints.   In his model, semantic representations, rather than 
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interacting sensory information that converges on a cross-modal layer of units.   
The network has a total of 28,000 connections, primarily in the cross-modal 
``semantic’’ layer.  The integration of sensory information at the semantic layer 
obeys a kind of sensory topography: Different regions of the semantic nodes 
are  devoted  more  or  less  strongly  to  one  speciﬁc  source  of  sensory 
information.   Tactile and visual information were processed by this network 
while it learned to associate a lexical item (encoding in terms of phonological 
features)  or  a  particular  action  (gesturing).   Even  at  the  level  of  detail 
described  here,  it  is  clear  that  this  model  advances  the  state  of  the  art 
considerably by moving beyond previous attempts at encoding semantics and 
taking seriously the kind of constraints Steedman suggests.
In  summary,  connectionist  modeling  illustrates  well  the  notion  of 
competing theoretical and veridicality constraints.  Existence proofs, much like 
Oliphant’s above, can be seen as models whose purpose is to loosely satisfy 
veridicality constraints, but demonstrate the success of theoretical constraints 
and ideals to capture a broad pattern of data.  More substantive models, such 
as Plaut’s, aim to apply theoretical ideals to difﬁcult details (in his case optic 
aphasia), and in due course, satisfy veridicality constraints more broadly than 
any competing theory’s models have yet offered (e.g., modular-computational 
theory of mind; Fodor, 1983, 2000).
 
 Conclusion
 
We  have  presented  a  conceptual  basis  for  considering  theories  and  their 
instantiations,  and  exempliﬁed  them  through  connectionism.  The 
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they  sometimes  level  unfounded  criticism  against  connectionist  theory.   
Despite  this,  connectionism  exhibits  all  the  hallmarks  of  a  good  scientiﬁc 
framework.   Its  theorists  are  resilient,  and  its  methods  allow  for  versatile 
modeling.  It meets both broad and explanatory theoretical constraints, while 
actual  practice within  the approach  continually  scales-up  to  meet  complex 
veridicality constraints.
It is important, however, to remark that, as in any scientiﬁc discipline, 
there  is  always  progress  to  be  made.    Not  all  areas  of  connectionist 
psycholinguistics, or other areas in which models  are adopted, involve this 
important  interplay of existence proofs  and  substantive modeling,  through 
which theoretical and veridicality constraints are satisﬁed.  It is crucial always 
to remain  vigilant  of  limitations  on  the ideals  and  details  of  any scientiﬁc 
research, lest we overlook ways to improve its ideals or learn how to better 
apply  them  (a  mistake  made  recently  by  Marcus,  2001,  who  criticizes 
connectionism,  but  omits  any  reﬂection  on  the  limitations  of  opposing 
approaches  to  which  he  subscribes).    We  only  hope  that  the  proposed 
conceptual  basis  may  encourage  modelers,  connectionist  or  otherwise, 
towards this goal. 
The next chapter explicitly seeks a model that satisﬁes the theoretical 
constraints on the perspective discussed in the introductory chapter: Cognitive 
processes  ﬂow into action  continuously. The  next  section presents  a simple 
connectionist model that captures basic aspects of categorization, along with 
exhibiting  the  important  theoretical  constraint  of  continuous  processing 
through time. 
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The Relationship Between Decision and Action: Simulating Dynamic 
Properties of Responses in Categorization
Introduction
Cognition  is  often  thought  to  happen  in  places  between  the  sensors  and 
effectors,  with  sharp  delineations  at  these  boundaries  (e.g.,  Fodor,  1983; 
Pylyshyn,  2000;  see  Rosenbaum,  2005,  for  relevant  discussion  on  motor 
control). This common account envisages cognition collapse its decisions onto 
the effectors,  directing various motor systems in an all-or-none fashion. For 
example,  numerous  theories  of  attention  posit  central  processing  separate 
from  systems  responsible  for  guiding  action  (e.g.,  Posner,  1980;  Posner  & 
Petersen,  1990).  In  rapid,  frequent,  and  metabolically  cheap  motor  output, 
such as  the ballistic  saccades  of  the eyes,  this  perspective seems  most  apt. 
When the eyes are drawn by an external stimulus, such as a sound source, the 
processing that has led to the saccade is programmed over a couple hundred 
milliseconds, and  once  it reaches  premotor regions responsible for saccadic 
movement,  ﬁres  off  a  motor  instruction  that  may  differ  from  moment  to 
moment only because of noise. In other words, once the command has been 
issued, and the eyes instructed on their movement, a ballistic, linear motion to 
the target should be observed (e.g., Becker, 1991). 
Recently, a growing body of research has revealed that motor systems 
in  fact  interact  more  richly  with  cognitive  processes.  Even  in  the  case  of 
saccadic movements, Doyle and Walker (2001) demonstrate that these rapid 
eye movements may reﬂect underlying attentional processing of visual cues. 
81They show that the eye-movement trajectory in a saccade to a given location 
actually curves depending on distractor or cue stimuli (see also Sheliga, Riggio, 
& Rizzolatti, 1994; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Gaveau, Martin, Prablanc, Pelisson, 
Urquizar, &  Desmurget, 2003). Rather than a direct, linear motion, the eyes 
reﬂect  underlying  processing  in  the  graded  nature  even  of  saccades.  This 
occurs after the cognitive processing has given way to them, and may thus be 
described as a “post-decision” dynamic property of a saccade trajectory, where 
the  purported  “decision”  event  is  deﬁned  as  the  point  at  which  motor 
movement  is  initiated.  Moreover,  when  multiple  ﬁxations  of  the  eye  are 
tracked during an experimental task, they reveal what may be described as a 
dynamically  changing probability  distribution  over graded  representational 
states (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; McMurray, Tanenhaus, 
Aslin,  &  Spivey,  2003).  In  both  individual  saccades  and  semi-continuous 
tracking  of  multiple  eye-movements,  dynamic  properties  of  motor  output 
reﬂect underlying cognitive processing.
Perhaps more compelling is evidence that manual responses exhibit a 
range  of  dynamic  post-decision  characteristics  that  reveal  processing.  For 
example, force and  velocity of  responses  after initiation  vary concomitantly 
with  frequency in  a lexical  decision task (Abrams  &  Balota,  1991; Balota & 
Abrams, 1995), and response and stimulus probability in simple reaction-time 
tasks (Mattes, Ulrich, &  Miller, 2002; Ulrich, Mattes, & Miller, 1999; see also 
Balota,  Boland,  &  Shields, 1989;  Osman, Kornblum,  & Meyer, 1986; Tipper, 
Howard,  &  Jackson,  1997).  More  recently,  Spivey,  Grosjean,  and  Knoblich 
(2005) used  computer-mouse trajectories to study spoken word recognition. 
These trajectories show continuous dynamic activation of multiple competing 
representations  during spoken word  recognition (see also Allopenna, et al., 
821998,  for related  eye-movement results).  In a  similar series of experiments, 
Dale, Kehoe,  and  Spivey (in  press)  show  that computer-mouse  trajectories 
indicate  competition  between  categories  when  classifying  atypical  animal 
exemplars. The dynamic characteristics of the response, in the form of mouse 
trajectories, revealed an attraction towards a featurally-similar category label 
(e.g., ﬁsh) for atypical exemplars (e.g., whale) compared to control trials (e.g., 
cat).
 Numerous  studies  have  suggested  that  properties  of  motor  output 
itself  shed  light  on  their  originating  cognitive  processes.  Perhaps  more 
importantly, these studies show that processing ﬂows in systematic ways into 
motor  behavior,  rather  than  simply  collapsing  onto  them  to  generate  a 
categorical  response.  They  may  indeed  recommend  a  “cascadic  ﬂow” 
perspective on cognition that sees information ﬂow continuously from sensors 
to effectors (McClelland, 1979;  Balota  &  Abrams,  1995; Spivey et  al.,  2005), 
permitting  the  emergence  of  these  post-decision  response  dynamics.  This 
perspective changes the way in which we understand how cognition becomes 
action, their relationship, and possibly their interaction. 
While  a  simplistic  perspective  on  their  relationship  --  envisioning 
cognition collapsing onto action -- may have motivated some to neglect the 
important  psychological  relevance  of  action  (Rosenbaum,  2005),  these 
discoveries  of  dynamic  response  characteristics  suggest  numerous  lines  of 
inquiry.  One  such  question,  and  the  focus  of  the  present  paper,  is  the 
following: What kind of interaction between cognition and action gives way to 
dynamic post-decision characteristics of responses?
In this paper, we employ a neural network model of categorization to 
explore this  question.  We aim to further  elaborate  the  possible relationship 
83and interaction between cognition and action using a localist attractor network 
that categorizes animal exemplars. While the model is simple, it provides an 
explicit  terrain  for  exploring  dynamic  post-decision response patterns, and 
what they might tell us about the cognitive system. 
In what follows, we brieﬂy review research on categorization and the 
role typicality plays in common accounts of categorization. We then present 
two  neural  network  simulations.  The  chosen  network  architecture  permits 
comparison of different relationships  between internal  processing of animal 
exemplars, and an output component that models an explicit motor response. 
In the ﬁrst simulation, we explore this by investigating a parameter space that 
speciﬁes the network’s decision-action relationship. Network conditions that 
vary  this  relationship  are  compared  in  how  well  they  ﬁt  with  human 
experiments  that  show  dynamic  characteristics  of  motor  responses  that 
illuminate  cognitive  processing.  In  the  second  simulation,  we  generate  a 
prediction  about  how  response  dynamics  should  reﬂect  ﬁner  category 
structure: Graded typicality results in graded response dynamics.
Categorization and Typicality
Theories  of  categorization  have  grown  in  sophisticated  ways  over  several 
decades,  from  classical  set  theoretic  approaches,  to  rich  knowledge-based 
accounts of categorization (see Medin, 1989, and Murphy, 2002 for reviews). In 
the current study,  we make use of the graded nature of category structure: 
Categories,  whatever  their  origin,  have  members  that  lie  along  typicality 
gradients. For example, an animal can be more or less typical as a member of 
an  animal  category,  such  as  of  mammals.  The  members  of  the  mammal 
84category thus reveal a typicality gradient, with cats being typical, and whales 
being  considerably  less  typical.  This  results  in  a  variety  of  experimental 
effects. Typical members are recognized faster (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973), 
more consistently (McCloskey &  Glucksberg, 1978),  have many features  in 
common (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), and can facilitate language comprehension 
(Garrod & Sanford, 1977). 
 Dale et al. (in press) make use of this property of category structure to 
uncover post-decision response dynamics in human participants. Computer-
mouse  trajectories  were  recorded  during  a  simple  categorization  task. 
Participants categorized an animal exemplar by clicking the mouse on one of 
two category choices. Mouse-movement trajectories consisted of a movement 
from the center-bottom of the screen, to the correct target on the left or right 
(beside  which was  a  competing category  label).  Target  trials  used  atypical 
animals (e.g., whale) and included an incorrect competitor category that had 
considerable  overlap  in  terms  of  semantic  and  visual  features  (e.g.,  ﬁsh). 
Though  participants  responded  by  clicking  the  appropriate  category  (e.g., 
mammal),  mouse-movement  trajectories  exhibited  substantial  attraction 
toward  the  competitor  category.  Competing  activation  of  the  incorrect 
category in these trials was  evident even  in  the properties  of  the  resultant 
motor output, and not simply in the decision processes leading up to it.
  Categorization  may  be  a  particularly  good  cognitive  process  to 
continue exploring these properties of motor output. Numerous studies have 
employed  fairly  simple  experimental  methodologies,  such  as  cued  ﬁxation 
(e.g., Doyle & Walker, 2001) or cued  reaching (e.g., Tipper et al., 1997), and 
traditional  reaction-time  tasks  (e.g.,  Ulrich,  Mattes,  &  Miller,  1999). 
Categorization  is  a  relatively  “higher-order”  process,  involving  more 
85processing  of  exemplars  prior  to  the  manual  response.  In  addition,  while 
lexical  decision  tasks  also serve as  good  indicators (e.g., Balota  & Abrams, 
1995; Spivey et al., 2005), research on category structure avails itself of a broad 
range of stimuli, both of real and artiﬁcial exemplars, permitting a wide range 
of parameters to be explored  (e.g., Murphy, 1991). More importantly for the 
present paper, theories of category structure have often made use of feature-
based explanations. With very few exceptions, theories of categorization have 
proposed evaluation of object features, and in some manner comparing these 
features to prototypes or exemplars in memory -- perhaps in the context of a 
knowledge domain (see Medin, 1989). This aspect of categorization theories 
makes  this  cognitive process  amenable  to constraint-based  neural  network 
architectures. In the following section, we present a simulation that processes 
features  of  categories  in  parallel,  and  can  model  the  time  course  of 
categorization of typical and atypical animal exemplars.
Before setting forth the current simulations, it is important to note that 
there exist a number of quantitative models for categorization, including basic 
retrieval and recognition mechanisms (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987), category learning 
and  organization (e.g., Love, Medin, & Gureckis,  2004), and even  typicality 
(e.g.,  Hirahara  &  Nagano,  2003;  Smith,  2002)  and  the  time  course  of 
categorization (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Lamberts, 2000). These and related 
models  have  been  applied  in  many  domains  relevant  to  concepts  and 
categorization (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; 
Medin & Shaffer, 1984; Nosofsky, 1987, 1988, 1991; Rehder & Murphy, 2003; 
McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Despite such a broad range of models and their 
application, none makes a distinction between the decision mechanism and a 
component that implements the overt response. For example, Nosofsky and 
86Palmeri  (1997)  and  Lamberts  (2000)  offer  prominent  models  for  the  time 
course of the decision leading up to the response, but not the dynamics of the 
response  itself.  As  described  above,  the  dynamics  of  motor  output  has  a 
character  that  systematically  reﬂects  underlying  cognitive  processing.  We 
make use of a relatively transparent neural network model that facilitates the 
inclusion  of  a  motor-response  component  --  the response  dynamics  of  the 
model discussed below is a natural extension of the architecture of the system 
itself. The model  therefore includes decision and  response components that 
are  very  similar  in  their  operation,  and  the  network  lends  itself  to  a 
straightforward  manipulation  of  parameters  to  explore  the  relationship 
between the categorization process, and the response dynamics it generates.
A  second  important  point  about  the  model  is  that  it  ﬁnesses  some 
debate about the nature of categorization. In particular, exemplar-based and 
prototype-based theories of categorization have been attacked and defended 
with little abatement for the past 20 years (e.g., recently, Smith & Minda, 2000; 
Nosofsky  &  Zaki,  2002).  We  do  not  address  these  broad  debates,  but  for 
simpliﬁcation  assume  a  basic  prototype  for  each  animal  category  used: 
Mammals, ﬁsh, etc., are assumed to have ideal, familiar, frequent, etc. features 
that deﬁne a prototypical exemplar. While this simpliﬁes the presentation of 
the model here, it would not be difﬁcult to implement a learning mechanism 
in the model in which certain features are weighted by exposure to exemplars, 
thus inﬂuencing the model by speciﬁc category exemplars. Moreover, the way 
in which we integrate a response component in the model may be extended to 
the  models  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  We  discuss  a  few  such 
examples following the simulations, in general discussion.
87Simulation 1
Network Architecture
We use normalized-recurrence to simulate the time course of categorization. 
This localist attractor architecture has been used to model a range of cognitive 
processes, including phoneme perception (Spivey & Dale, 2004), spoken-word 
recognition  (Spivey  et  al.,  2005),  online  sentence  processing  (Spivey  & 
Tanenhaus,  1998; McRae,  Spivey-Knowlton,  & Tanenhaus, 1998; Tanenhaus, 
Spivey-Knowlton, & Hanna, 2000), and in modeling the time course of visual 
search  (Spivey  &  Dale,  2004;  Spivey-Knowlton,  1996).  The  architecture  is 
localist  because  individual  units  stand  for  speciﬁc  features  of  the  animal 
exemplars. For example, when having the network categorize cat, one unit in 
the network might be active to represent the feature representing the animal’s 
habitat,  <land>.  The  architecture  is  an  attractor  network  because  iterated 
updates  of its unit  activations  lead  the network towards a  stable state.  By 
applying a set of activation-update rules, the activations of the network’s units 
are  expected  to  asymptote  on  particular  values,  usually  with  one  unit 
obtaining  maximal  activation,  and  competing  units  approaching  minimal 
activation.
The network functions according to two basic computational principles. 
First, multiple feature units simultaneously constrain the network’s behavior. 
Second,  this  parallel  feature  processing  is  integrated  in  a  layer  of  units 
representing alternative outcomes  of the model, in which one unit achieves 
maximal activation over time. Fig. 4.1 presents the current model. It consists of 
an array of feature layers, in which each unit represents a particular property 
88of animal exemplars. These layers feed into an integration layer, in which the 
outcome of categorization is  assessed  by iterated  parallel  processing of the 
constraints (see Table 4.1).
To  further  illustrate  how  the  model  captures  the  time  course  of 
categorization,  we  can  present  an  exemplar  to  the  model  by  setting  the 
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Figure 4.1: Visual depiction of the model, with interconnected layers. The 
motor layer (M) has one-to-one connections from integration nodes (e.g., 
reptile to “r”; and mammal to “m”).
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)appropriate  features  in  the  layers  to  an  activation  of  1,  and  all  those  not 
relevant to 0. For example, when setting features representing the exemplar 
whale, the values for LIMBS  features would  have 1 for <ﬁns>, and 0 for all 
other units. The activity of all these layers serves as input at the integration 
layer by taking a sum over all  relevant nodes. For  the  processing of  whale 
features, the net input to the mammal node would be the sum of the activation 
levels of the units representing mammalian features – in this case, 0 for <legs>, 
but 1 for <air> as source of oxygen, and so on. When processing whale, the ﬁsh 
node will thus receive some net input from the <ﬁns> feature unit.
 The integration layer is then updated by normalization: The units are 
made to sum to 1 all together by dividing these net input values by the total 
net input to the integration layer across all units. This normalized activation 
then feeds back into the feature layers,  these are then normalized, and  the 
cycle  is  continued  until  the  integration  layer  becomes  stable.  Fig.  4.2 
represents such a simulation run for whale, in which repeated iteration results 
in  stable and  maximal  activation  of  the unit for  mammal  in the integration 
layer.1
 Formal presentation of this models’ functioning is straightforward. Net 
activation into the i-th integration unit is the total sum of its relevant feature 
units across all  the feature layers (the i-th unit in each layer). From this net 
input, the output from this integration unit is obtained by dividing this input 
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1   In  this  example  and  all  simulations,  to  increase  the  “task 
veridicality” (Chriatiansen & Chater, 2001), and make similar its trials to those 
of human participants, the model was permitted to “see” the category labels 
for 5 iterations prior to having the exemplar presented. This served to lend 
some small activation to the features relevant to these potential categories.activation  by the total  sum of  activation  into all  integration  units.  With Fk 
representing the k-th feature layer in the set of layers F, and I the integration 
layer, 
€ 
netI,i,t = aFk,i,t−1
F
k
∑
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Table 4.1: Categories and their prototypical features used in the model
Category
Feature Fish Mammal Bird Reptile Insect
OXYGEN water air air air air
BIRTHING eggs live eggs eggs eggs
HABITAT water land sky land sky
BLOOD cold warm warm cold cold
SKIN scales fur feathers scales exo-
LIMBS fins legs wings legs wings€ 
aI,i,t = netI,i,t / netI, j,t
I
j
∑
where net.,i,t and a.,i,t represent net input and activation of the i-th unit of the 
given layer at time step t. The value netI,2,t  is the net input to the second unit of 
the integration  layer,  receiving  input  from the  second  feature unit  of  all  6 
layers of F. The subsequent activation of a feature unit is determined by the 
sum  of  its  previous  activation  and  that  activation  multiplied  by  the 
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Figure 4.2: An example run of the network over multiple iterations for the 
exemplar  whale.  At  ﬁrst,  categories  (integration  unit  activations)  are 
relatively  similar,  and  gradually  the  unit  representing  mammal  gains 
maximal activation, and incorrect categories approach 0. Due to featural 
overlap between whale and the category ﬁsh, this unit more successfully 
competes with mammal than the others.
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Fishcorresponding  input  from  the  integration  layer.  Each  feature  layer  then 
outputs  a  normalized  activation,  as  in  the  integration  layer.  This  process 
continues  until  one  unit  in  the  integration  layer  (or  motor  layer)  reaches 
criterion activation (see below).
€ 
netFk,i,t = aFk,i,t−1 + aI,i,t •aFk,i,t−1
€ 
aFk,i,t = netFk,i,t / netFk, j,t
Fk
j
∑
There are a  number  of  beneﬁts  to this  simple  architecture.  First,  its  inner-
workings  are  directly  scrutable.  While  it  is  important  to  seek  scaled-up 
systems  that  ﬁt  data  from  categorization  (e.g.,  Love  et  al.,  2004)  or  other 
processes (e.g., language processes, Rohde, 2002; Plaut, 2002), simple models 
that capture core theoretical principles may serve as explicit and transparent 
accounts for basic patterns of behavioral or neurophysiological data. One such 
core  theoretical  principle,  a  second  beneﬁt  of  this  model,  is  conceiving 
cognitive processes as subject to simultaneous informational constraints. This 
constraint-based  approach  to  the  time-course  of  categorization  ﬁts  with 
perspectives on related cognitive phenomena (e.g., Simon & Holyoak, 2002), 
particularly  psycholinguistic  processes  (e.g.,  Bates  &  MacWhinney,  1989; 
MacDonald, 1994; Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999), and  other feature-based 
approaches to semantic knowledge (see McRae, 2004, for a review). Finally, 
this  transparency  and  theoretical  property  are  implemented  in  a  simple 
system that operates through iterated  updates of its activations. This makes 
normalized-recurrence particularly suitable for capturing temporal properties 
93of cognition,  an  important goal  for  models  of  a  cognitive  process  such  as 
categorization (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).
 As shown above, this model permits tracking of competing category 
nodes, and exhibits  a time course showing one winning over the others. In 
order  to  map  this  categorization  model  onto  a  simulated  response,  we 
supplement it with an additional bank of nodes that receives input from the 
integration  layer.  This  “motor”  bank  of  units,  denoted  M,  represents  the 
outcome response, and also exhibits a time course over iterations of the model 
(see Fig. 4.1). Just as the integration layer approaches a stable decision through 
input from feature layers, the motor layer does so through  input from the 
integration layer. At a given time tα, some number of time steps over which 
integration and feature layers have interacted, these M units begin to receive 
activation from the integration layer in a manner similar to how the feature 
layers receive integration activation. 
€ 
netM,i,t = aM,i,t−1 + aI,i,tα +t−1•aM,i,t
The activation of the i-th unit aM,i,t is then similarly normalized. The parameter 
tα may be varied, allowing M to receive input from the categorization decision 
at different points in time. We choose to vary this parameter by observing the 
“conﬁdence” of the categorization decision -- the maximal activation found in 
the integration  layer,  denoted here as  α. The integration and  feature layers 
may therefore be permitted to interact for a period of time (up to iteration tα) 
before  M  receives  input  from  the  integration  layer  when  the  maximal 
activation in the integration layer is α or higher.
94 As  outlined  further  below,  this  allows  a  number  of  parameters 
specifying  the  interaction  between  I  and  M  to  be  modiﬁed.  First,  a 
“collapsing” of the integration layer’s information before it outputs to M can 
be  implemented.  This  has  the  effect  of  producing  a  serial  transfer  of 
information from the categorization process into the generation of a response. 
Second,  the point  in  time at  which  M begins  to  receive  input  from I, and 
begins  to  update  its  activation  towards  a  stable  output  response,  can  be 
modiﬁed. Finally, M may be included in the set of layers F that feed into the 
integration layer. This allows the process of categorization to be inﬂuenced by 
available responses in the task.
Procedure
In  the  following  simulation,  we  compared  three  different  initial  network 
conditions.  An  atypical-competitive  condition  involved  initializing  a  non-
prototypical  exemplar  (e.g.,  whale),  and  a  featurally-similar  competing 
response  possibility  (e.g.,  ﬁsh).  An  atypical-noncompetitive  condition  was 
different only in activating a less saliently competing response unit (e.g., bird). 
Finally,  in  a  typical  condition,  (proto)typical  feature  values  were  activated, 
with a randomly selected competing response option. Table 4.2 presents the 
basic outline of simulation runs. Each trial in the conditions was selected to 
have some overlap with Dale et al. (in press), in which human participants 
were subjected to similar trial types.
The beginning of a simulation run involved setting feature layer units 
to their relevant values, and turning the two relevant response units to .5 to 
have equibiased initial  response options. According to the equations above, 
95Table 4.2: Initial network conditions: Exemplars and response options
Condition Exemplar Correct / Incorrect category
atyp-competitive whale mammal / ﬁsh
penguin bird / ﬁsh
bat mammal / bird
atyp-noncompetitive whale mammał /reptile, bird, insect
penguin bird / reptile, bird, insect
bat mammał / reptile, ﬁsh, insect
typical prototype mammal / (4 others)
prototype bird / (4 others)
96activation then feeds into the integration layer, and back, until the motor layer 
reached criterion activation (.95). 
As mentioned above, the parameters of this attractor network may be 
modiﬁed so as to vary the relationship between the categorization units in I 
and  the  output  units  M.  Three  separate  sets  of  runs  using  these  network 
conditions were conducted to explore this relationship. In the ﬁrst, we merely 
demonstrate that the model captures the intuition regarding serial output to 
motor processes:  Categorical  output  to  motor  units  produces  a  categorical 
time course of responding. In a second and third set of runs we reveal that the 
graded response dynamics exhibited in the time course of M is inﬂuenced by 
two factors. First, how much pre-decision processing occurs before I comes to 
generate a response in the motor layer. And secondly, how interaction between 
motor and integration layers contributes to graded effects observed in human 
experiments. Each of these conditions is outlined individually below.
Collapsing  Information  Before  Output.  This  condition  is  a  simple 
demonstration of the absence of graded patterns the model’s “motor output.” 
This  occurs  when  the  integration  layer  I  collapses  its  information  once  a 
criterion  activation  has  been  reached.  For  this  simulation,  we  choose  a 
threshold of .5, while any value will work. Once aI,i,t for some unit i achieves a 
value of .5 (and all others will thus be .5 or less), aI,i,t is set to 1, and all other 
categories  to 0.  This loses the graded information contained  in I, and  then 
propagates to M to generate a response. The parameter tα is thus set to that 
particular iteration’s time step when there is .5-activation in one unit of the 
integration layer (α = .5). 
Varying α. The point in time at which activation ﬂows from I to M can 
also be varied. This can be accomplished by varying the conﬁdence threshold 
97(α)  at  which  the integration  layer begins  to inﬂuence  the  motor  layer. As 
mentioned, tα is deﬁned as the point at which one integration layer unit has 
activation of α or greater in each subsequent iteration:
€ 
tα = ′  t   ,   
€ 
where max(aI, ′  t ) ≥α and  
€ 
max(aI, ′  t −ε) <α, ε =1, ...,  ′  t −1
We do this while maintaining the non-integral activation values in layer I. We 
chose three levels  of threshold  α  that  span  a  reasonable range of possible 
activation of the integration units: 0, .4, and .8. This parameter will reveal in 
the model the amount of processing that may lead to or diminish dynamic 
post-decision  dynamics  in  the  activation  of  M.  We  hold  the  interaction 
parameter (β; see next section) constant at 1 while modifying tα.
Varying  Interaction  between  I  and  M.  Finally,  we  examine  whether 
interaction between integration and motor layers contributes to graded output 
in the model, and as observed in human experiments. To do this, we add a 
term to the net input to unit i in I:
€ 
netI,i,t = aFk,i,t−1
F
k
∑ + β •aM,i,t−1
This permits activation in M, set at the beginning of the simulation run, to 
impinge on the time course of the categorization decision -- activation in I. The 
interaction parameter β permits variable interaction from M to I, and we use a 
broad  range of values  again: 0,  .5, and  1. We hold  tα constant across these 
parameters using a threshold of α = 0.
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Collapsing Information Before Output. Fig. 4.3 presents mean motor activation of 
networks when information is collapsed for the winning category unit (e.g., 
mammal for whale). All run conditions were normalized into 10 time steps so 
they could be overlaid  (Spivey et al., 2005; Dale et al., in press). The ﬁgure 
presents the iteration after competing response units are set at .5, showing the 
subsequent 9 normalized time steps before the motor units reach criterion of .
95 or greater. All conditions, whether atypical or typical, exhibit the same time 
course of  output. This perhaps trivial  result merely serves  to illustrate that 
adopting the all-or-none assumption in the current architecture naturally leads 
to  identical  motor  responses  once  the  categorization  decision  has  been 
established.
Varying α. Fig. 4.4  presents the effect of increasing or decreasing the 
threshold  at which  I begins to feed into M. The normalized  time course of 
correct  category units  becomes  more similar across conditions  as  threshold 
increases. The earlier the integration layer feeds into motor,  the greater the 
competition effect  seen in the atypical-competitive activation change. As  an 
additional check of this pattern, we ran two further parameter values having 
tα  established  at  integration  thresholds  0,  .2,  .4,  .6,  and  .8.  The  average 
difference between atypical-competitive and  typical  trajectories  in  the three 
middle time steps diminishes signiﬁcantly as this parameter is increased (r = -.
97, p < .005).
Varying Interaction between I and M. Fig. 4.5 shows that feedback from M 
into  I  is  not  required  to  generate  the  graded  patterns  in  the  atypical-
competitive  condition.  However,  increasing  feedback  from  M  generates  a 
99slight competition in the atypical-noncompetitive runs. Again, we ran another 
two parameter values (β =  .25 and .75), and  tracked the average difference 
between the middle three time steps for atypical-noncompetitive and typical 
conditions. This difference increases signiﬁcantly with β (r = .98, p < .005). In 
other words, there emerges a disparity in the output dynamics of typical and 
atypical-noncompetitive runs when one allows motor and integration layers to 
more ﬂuidly interact.
Mapping to Human Data.   To investigate the relationship between the 
simulation and human data, we analyzed x-coordinates in manual trajectories 
drawn from Dale et al. (in press). A number of measures may be used, such as 
y-coordinate  and  Euclidean  distance  to  target.  However,  the  x-coordinate 
more closely represents proximity to correct or incorrect target (since, in the 
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Figure  4.3:  No matter  the  initial  condition  of  the  network,  the  time 
course of the motor response  is  precisely the same (cross =  atypical-
competitive; triangle = atypical-noncompetitive; circle = typical).
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Figure  4.4:  As  the  conﬁdence  threshold  decreases,  differences  between 
conditions become more marked. The sooner the integration layer inputs to 
response units, the more extensive the effect of typicality (cross = atypical-
competitive; triangle = atypical-noncompetitive; circle = typical).102
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Figure 4.5: As the interaction parameter for M and I increases, differences 
between typical and  atypical-noncompetitive become more marked. The 
more  the  integration  layer  receives  feedback  from  available  response 
options, the more extensive the effect of  typicality even  if the response 
options  are  not  obviously  competing  (cross  =  atypical-competitive; 
triangle = atypical-noncompetitive; circle = typical).experiment, y-coordinates are the same for each category response label). In 
addition, differences in x-coordinates have served as the basis for comparing 
response dynamics in previous work (Spivey et al., 2005; Dale et al., in press). 
Data from the lexical  categorization tasks in Dale et al. (in press) are 
shown in Fig. 4.6. This graph depicts similarly normalized time courses of the 
same trial types in human experiments as the manual response’s x-coordinate 
reaches  its  target. The  ﬁgure  bears resemblance  to network  conditions  that 
involve interaction between integration and motor layers in both directions. In 
fact, in both perceptual (i.e., pictures) and lexical categorization, Dale et al. (in 
press)  observed  curved  motor  trajectories  in  trials  akin  to  atypical-
noncompetitive network conditions here, along with the more intuitive effect 
103
0
0.5
1
Time
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
T
o
w
a
r
d
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
(
x
)
Figure  4.6:  Normalized  x-coordinate  location,  giving  proportion  of  x-
coordinate within a trial completed, grouped into  the same number of time 
bins  used  in  the  simulation  (cross  =  atypical-competitive;  triangle  = 
atypical-noncompetitive; circle = typical).of  atypical-competitive  conditions.  In  a  correlation  of  corresponding  time 
steps, these normalized x-coordinate proportions show a strong relationship 
with  M  activation  in  the  high  interaction  (β  =  1)  and  early  motor  input 
condition (α = 0; r = .99, p <  .0001). When conducting the same regression 
analysis over the other parameter values, one obtains increases in ﬁt in the 
expected  directions (see Fig. 4.7). The best ﬁt with human data is obtained 
when interaction between integration and motor layers is maximized: When β 
is large (high interaction between I and M), and α is small (early input to M).
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Figure 4.7: As the interaction parameter β   (dotted  line) is increased, a 
better ﬁt is  achieved  with  normalized  human  data. As  the  conﬁdence 
threshold α (solid line) is increased, the opposite holds. Discussion
Results  of  this  simulation  suggest  that  a  model  of  categorization  which 
involves  interaction  between  decision-making  and  response-generation 
components ﬁts best with data from human participants. In addition, when 
the model involves early activation of the response component by the decision 
component, the pattern of competition seen in the simulation conditions again 
matches human data. Put simply, the data observed in human experiments are 
modeled by a system in which decision and action ﬂuidly interact.
It is important to note a few caveats before generating a prediction from 
the model. First,  as noted  in the introduction  to the normalized-recurrence 
architecture, this simulation is not intended to capture categorization in full 
detail.  Instead, the  architecture  instantiates  parallel  feature  processing that, 
through iteration, leads to a stable network state. The speciﬁc conﬁgurations 
employed  in  the current simulation  resemble a  simpliﬁed  semantic  feature 
space for animal categories and their exemplars. Second, the parameter range 
explored  is  not  intended  to  map  directly  onto  any  neurophysiological 
variables. The fact that the best match the human data are the parameters’ 
extreme values by itself makes it inappropriate to pursue this -- in fact, given 
the simplicity of the model, seeking such a correspondence may be setting it 
too great a task. A related concern is the exact nature of the neural processes 
governing manual output. It may be possible that multiple independent motor 
programs generate the response dynamics in such experiments as Spivey et al. 
(2005) and Dale et al. (in press). The model cannot currently address this issue.
Therefore,  rather  than  capturing  categorization  and  its  underlying 
neural substrate, the model provides a simpliﬁed computational system that 
105explores  the  effects  of  two  interacting  systems.  One  system  acts  through 
constraints imposed by features to decide on a relevant category node; another 
acts through this decision component at a given later time to mediate between 
only two possible stable states (the correct vs. incorrect node). Results suggest 
that, in such a context, ﬂuid interaction between these components generates 
dynamic output patterns resembling human data.
Simulation 2: Typicality Gradients in Output
If this architecture is to serve as a basis for comparing the role of decision and 
action components, then it should  generate predictions in different stimulus 
contexts.  One  explored  here  is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  feature-based 
processing  of  the  network.  As  in  numerous  experiments  in  categorization 
(discussed in the introduction), the model should exhibit patterns of responses 
whose characteristics lie along typicality gradients: Response dynamics for cat 
should  reveal  less  competition  than  that  for  whale,  with  graded  results 
between these typical and atypical extremes.
Procedure
We  selected  mammals  as  the  category  whose  typicality  gradient  will  be 
explored in this simulation. Exemplars of this category were generated by the 
following procedure.  Starting  from  a  prototypical  feature  arrangement,  we 
selected  one  or  two  feature  layers,  and  randomly  changed  their  value  to 
correspond  to  that  expected  by  another  category.  For  example,  we  might 
change the prototypical  mammal  pattern by choosing LIMBS, and  changing 
106the initial  network condition  to begin  with <ﬁns>  rather than  <legs>.  This 
generates approximately 50 atypical (sometimes hypothetical) exemplars. The 
response options activated with .5 at the beginning of a simulation run were 
the correct category (mammal), and a randomly selected incorrect category.
 While the previous simulation used three groups of network condition, 
the current simulation involves a gradient of typicality. Rather than grouping 
the various generated exemplars, we seek to establish a relationship between 
typicality  values  (semantic  distance;  see  below),  and  dependent  measures 
drawn  from  a  network’s  behavior  when  processing  these  exemplars.  We 
investigated a network’s response dynamics using two measures drawn from 
the  behavior  of  M  over  multiple  iterations  of  a  run.  The  ﬁrst  is  the  total 
amount of time required for the motor units to achieve a maximum value of .
95.  This  output  measure  corresponds  to  the  amount  of  time  the  motor 
response is “in motion” before completion, as in human experiments in Spivey 
et al. (2005) and Dale et al. (in press). The second measure is the amount of 
activation achieved by the ﬁfth time step. This value was chosen to sample, on 
average, network progress at approximately 40-50% of its total response. This 
serves  as  a crude measure  of  the “velocity”  of  the output dynamics, used 
similarly  in  Spivey  et  al.  (2005)  in  human  participants.  Interaction  and 
threshold components were at their maximum value (β  = 1; α = 0).
The  response  dynamics  of  the  network  is  sensitive  to  typicality 
gradients if we observe a signiﬁcant relationship  between  the similarity (or 
dissimilarity) of the modiﬁed exemplar to the prototypical mammalian feature 
pattern, and our output measures. A “dissimilarity” or distance measure was 
obtained  using  the  Euclidean  distance  in  feature  space:  Once  the  atypical 
vector  was  generated  by one or two  modiﬁcations,  the Euclidean  distance 
107between it and the original  prototypical  mammalian vector was  computed. 
After  all  network  runs  were  completed,  we  conducted  regression  analyses 
between output measures, and exemplar distance from prototype.
Results
Regression results show a signiﬁcant relationship between distance in feature 
space and both output measures. Total response time was positively related to 
typicality:  The more typical  an  animal  (shorter semantic  distance),  the less 
time required for the motor response to be generated (r = .30, p <  .001). In 
addition, the activation of the network by the ﬁfth time step was signiﬁcantly 
related to distance from the prototype. Animal exemplars at a greater distance 
from the prototype had lower activation (r = -.29, p < .001).
We ran this same typicality-gradient simulation over parameter values 
that ranged from highly interactive between decision and action. The highest, 
used in the ﬁrst regression analysis, has the M to I parameter (β) at a high 
value (1), and decision threshold (α), at a low level. We varied these values by 
jointly  decreasing β  and  increasing α, and  with each  variation  conducting 
regression analyses to test for typicality gradient effects. Results are presented 
in  Fig.  4.8.  As  interactivity  between  decision  and  action  components 
diminishes, typicality gradient effects substantially diminish.
Discussion
If response dynamics ﬂows systematically from their cognitive processes, the 
current simulation predicts  that  typicality  gradients  should  be exhibited  in 
108measures drawn from output. These gradients do not hold when the model 
has little interaction between decision and action components. Like research 
on lexical decision and frequency (e.g., Abrams & Balota, 1990), this suggests 
that similar correlations between output and typicality measures will obtain in 
human experiments on categorization. 
109
Figure  4.8:  Time  required  for  response  (solid  line),  and  motor 
activation  of  correct  option  (dotted  line)  correlated  with  Euclidean 
distance  of  generated  exemplar  as  interaction  (β)  and  decision 
threshold  (α)  vary.  Signiﬁcant  typicality  gradients  are  achieved  as 
interaction grows (high interaction, low threshold for response). Note: 
r in the motor activation is  a negative relationship -- i.e., higher the 
motor  activation,  the  lower  the  distance  to  mammalian  prototype.   
Solid horizontal line indicates cutoff for signiﬁcant r given N.
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rGeneral Discussion
Normalized-recurrence  provides  a  simple  yet  ideal  arena for exploring the 
interaction among constraints that underlie taxonomic categorization. These 
constraints involve the parallel processing of features, and an accumulation of 
information  that guides  the  categorization  decision and  resultant  response. 
This  model  indeed  resembles  several  recent  simulations  that  also  seek  to 
characterize the time course of categorization (e.g., Lamberts, 2000). While the 
current  model  is  simple,  it  offers  some  explicit  insight  into  the  possible 
relationship  between the categorization decision, and the resultant response 
itself.  In  the  model,  patterns  of  competition  observed  in  human  data  are 
obtained when both the decision process and the motor output concurrently 
and continuously interact. The kind of approach used here may suggest ways 
in  which  existing models  (e.g.,  Nosofsky &  Palmeri,  1997;  Lamberts,  1995, 
2000) might integrate action parameters, thereby providing a fuller picture of 
the  cognitive  process:  Accounting  for  not  just  the  hypothesized  internal 
processes,  but  information  accumulation  all  the  way  into  the  observable 
response behavior and its time course. For example, the Nosofsky and Palmeri 
model  involves  a random-walk process where exemplars race each other to 
help  categorize  a  test exemplar. Including a  motor component may simply 
involve integrating a second random-walk process in which possible category 
responses race each other for selection. Interactive parameters could then be 
similarly explored. 
One possible promissory note about such models is a synthesis of “pre-
decision”  process  models,  and  the  experimentally  observed  relationship 
between  process  and  response  characteristics.  Growing  research  on  the 
110embodiment  of  cognition  (e.g.,  Barsalou,  1999;  Clark,  1977)  shows  that 
parameters  of  action  can  impinge  on  the  cognitive  processing  eventually 
leading  into it (e.g., Glenberg &  Kaschak,  2002; Tucker &  Ellis,  1998).  The 
current  model  provides  some  simple  means  by  which  computational 
mechanisms of these effects can be devised.
 The current model has some obvious limitations. Firstly, it is extremely 
simple. The model simply embodies basic computational principles regarding 
constraint-based  feature  processing,  and  the  continuous  integration  of  this 
information. However, it is perhaps surprising that such simple assumption 
can  succeed  in  generating  the  kind  of  response  patterns  observed  in  the 
human  experiments:  Both  competitive  and  noncompetitive  trials  and  their 
graded response characteristics can be captured in this system. 
 Secondly,  as  discussed  earlier,  the  model  does  not  seek  to  resolve 
current  debate  regarding  opposing  theories  of  the  categorization  process. 
While  the  model  may  prima  facie  have  difﬁculty  ﬁtting  knowledge-based 
results  of  categorization,  its properties serve as  an  exploration of  the  time 
course of categorization given certain conditions. Those assumed here at least 
sufﬁcient to model basic categorization tasks. While this is promising, others 
seek to scale up computational models of categorization and category learning 
(Love et al., 2004). The current model may again provide some motivation for 
integrating output-based dynamics to model responses. 
In conclusion, these simulations aim to further the argument that the 
process  of  categorization does not serially project into the effectors. Rather, 
manual output responses may receive continuous information ﬂow from the 
categorization  process  as  it  unfolds.  Moreover,  these  action  parameters 
themselves may serve as further constraints on the categorization process -- 
111thereby  suggesting  that  cognition  and  action  are  not  bounded  by  strict 
demarcation, but interact ﬂuidly and systematically.
112CHAPTER FIVE
Typicality Gradients in Lexical Categorization 
Revealed by Graded Manual Responses
Introduction
An  increasing  amount  of  research  reveals  that  dynamic  characteristics  of 
motor  output  reﬂect  underlying  cognitive  processing,  rather  than  simply 
reﬂecting the discrete decision resulting from that  processing.  For example, 
when the cognitive system directs manual output amidst an array of graspable 
objects,  the  arm’s  movement  does  not  always  proceed  in  ballistic  fashion 
toward a single selected object, but may reveal subtle dynamic characteristics 
depending on the nature of underlying processing. Both manual output and 
oculomotor responses demonstrate these dynamic  characteristics intrinsic to 
the temporal extent of a response, not just the ﬁnal outcome of the response. 
For  example,  Doyle  and  Walker  (2001)  demonstrate  that  saccadic  eye 
movements reﬂect attentional  processing of visual cues in  a  simple ﬁxation 
experiment.  Saccade  trajectories  to  the  same  location  exhibit  very  subtle 
differential curvature depending on the position of distractor or cue stimuli 
(see  also  Sheliga,  Riggio,  &  Rizzolatti,  1995).  Additionally,  considerable 
research over the past 10 years has shown that eye movements offer a semi-
continuous measure of ongoing cognitive processing (Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 
1995;  Tanenhaus,  Spivey-Knowlton,  Eberhard,  &  Sedivy, 1995;  Underwood, 
2005). Aggregate data  from eye  movements  often  indicate a  graded  nature 
inherent to cognition in general.  
113Similar  ﬁndings  demonstrate  that  manual  motor  output  can  reveal 
graded  representations.  The  force  and  velocity  of  manual  responses  vary 
concomitantly  with  frequency in a  lexical  decision  task (Abrams &  Balota, 
1991; Balota & Abrams, 1995), and response and stimulus probability in simple 
reaction-time tasks (Mattes,  Ulrich, & Miller, 2002; Ulrich,  Mattes, & Miller, 
1999; see also Osman, Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986; Balota, Boland, & Shields, 
1989). And in experimental work similar to the saccade trajectory experiments 
described  above, Tipper, Howard, and  Jackson (1997) have shown that arm 
trajectories  can  curve  depending on  the  visual  distractor  context  in  which 
reaching motions are made (see also Tipper et al., 1992; Sheliga et al., 1997). 
More recently,  Spivey, Grosjean, and  Knoblich (2005) and  Dale, Kehoe, and 
Spivey  (in  press)  used  computer-mouse  trajectories  to  show  that  graded 
manual  output  reveals  temporal  continuity  in  the  underlying  cognitive 
processes in spoken word recognition and categorization. 
In the latter two studies, manual trajectories were measured  through 
streaming  x-y  coordinates  of  computer  mouse  movement,  and  revealed 
attraction to other response choices in the visual display. For example, in Dale 
et  al.  (in  press),  mouse  trajectories  were  recorded  during  lexical  and 
perceptual  categorization  of  animal  exemplars.  Participants  categorized  an 
animal  by  clicking  the  mouse  on  one  of  two  category  choices.  Mouse-
movement trajectories consisted of a movement from the bottom center of the 
screen,  to the  correct  target  on  the  upper left-  or right-hand  corner  of  the 
screen  (beside  which  was  a  competing  category  label).  Target  trials  used 
atypical animals (e.g., whale) with an incorrect competitor category that had 
considerable  overlap  in  terms  of  semantic  and  visual  features  (e.g.,  ﬁsh). 
Though  participants  responded  by  clicking  the  appropriate  category  (e.g., 
114mammal),  mouse-movement  trajectories  exhibited  substantial  attraction 
toward  the  competitor  category.  Competing  activation  of  the  incorrect 
category in these trials was  evident even  in  the properties  of  the  resultant 
motor  output,  and  not  simply  in  the  decision  processes  leading  up  to  it. 
Information ﬂows from the sensors into the categorization process and does 
not  “discretize”  before  issuing  motor  output  to  the  effectors.  Instead,  the 
effectors  themselves  seem  to  reﬂect  some  of  this  processing  given  the 
typicality of the exemplar (e.g., rabbit vs. whale), and the featural overlap with 
the competing category (e.g., ﬁsh).
This  literature  most  often  explores  movement  dynamics  in  simple 
experimental manipulations. For example, in both the saccade (e.g., Doyle & 
Walker, 2001) and manual response research (e.g., Tipper et al., 1997), motor 
trajectory curvature occurs in simple contexts containing visual distractors. An 
important  outstanding  concern  is  the  extent  to  which  properties  of  motor 
dynamics  reﬂect ﬁner-grained  aspects of  the underlying processing task. To 
make this point clearer, consider the categorization experiments in Dale et al. 
(in  press) just  described.  While these experiments relied  on two groups  of 
animal exemplars, highly typical (e.g., rabbit) and highly atypical (e.g., whale), 
they did not explore whether typicality gradients between these extremes are 
evident in mouse trajectories. Similar research on lexical decision suggests that 
there should be a relationship between such stimulus parameters and motor 
output (e.g., Abrams & Balota, 1991). 
Given  the  extensive  inﬂuence  of  typicality  in  categorization  (see 
Murphy, 2002), and  that motor output may reﬂect cognitive processing, one 
should also expect that motor output would reveal gradedness as a function of 
typicality in a similar categorization task. Even further details regarding the 
115underlying factors contributing to graded motor output can be acquired by 
exploring what speciﬁc semantic features deﬁne the typicality gradients along 
which output varies. For example, when categorizing animal exemplar names 
(lexical  items), one might expect that certain semantic  features constraining 
that  process  would  exert  more  of  an  inﬂuence  than  others.  For  example, 
perhaps  static  visual  features,  such  as  shape  or  color,  exert  more  of  an 
inﬂuence if animal exemplars were presented in picture form. 
The  following  experiment  aims  to  supply  some  insight  into  these 
issues. A large set of animal lexical items is categorized in the same task as Dale 
et al.  (in press), but the competing, incorrect category is  randomly selected 
from  4  possible  alternatives.  Motor  output  is  again  measured  in  terms  of 
mouse trajectories. The subsequent analysis provides clues about ﬁner-grained 
processing  exhibited  by  motor  output.  Firstly,  typicality-gradient  effects 
should  be revealed in the motor output. Secondly, because lexical  items are 
being processed, we use multiple typicality measures  to reveal that speciﬁc 
feature sets are related to the typicality gradient along which motor output 
varies. Results demonstrate that the effectors exhibit cognitive processing in 
systematic ways: Effects found in research on categorization decisions are also 
revealed  in  their motor output. In  addition, motor output  can uncover the 
semantic features of the stimuli that underlie the lexical categorization task.
Experiment
Participants 
31 Cornell University undergraduates participated in the study for extra credit 
in psychology courses. All participants were right-handed.
116Materials 
Basic-level animal names were selected from the concept-name set of McRae et 
al.’s (1997) study in which participants listed features of various animals and 
objects. For the present study, we used  125 of McRae et al.’s animal names. 
Each animal  corresponded  with a  superordinate  category of  mammal, ﬁsh, 
reptile, bird, or insect. The experiment was programmed using RealBasic, and 
presented on an Apple eMac computer. A standard one-button Apple mouse 
was sampled using RealBasic’s Timer control at a rate of approximately 40 Hz.
Procedure 
At the start of each experimental trial, participants were presented with two 
superordinate animal categories, one category name in the upper right-hand 
corner of the computer screen and one category name in the upper left-hand 
corner  (with approximately 16  degrees  of  visual  angle between categories). 
After 2000 ms, a 1 cm2 square appeared  at the bottom center of the screen 
(approximately 13 degrees of visual angle from either category name). When 
participants clicked on this square with the computer mouse, the square was 
replaced by a basic-level animal name that corresponded with one of the two 
superordinate animal categories already at the top of the screen. Participants’ 
task was to click on the superordinate category corresponding with the animal 
name  for  that  trial.  Before  the  125  experimental  trials,  each  participant 
completed three practice trials. The animal name presentation order and each 
trial’s incorrect category were randomized. Likewise, the presentation side of 
the category names (left vs. right) was also random. Streaming x-y coordinates 
117were  recorded  between  participants’  click  on  the  square,  and  their  ﬁnal 
categorization choice (see Fig. 5.1A).
Typicality/Similarity Measures 
Three  different  typicality  measures  were  explored.  These  measures  were 
aimed at quantifying the proximity of each animal to the incorrect categories 
in semantic feature space using a distance metric. Typicality here refers to the 
proximity in  semantic  space of  animals to categories  of  which  they are not 
members  (e.g.,  in  semantic  feature  space,  a  whale  is  more  typical  of  the 
category ﬁsh than of the category cat). Typicality here is  then (dis)similarity, 
expressed  through semantic distance, between the animal exemplar and the 
central featural properties of the incorrect, competing label which is assumed 
to draw the manual trajectories towards it.
Each of the 125 animal names can be represented as a sparse semantic 
vector  in  a  205-dimension  feature  space  drawn  from McRae  et  al.’s  (1997) 
concept-name  set.  These  semantic  features  were  organized  into  three 
groupings:  visual-dynamic,  visual-static,  and  category  features.  Visual-
dynamic features (109 total) depicted speciﬁc animal behaviors, e.g., “swims” 
and  “eats  seeds.”  Visual-static  features  (74)  depicted  speciﬁc  appearance 
characteristics,  e.g.,  “has  a  long  tail”  and  “is  furry.”  Category  terms  (22) 
included non-visual labels often used to classify animals, e.g., “is domestic” 
and  “is  endangered.”  These  groupings  deﬁned  three  typicality  measures: 
Proximity in semantic space using dynamic features, static features, and the 
full 205 feature set.
The  125  animals  can  be  mapped  in  a  semantic  space  with 
dimensionality of the number of  relevant features (dynamic, static, or full). 
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Figure 5.1B: Depiction of dependent measures.
Figure 5.1A: What participants saw, along with a hypothetical mouse 
trajectory to the correct category.
 Each  category’s  central  tendency  point  was  determined  by  averaging  the 
coordinates of its constituent animals. In the resulting space, the most typical 
animal  exemplars of each category clustered around their category’s central 
tendency point. On the other hand, atypical animal exemplars (e.g., whale) of 
each category were positioned much further away, often nearer to the central 
tendency point of an entirely different animal category (e.g., ﬁsh).
Output Measures and Analyses
Streaming x-y coordinates were sampled from the presentation of the lexical 
item, to the ﬁnal categorization click, and only correct trials were subjected to 
analysis. Four properties of manual output were extracted from these mouse-
movement  data  (see  Fig.  5.1B).  First,  the  movement  initiation  time  was 
computed by measuring the number of samples before mouse movement was 
detected (i.e., while the cursor was motionless after the start of a trial). From 
the  remaining  trajectory  representing  output  motion,  we  calculated  the 
number of time steps required to ﬁnish the categorization (movement time), 
the total area occupied by the trajectory compared to an assumed straight line 
to the correct  category  (area), and  the closest  point in the trajectory to the 
competing  category  (proximity  to  incorrect  category).  All  measures  were 
based  on raw Timer control  samples extracted in RealBasic, rather than  an 
approximated temporal measure.
Analyses aimed to detect the extent to which each feature set predicted 
these dependent  measures.  In  other words,  if  an animal’s  feature  vector is 
close  to  a  competing  category’s  vector,  one  would  predict  that  output 
measures would  represent attraction towards  that category label.  Therefore, 
proximity to the incorrect category label should be smaller (closer to label) if 
120the distance between the animal and incorrect category in semantic space is 
small. To test this, we performed a two-part analysis. Both tests make use of 
item-based observations. Each animal is paired with 4 randomly selected non-
targets. With 125 animals, we therefore have 500 item types supplied by the 
experiment.  The subsequent analyses  are  based  on  these 500 item-category 
pairs.  Each  pair  has  observations  averaged  across  participants  who 
encountered it in a trial during the experiment. These data were used in the 
two-part analysis.
In  the  ﬁrst part,  we separated  animals  along typicality gradients by 
using one standard  deviation  (SD) of the mean  distance from animals  to a 
given category (i.e., all animals to bird). This produced two groups of animals 
for each category. The ﬁrst group (N 㲓  60 in the three feature sets), one SD 
below the mean distance, represents those animals close in semantic space to the 
competing category. The second group (N 㲓 60), one SD above, is particularly 
distant from the central tendency of the category (see Table 5.1 for examples). 
We conducted t-tests between these groups for each measure.
In  a  second  test,  we sought to conﬁrm  that  signiﬁcant  relationships 
between typicality and the measures held across the entire group of animals. 
To  do  this,  we  computed  a  regression  coefﬁcient  between  the  typicality 
measures  and  the  output  measures.  Proximity  to  incorrect  category,  for 
example, should reveal a positive relationship with typicality (measured here 
in  distance): Closer semantic distance  measures  should  signiﬁcantly predict 
closer spatial proximity measures in the mouse movements.
121122
Table 5.1: Some examples of close and distant animals in dynamic semantic 
space
Close animals (one SD below mean of distance for given category)
animal category distance
seal ﬁsh .30
dove insect .31
walrus ﬁsh .34
Distant animals (one SD above mean of distance for given category)
animal category distance
skunk insect 1.09
moth ﬁsh 1.08
bull bird 1.06Results
Participants  erred  on  2.45%  of  experimental  trials.  These  trials  were  not 
included in statistical tests.
In comparing the groups of above/below one SD to the mean distance 
in  dynamic  feature  space,  animals  close  to  competing  categories  exhibited 
larger trajectory area (69386.7 vs. 64671.4 pixels2, t(122) = 2.0, p < .05), longer 
time in motion (26.3 vs. 23.3 samples, t(122) = 2.6, p < .05), and signiﬁcantly 
closer proximity to the competing category label (340.7 vs. 368.1 pixels, t(122) 
= 2.6, p < .05). Neither visual nor full 205-dimensional feature space exhibited 
any signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant differences.
Regression analyses revealed the same pattern. Only dynamic feature 
space again revealed signiﬁcant relationships between output measures and 
distance. These are presented in Table 5.2, along with the results for static and 
full space regressions.
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Table 5.2: Regressions across sets and output measures
r
Measure Dynamic Static Full
Area -.13** -.01 -.03
In motion -.15*** .04 .00
Proximity .13** .04 .04Discussion
Results  further  support  that  dynamic  properties  of  motor  output  reﬂect 
cognitive  processing.  The  output  measures  signiﬁcantly  relate  to  typicality 
gradients for categories and animals that are not their members: The closer the 
proximity  in  semantic  space  between  animal  and  incorrect  category,  the 
greater the attraction of the manual response towards that category label. In 
addition, by separating the feature space in terms of different semantic content 
(function  vs. visual  features),  we  ﬁnd that the dynamic  feature set predicts 
attraction to the non-target label, while static visual features do not. Although 
there are a number of caveats regarding the immediate implications of these 
semantic  spaces  (see  below),  this  at  least  suggests  that  motor  output  is 
reﬂecting ﬁner-grained featural semantics that underlie lexical categorization 
in the task. 
An  additional  analysis  that  may test this claim is to conduct similar 
tests  using  Latent  Semantic  Analysis  (LSA;  Landauer  &  Dumais,  1997),  a 
semantic representation scheme based on co-occurrence of lexical items in text. 
If motor output reﬂects the processing of lexical  items speciﬁcally, then we 
should also observe signiﬁcant results when computing typicality gradients in 
terms of LSA measures.
LSA Analysis
LSA  measures  computed  semantic  similarity  (rather  than  distance  or 
dissimilarity) between animal names and the 4 alternative categories to which 
they do not belong. We should therefore expect the reverse pattern of results 
for our dependent measures.
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distance  from  mean  typicality.  These  did  not  produce  signiﬁcant  results. 
However, unlike the regression results above for visual, but similarly for the 
function feature space, LSA  signiﬁcantly predicted  all dependent  measures: 
area, r = .14, p < .01, movement time, r = .11, p < .05, and proximity, r = -.10, p 
<  .05.  While  the  SD  separation  of  animal-category  pairs  did  not  attain 
signiﬁcance, the regression results reveal that typicality gradient effects hold 
with LSA measures.
Movement Initiation Time
We present a ﬁnal analysis that tests a prediction made by the perspective that 
processing  ﬂows  into the  effectors.  If  cognition  indeed  does  not  discretize 
information prior to initiating motor output during categorization, then there 
is  likely  an important  temporal  component  to the  process.  If  a participant 
allows a relatively large amount of time to pass during a trial before initiating 
their response, then one would not expect there to be signiﬁcant dynamical 
competition in  output:  By spending more time evaluating the animal name 
and category labels before moving, the decision process may reach a higher 
level of certainty. The upshot may be a more reliably linear, ballistic movement 
to the correct category label. 
We looked at the relationship between movement initiation time and 
the  output  measures.  One  measure  exhibits  a  signiﬁcant  relationship. 
Proximity to competitor is positively related (r = .15, p < .001). In other words, 
the longer the amount of time spent before initiating motor movement, the 
less spatial attraction exerted by the competing category.
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In everyday life, our arms move continuously during such tasks as gesturing 
in  conversation,  organizing  objects  on  a  table,  or  managing  cooking 
ingredients. Their neural substrate is a fairly slow system (relying heavily on 
prediction; e.g., Flanagan & Lolley, 2001), not ﬁring off movements in staccato 
fashion (much like saccades), but often changing course mid-path, or issuing 
graded movements as it directs the arms to their target. This intuition about 
everyday movement is demonstrated in the foregoing results, and in the array 
of  motor-dynamics  ﬁndings  reviewed  above.  Even  in  a  relatively “higher-
order” cognitive process such as categorization, manual output has internal 
characteristics that likely reﬂect the categorization process itself. In the above 
results, mouse trajectories vary concomitantly with typicality gradients, and 
these gradients may lie along semantic dimensions relevant to the processing 
task (lexical categorization).
Nevertheless, a number of important limitations should be noted. First, 
the results, while robust, are thus far fairly weak. There may be a number of 
reasons  for  this.  Firstly,  Dale et  al.  discovered  that  lexical  stimuli  generate 
weaker  competition  effects  in  mouse  trajectories  --  if  picture  stimuli  were 
used, stronger effects of typicality may be observed, along with the potential 
importance of static visual features.
Secondly, previous ﬁndings with saccadic trajectories show an effect of 
location  of  distractors  relative  to  targets,  resulting  in  varying  strengths  of 
trajectory curvature (see Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002, for a review). In the kinds 
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of  relative  location.  Further  studies  may  explore  different  locations  of 
competing category labels,  and  whether this  weak result is inherent to the 
nature of  interaction  between  cognition  and  action,  or  perhaps  the design 
presented here involved response choices situated too close or too far to reveal 
more marked trajectory effects.  
Thirdly,  little  was  done  to  transform  the  semantic  feature  space 
afforded by McRae et al.’s (1997) concept set (e.g., multidimensional scaling, 
row/column  normalization,  similarity-metric  transformation).  Also,  these 
feature sets were not intended to deﬁne categories – so raw feature values in 
Euclidean space were used to infer category clusters. Moreover, we did not 
make use of typicality scores for correct categories. We feel that this is in fact a 
more conservative test of the predictions made above, because raw Euclidean 
distance between  animal  and  incorrect  category relates  to motor  measures, 
without  adding  the  additional  information  regarding  proximity  to  correct 
category semantics. Further detailed analysis of McRae et al.’s (1997) semantic 
feature space may thus strengthen these results.
Despite  these  limitations,  the  proximity  of  correct  and  incorrect 
category labels  did  produce dynamic  motor movement effects that  reliably 
correlate with raw semantic feature space. The results further contribute to a 
wide  literature  on  processing  distinctions  between  mode  of  stimulus 
presentation: Categorization of lexical items may rely on semantic information 
that is distinct from that centrally involved in categorizing pictures of animal 
exemplars (e.g., Snodgrass, 1984; Viswanathan & Childers, 2003). Although it 
is  possible that the limitations  may have rendered detection of visual  static 
effects undetectable, further exploration may seek to explore the contribution 
127of visual (or other perceptual) information in both decision- and output-based 
measures in lexical categorization (see, e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999). One approach 
is to make use of picture stimuli of the 125 animal names (e.g., Dale et al., in 
press). Another, as  mentioned, is to subject the semantic feature space used 
here to more detailed analyses, perhaps revealing the relevance of other visual 
or other perceptual semantic features in more sensitive tests. 
The  ﬁndings reported  here  challenge  the common  intuition that  the 
properties  of  motor  output  are  uninformative  of  cognition.  Perhaps  more 
importantly, they suggest that processing ﬂows in systematic ways into motor 
behaviors,  rather  than  simply  being  collapsed  onto  them  to  generate  a 
categorical  response  (cf.  Gold  &  Shadlen,  2000).  They  may  recommend  a 
“cascadic  ﬂow”  perspective  on  cognition  that  sees  information  ﬂow 
continuously from sensors to effectors (McClelland, 1979; Balota & Abrams, 
1995; Spivey et al., 2005). These results lend support to this perspective, which 
challenges  the discrete perspective on the way in which a central  cognitive 
process, such as categorization, becomes action. 
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From Apples and Oranges to Symbolic Dynamics:
A Framework for Conciliating Notions of Cognitive Representation
1. Introduction 
Since  its  inception,  cognitive  science  has  offered  up  a  wide  array  of 
hypothetical constructs, intervening somewhere between our sensors and our 
effectors, to explain our observable behavior.  Many of these constructs can be 
ﬁled under the umbrella term “representation.”  Representations might “stand 
for”  things  in  the  world  (Bloom  &  Markson,  1998),  be  asymmetrically 
dependent  with  worldly  objects  (Fodor,  1987),  they  might  get  stored  or 
processed  or  recalled  (Atkinson  &  Shiffrin,  1968),  and  they  surely  change 
somehow during development and  learning (Danovitch & Keil, 2004).   This 
generic construct has appeared and reappeared in a variety of forms, labeled 
variously with the terms “traces” (e.g., Rosen, 1975), “schemata” (e.g., Bartlett, 
1932; Neisser, 1976), “categories” (e.g., Rosch, 1975), “concepts” (e.g., Medin, 
1989),  “object  ﬁles”  (e.g.,  Feigenson  &  Carey,  2003),  and  so  on  –  perhaps 
describable as different forms of representation. 
There is no single agreed  upon theory or deﬁnition of representation 
among cognitive scientists (Dietrich & Markman, 2003).  The details about any 
particular brand of representation are mostly speciﬁc to the theory in which it 
plays  a role – but  each brand  can  be  characterized in terms  of  some basic 
features.    Nonetheless,  even  these  most  fundamental  properties  of 
representation are the subject of continuing debate in cognitive science.  One 
such property concerns  the temporal  and  spatial  extent  of  representational 
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family of theories may be described as “discrete-symbolic,” because they claim 
that  internal  representational  states  involve  discrete  computational 
information structures that are manipulated in logical  algorithmic processes.   
Here, “computational” can be understood  intuitively as structures  that take 
the form of  something  a digital  computer would  process  –  content  that  is 
discrete in space and time.  A competing family of theories may be described 
as  “continuous-distributed,”  because  they  instead  invoke  representational 
states that are spread out in space, and extended in time.   These states are 
graded, statistical, and probabilistic – they cannot be individuated discretely 
in  time, or uniquely in their informational  content.   Continuous-distributed 
representations contain probabilistic informational patterns that might blend 
into other such representations, whereas discrete-symbolic representations are 
by deﬁnition independent uniquely identiﬁable states that are each separate 
from, yet used in conjunction with, other discrete representations (Dietrich & 
Markman, 2003).
Debate  continues  about  which  composition  is  the  most  appropriate 
foundation for cognitive explanation.  Recently, Dietrich and Markman (2003; 
Markman  &  Dietrich,  2000)  have  offered  persuasive  arguments  about  the 
crucial  role  of  symbolic  representation  in  higher-order  cognition,  such  as 
conceptual  organization,  problem  solving,  and  language  (see  also  Marcus, 
2001;  Pinker,  1997).    Meanwhile,  Spivey  and  Dale  (2004)  argue  that  a 
continuous  composition is extensively  evidenced  throughout  even  complex 
cognition, offering examples  from real-time language processing and  visual 
cognition (see also Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi & Plunkett, 
1996;  Port  &  Van  Gelder,  1995).   In  this  article,  we  provide a  review  and 
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formats can be directly compared and evaluated.  We suggest that a kind of 
“mathematization”  of  the  problem  space,  in terms  of  nonlinear  dynamical 
systems and symbolic dynamics, can aid in a variety of ways.  The descriptive 
power  of  dynamical  systems,  and  the  computational  power  of  symbolic 
dynamics  based  on  them,  can  reveal  an  epistemological  synthesis  of  this 
debate,  and offer an  illuminating framework for exploring such conceptual 
conciliation.    For  reasons  that  we  describe  later,  we  do  not  expect  the 
framework of symbolic dynamics to make moot the debate between discrete 
and  continuous descriptions  of  mental  activity, but  rather may pose  as the 
level  playing ﬁeld  on  which the debate may actually achieve a consensual 
resolution. 
A case may be made for mathematization  of  scientiﬁc  domains as  a 
course toward resolving theoretical disputes, clarifying conceptual confusions, 
and  making  potential  decisions  concerning  the  greater  validity  of  one 
verbalized scientiﬁc description over another (e.g., for a discussion of this in 
psychology,  see  Meehl,  1998).   What  early  calculus  did  for  Newtonian 
mechanics, tensor calculus for general relativity, symbolic logic for computer 
science, among other possible examples, is to provide a formal framework for 
exploring  the  relationships  among  observables,  thereby  making  explicit 
predictions  that  can  be  tested  empirically.    A  common  mathematical 
framework, within which different theories compete, permits more rigorous 
evaluation  of  hypotheses  that  otherwise  would  be  couched  merely  in  a 
verbalized form. For example, despite the growing popularity of quantitative 
models,  it  is  not  difﬁcult  to  ﬁnd  theories  in  cognitive  psychology  whose 
existence enjoys only verbal description.  This certainly does not invalidate the 
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reminded  of  the  youth  of  cognitive  science.   The  bigger  problem  is  that 
multiple competing theories in verbal form may be conducive to debate with 
little  chance  of  resolution.   For  one  thing,  without  a  common  formal 
framework, it may be difﬁcult to tell if two competing theoretical schemes are 
in fact mutually exclusive, or perhaps even extensionally equivalent.  In other 
words,  without  explicit  formulation  of  the  relationship  among  theoretical 
entities, in more or less formal terms, it may be difﬁcult to determine whether 
two  competing  entities  are  two  distinct  incommensurable  accounts,  two 
different aspects of  one process, or merely two different descriptions of the 
same process.  Secondly, theorists of differing persuasions may be talking past 
one  another,  preventing  a  Hegelian  “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”  resolution 
that  may  be  revealed  by  a  common  framework  permitting  conciliation  of 
competing notions. 
There  are  pursuits  in  cognitive  science  that  beneﬁt  from  aspects  of 
formalization at present.  For example, connectionist models have been used 
as  a  common  information-processing  framework  for  evaluating  competing 
theoretical  accounts  of  cognitive  processes  involved  in  language.  McRae, 
Spivey-Knowlton,  &  Tanenhaus  (1998)  used  a  localist  attractor  network  to 
compare directly the immediate information-integration predictions from the 
constraint-based  theory of sentence processing  (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & 
Seidenberg, 1994) to the architecturally delayed  integration predictions from 
the Garden-Path theory (Frazier, 1995).  Drawing from work by Elman (1990) 
and Schütze (1994), Spivey-Knowlton and Saffran (1995) used a connectionist-
like framework to directly compare the advantages of incremental prediction 
and explicit negative evidence in learning a simple language structure.  Also, 
132particularly  relevant  to  our  concerns  here,  homogeneous  versus  hybrid 
simulations using connectionist principles have recently been  developed  to 
compare dual- vs. single-route models of reading (Harm & Seidenberg, 1999; 
Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, Langdon & Ziegler, 2001).  Other formal frameworks, 
such as Bayesian modeling (Tenenbaum & Grifﬁths, 2001), genetic algorithms 
(Chater,  Christiansen  &  Reali,  2004),  and  statistical  models  of  sentence 
processing (Chater & Redington, 1996) have been manipulated in ways that 
allow comparison of competing theories.  
The  overarching theoretical  concern,  however, is  that  many of  these 
models  involve too many degrees  of  freedom  to  make  them  a sufﬁciently 
agreed-upon  common  ground  for  comparing  theoretical  constructs  whose 
properties are highly disparate.   Comparing individual  models of particular 
processes  is  surely  valuable  and  inevitable,  yet  fundamental  theoretical 
differences  in  cognitive science  cannot  be  contacted  through  manipulating 
already-existing architectures.1  The debate over representation is particularly 
illustrative  in  this  respect.    Those  who  propose  symbolic  rules  and 
representations  have often urged  core qualitative differences between these 
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1 This is not to say that theoretical debate cannot proceed by comparing 
distinct architectures and their ability to capture the data – because this is 
already an area of productive debate in cognitive science (e.g., Pitt, Myung, & 
Zhang, 2002; Roberts & Pashler, 2000).  We are instead recommending the use 
of a single formal framework that permits comparison of different theoretical 
constructs that could exist within that framework. The relative contribution of 
these different constructs for ﬁtting experimental data, within the same set of 
agreed mathematical or formal principles, would then adjudicate between the 
competing theories.kinds of states and the probabilistic distributed states that are the hallmark of 
statistical models, such as connectionist simulations.  For this reason, choosing 
a formalization that has a pre-existing afﬁliation with a particular theoretical 
framework, such as a production system or a connectionist model, biases the 
enterprise toward the theory from which the model originated.   A common 
ground  should  instead  derive  from  a  formalization  that  can  already 
adequately incorporate and implement both sides of the theoretical debate.  A 
mathematization or formalization of the debate over representation needs a 
common  framework  for  directly  comparing  symbolic  states  and  dynamic 
processes within the same explanatory arena.
 In this article, we propose that a branch of dynamical  systems theory may 
serve as this common ground.   Symbolic dynamics has both complemented 
understanding of the continuous-time nature of systems, along with providing 
groundbreaking insight into the computational power inherent in dynamical 
systems  (e.g.,  Crutchﬁeld,  1994).   A  few  proposals  concerning  symbolic 
dynamics  have already been offered  from  contributors outside of  cognitive 
science.   Below we introduce symbolic dynamics  for the cognitive scientist, 
and  review some of  these  proposals.  Before describing this  framework,  we 
ﬁrst  offer  discussion  supporting  the  position  that  some  portion  of  our 
perceptuałcognitive processes  is  already awash  in continuity:  That the best 
physical description of the mind/brain must invariably invoke, at some level, 
continuous (or discretely-approximated continuous) bases for understanding 
the  substrate  of  cognition.  A  theory  of  cognition  is  superimposed  on  this 
continuity in two broad ways historically:  Discrete-symbolic  or continuous-
distributed representational states and  processes  as the theoretical  basis for 
cognitive explanation.  We then introduce symbolic dynamics as a framework 
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both kinds of explanation.  We ﬁnally offer our own consideration of symbolic 
dynamics,  with  its  potential  contribution  to  and  limitations  in  cognitive 
science.
2. Continuity
A  key  point  Dietrich  and  Markman  (2003)  use  to  support  discrete 
representations is our cognitive system’s ability to form categories for objects 
in  our  world:  “If  a  system  categorizes  environmental  inputs  then  it  has 
discrete representations” (p. 101).  Moreover, they argue, continuous accounts 
of  categorization  would  miss  the  mark,  since  categorization  by  deﬁnition 
involves  consistent  responses  to  completely  distinct  elements  in  our 
environment  –  it  makes  no  room  for  continuity  (historically  this  may  be 
arguable, cf. Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973; Rosch, 1975).  Although Dietrich and 
Markman offer extensive discussion to forestall possible replies, there remains 
a problem with this perspective.  What the authors dub “enduring classes of 
sameness”  (p.  101),  in  an  environment  that  our  system  must  categorize, 
involve discrete internal representations whose primary evidence comes from 
what might be called time-course irrelevant responses during a cognitive task.   
An outcome-based  response measure, such as a forced-choice categorization 
task,  is  time-course  irrelevant  because  the  temporal  dynamics  of 
representational activations leading up to the forced choice go undetected by 
the response measure.  Such response measures may artiﬁcially exaggerate the 
degree  to  which  the enduring classes  exhibit  their sameness.  For  example, 
even  the  cognitive literature’s darling of discrete mental  events, categorical 
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1957),  exhibits  some  graded  sensitivity  to  continuous  phonetic  feature 
information when its temporal dynamics is measured with reaction times and 
eye movements (McMurray, Tanenhaus, Aslin, & Spivey, 2003; Pisoni & Tash, 
1974; see section 2.2 below).   In this article, we consider two realms, visual 
cognition and language comprehension, in which an unmistakable continuity 
is observed even in seemingly discrete, categorical tasks (see Spivey & Dale, 
2004, for further review). 
2.1 Vision
Vision research is replete with examples of continuity in real-time perception.   
The  gradual  settling  of  a  population  code  of  neurons,  over  the  course  of 
hundreds  of  milliseconds,  is  a  typical  way  to think  about  how  the  visual 
system  recognizes  objects  and  faces.  Compelling  visualizations  of  the 
continuous manner in which sensory input gradually produces a percept can 
easily be found in visual neuroscience. We brieﬂy consider three cases: Object 
and face recognition, visual search, and perceptual decisions.  
Rolls  and  Tovee  (1995)  recorded  from  neurons  in  macaque 
inferotemporal cortex, and found that it takes a few hundred milliseconds for 
a  responsive  population  of  cells  to  achieve  their  appropriate  ﬁring  rates 
indicating  full  identiﬁcation  of  a  ﬁxated  object  or  face.  The  cumulative 
information (in bits) provided by an inferotemporal neuron in the service of 
recognizing a face or object accrues  continuously (though nonlinearly) over 
the  course  of  about  350  milliseconds  until  asymptote.  Perrett,  Oram,  and 
Ashbridge  (1998)  demonstrate  similar  patterns  of  gradual  accumulation  of 
136neuronal evidence during face recognition.  When an object or face is partly 
rotated away  from  the  frontal  view,  recognition or matching will  generally 
take longer as a function of how far it is rotated (e.g., Cooper & Shepard, 1973; 
Jolicoeur,  1985;  Shepard  &  Metzler,  1971;  see  also  Georgopoulos,  Lurito, 
Petrides, Schwartz, & Massey, 1989).  Perrett et al. (1998) describe recordings 
from cells in the monkey temporal  cortex  during viewing of frontal,  three-
quarter  proﬁle,  proﬁle,  and  quarter  proﬁle  schematic  faces.   When  the 
accumulated action potentials are plotted  over time,  these curves gradually 
rise  to  asymptote  over  the  course  of  several  hundred  milliseconds,  but  at 
different rates as a function of how canonical the face orientation is.
The same kind of gradual accumulation of perceptual evidence can be 
observed  when  multiple  objects  are  competing for  attention  during  visual 
search. Although  a  serial-processing  account  has  argued  that  the  observer 
allocates attentional resources wholly and discretely to individual objects, one 
at a time (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1988; see also Wolfe, 1992), 
a parallel-processing account is recently being developed in which attention is 
best  characterized  as  involving  partially-active  representations  of  objects 
simultaneously competing for probabilistic mappings onto motor output (e.g., 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Reynolds & Desimone, 2001). In fact, a wide range 
of  studies  have  been  suggesting  that  the  traditional  distinction  between 
putatively  “serial”  and  “parallel”  search  functions  is  best  revised  as  a 
continuum of search efﬁciency rather than two separate mechanisms of visual 
search (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Nakayama & Joseph, 1998; Olds, Cowan, 
Joliceur,  2000;  Wolfe,  1998;  see  also  Spivey,  Tyler,  Eberhard,  &  Tanenhaus, 
2001).
137Finally,  Gold  and  Shadlen  (2000)  examined  decision  processes  in 
macaque visual perception.  A common task in visual psychophysics involves 
presenting a display of quasi-randomly moving dots.   As the experimenter 
increases the proportion of dots that move in a roughly consistent direction, 
the perception of a coherent direction of ﬂow amidst the dots becomes more 
apparent  (Britten,  Shadlen,  Newsome,  &  Movshon  1992).  Monkeys  were 
trained  to  indicate  the  perceived  direction  of  dot  ﬂow,  upon  offset  of  the 
stimulus,  by  making  an  eye  movement  to  one  peripheral  location  or  an 
opposite  one.   After  identifying  a  relevant  frontal-eye  ﬁeld  (FEF)  region, 
electrical  microstimulation  evoked  an  involuntary  saccade  that  was 
perpendicular  to  the  two  voluntary  response  saccades.   On  some  of  the 
direction-of-ﬂow  judgment  trials,  this  region  was  microstimulated 
immediately after the moving dot display disappeared, i.e., exactly when the 
monkey was  supposed  to  produce  a  voluntary  eye  movement that  would 
indicate his response regarding the perceived direction of ﬂow of the dots. By 
incrementally  increasing  viewing  time  of  the  stimulus  before  this 
microstimulation, the experimenters were able to observe the gradual increase 
in  “strength”  or  “conﬁdence”  of  the  perceptual  decision  over  time,  as 
indicated  by the degree to which  that  voluntary saccade “leaked  into”  the 
execution  of  FEF-microstimulated  evoked  saccade.  Thus, the  population  of 
FEF cells that produced the evoked  saccade were already somewhere in the 
process  of  settling  toward  a  pattern  of  activation  that  would  produce  the 
voluntary response saccade.  If the microstimulation took place early on in this 
decision  process,  rather  little  effect  of  the  voluntary  response  would  be 
apparent in the direction of the evoked saccade, but if the miscrostimulation 
took  place  later  on  in  the  decision  process,  a  signiﬁcant  amount  of  the 
138voluntary response would be apparent in the direction of the evoked saccade.   
This ﬁnding suggests that decision processes themselves may be coextensive 
with  the  gradual  settling  of  partially-active  and  competing  neural 
representations in oculomotor areas of cortex (Gold & Shadlen, 2001; Schall, 
2000; see also Georgopoulos, 1995).
2.2 Language
Much like visual perception, language comprehension also exhibits a form of 
temporal dynamics that reveals underlying continuous-distributed formats of 
representation.   There  is  considerable  evidence  that  the  multiple  levels  of 
linguistic  complexity  –  comprehension  of  speech  sounds,  words,  and 
sentences – are driven by graded, partially active representations.  At the level 
of  speech  sounds,  the  phenomenon  of  categorical  perception  was  long 
adduced  as  evidence  for  discrete  representational  states  (Liberman,  1982).   
Lately  it  has  been  subject  to  extensive  empirical  investigation,  and  made 
consistent  with  more  temporally  dynamic  approaches  to  categorization 
(Damper & Harnad, 2000; see also Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones, 1977).   
For  example,  McMurray  and  Spivey  (1999)  tracked  participants’  eye 
movements while they performed the standard categorical identiﬁcation task.   
This  task  involves  categorizing  sounds  that  lie  on  a  voice-onset-time 
continuum between “bah” and “pah,” by clicking a relevant icon on one or the 
other  side  of  the  computer  screen.  Thus,  in  addition  to  recording  the 
participants’ explicit choice, there was also a semi-continuous record of how 
the eyes tended toward one or the other response icon during categorization.   
With “pah” or “bah” sounds near the categorical boundary, eye movements 
139exhibited conspicuous vacillation between categories before the overt mouse-
click  response  was  made.  Despite  the  apparent  categorical  nature  of  the 
eventual choice, eye movements revealed a more continuous decision process 
that  is  sensitive  to  some  of  the  graded  acoustic-phonetic  variation  in  the 
stimulus. These temporary phonemic ambiguities exhibit their effects not just 
in  phoneme categorization tasks but also in spoken word recognition tasks 
(McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2002; McMurray et al., 2003).  
At the level of word recognition, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, Eberhard, & 
Tanenhaus (1994) demonstrated cohort  effects in eye-movement patterns by 
having  subjects  follow  instructions  to  manipulate  real  objects  on  a  table.   
Participants  sat  in  front  of  a  table  containing  a  central  ﬁxation  cross  and 
various objects around it (e.g., a fork, a mug, a candle).  In some trials, objects 
whose names had similar initial phonemes were present on the table, available 
for manipulation (e.g., a bag of candy and a candle). Even before the spoken 
word  was  completed,  eye-movements  to both objects  were often  observed, 
such as brieﬂy ﬁxating the candle when instructed  to “Pick up  the candy.”   
This phonologically similar object conspicuously attracting eye movements is 
indicative  of  the  competing  lexical  representation  being  partially  active 
during, and perhaps shortly after, delivery of the spoken word.   Headband-
mounted  eye-tracking  studies  like  this  have  demonstrated  this  real-time 
lexical competition using computer-displayed objects (Allopenna, Magnuson, 
& Tanenhaus, 1998), using artiﬁcial lexicons (Magnuson, Tanenhaus, Aslin, & 
Dahan,  2003), with young children (Fernald,  Swingley, &  Pinto,  2001), and 
even across two languages in bilingual  participants (Marian & Spivey, 2003; 
Spivey & Marian, 1999).
140Finally,  in sentence  processing,  eye  movements can again  reveal  the 
continuous intake and use of information during comprehension of a spoken 
utterance. For example, when presented with a real 3-D display containing an 
apple on a towel, another towel, and an empty box, and then instructed to 
“Put the apple on the towel in the box,” participants often look brieﬂy at the 
irrelevant lone towel near the end of the spoken instruction before returning 
their gaze to the apple, grasping it, and then placing it inside the box (Spivey, 
Tanenhaus, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 2002; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, 
&  Sedivy,  1995).  In  this  case,  the  syntax  is  ambiguous  as  to  whether  the 
prepositional  phrase  “on  the  towel”  is  attached  to  the  verb  “put”  (as  a 
movement  destination)  or to  the  noun  “apple” (as  a modiﬁer).   Given  the 
actions afforded by the display, the latter syntactic structure is the correct one. 
However, the brief ﬁxation of the irrelevant lone towel indicates a temporary 
partially-activated  incorrect  parse  of  the  sentence.   To  demonstrate  the 
inﬂuence of visual context on this syntactic ambiguity resolution process, the 
display was slightly altered to include a second apple (resting on a napkin).  In 
this  case,  the  visual  co-presence  (in  Herb  Clark’s,  1992,  terms)  of  the  two 
potential referents for the phrase “the apple” should encourage the listener to 
interpret the ambiguous prepositional phrase “on the towel” as a modiﬁer (in 
order  to  determine  which  apple  is  being  referred  to)  rather  than  as  a 
movement  destination  (cf.  Altmann  &  Steedman,  1988;  Crain  &  Steedman, 
1985; Spivey & Tanenhaus, 1998).  And, indeed, with this two-referent display, 
participants  rarely  ﬁxated  the  irrelevant  lone  towel,  indicating  that  visual 
context  had  exerted  an  immediate  inﬂuence  on  the  incremental  syntactic 
parsing of the spoken sentence (Spivey et al., 2002; Tanenhaus et al., 1995; see 
also Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers, & Pickering, 2003).
141The current state of affairs  in the ﬁeld  of  sentence processing is  at a 
consensus  with regard  to  the  continuity  of  information ﬂow, and  has  been 
gradually  approaching  consensus  with  regard  to  the  rapid  integration  of 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatic context (Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 2004).  Just 
as  the  processing  of  speech  sounds,  at  the  scale  of  tens  of  milliseconds, 
appears  to  be  characterized  by  multiple  partially  active  phonemic 
representations  competing over time (McMurray et al.,  2002,  2003), and the 
comprehension  of  spoken  words,  at the  scale  of  hundreds  of  milliseconds, 
appears to be characterized by multiple partially active lexical representations 
competing  over  time  (Allopenna  et  al.,  1998;  Marslen-Wilson,  1987; 
McClelland & Elman, 1986), so does the resolution of syntactic ambiguity, at 
the scale of seconds, appear to be characterized by multiple partially active 
syntactic representations competing over time (MacDonald et al., 1994; Spivey 
& Tanenhaus, 1998; Stevenson, 1994; Tabor & Tanenhaus, 1999).
2.3 Summary
From perception, such as visual processing, to cognition, such as the various 
levels  of  linguistic  processing,  there  seems  to  be  extensive  evidence  for 
continuous-distributed  representation  (see Spivey &  Dale,  2004, for further 
discussion and  examples).   There nevertheless  remains  considerable debate 
about the nature of representation in other areas of cognition.  In particular, in 
“high-level” cognitive processes such as reasoning and problem solving, there 
seems  to  be  markedly  slower  success  with  continuous-distributed 
frameworks.  This situation is exacerbated further by the comparatively rapid 
rise,  and  longer  history,  of  discrete-symbolic  accounts  of  reasoning  and 
142problem solving (e.g., Weizenbaum, 1966; Winograd, 1970; Newell & Simon, 
1976).  
If  it  can  be granted  that  perception  is  largely driven  by continuous 
change in processing states, then for the discrete-symbolic perspective to be 
right  about  cognition,  there  must  be  a  “discretization”  that  happens 
somewhere in between perception and motor output.  The debate can then be 
placed in the following terms: How early in the system do  our theories need to 
postulate this discretization, thus invoking a language of discrete symbols generated 
through  causal  inﬂuences  of  continuous  processes?    A  purely  continuous-
distributed account of cognition might place this discretization at the extreme 
end, only in between the motor action itself and its effects on the problem-
solving  environment.   For example, although  you  may be trying to decide 
between moving your rook four squares up or three squares up in a game of 
chess,  and  this  vacillation  may  even  be  visible  in  the  continuous  motor 
movement, in the end, only one of those alternatives  actually happens.   In 
contrast,  the  discrete-symbolic  account  of  cognition  urges  an  earlier 
discretization,  recommending  theories  to  work  with  symbolic  states  and 
algorithmic state-transition rules not long after perceptual processing.  In such 
a case, the decision to move one’s rook three squares or four squares would be 
discretely made in an internal cognitive stage, and any vacillation observed in 
the  motor  movement  would  be  best  interpreted  as  a  vestigial  or 
epiphenomenal echo of the earlier temporary cognitive uncertainty.
If  this  formulation  of  the  question  is  agreeable  to both  sides  of  the 
debate,  then  there  exists  a  “common  format  of  explication”  that  future 
research in high-level cognition might fruitfully use in order to consensually 
adjudicate  between  theories  that  propose  an  internal  discretization  of  the 
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discretization of them.   The mathematical  arena of symbolic dynamics (e.g., 
Crutchﬁeld, 1994; Devaney, 2003; Goertzel, 1998; Shalizi & Albers, submitted; 
see also Cleeremans,  Servan-Schreiber &  McClelland,  1989; Tabor,  2002, for 
related  discussions)  has  exactly  the  ingredients  for  building  systems  that 
implement continuous temporal dynamics in a high-dimensional state space 
(of perception and of action) and can convert that continuous trajectory into an 
emitted string of formal logical symbols for describing external action-effects 
in a problem-solving environment, and also for describing internal cognitive 
states.2  We next offer a very simple introduction to symbolic dynamics, and 
then discuss a number of issues relevant to its application in cognitive science.
3. Symbolic Dynamics 
A  continuous-distributed  perspective  on  representation  in  perceptual  and 
cognitive processes is often couched in model systems that change in time (be 
it continuous-time or discrete-time): dynamical systems.  A dynamical systems 
framework provides a rich set of conceptual tools for cognitive science.  The 
geometric entities in the study of dynamical systems can serve as an intuitive, 
and  potentially  mathematically  rigorous,  vocabulary  for  visualizing  state 
changes within and between perception and cognition.  As already mentioned, 
this strategy is widely used in many areas of cognitive science, and is often 
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2 In fact, while defending discrete representations in cognition, Dietrich & 
Markman (2003) essentially describe the basic concept of symbolic dynamics, 
without referring to it by name, in their fourth argument (their discussion of 
Fig. 6.3).considered its own framework for the study of cognition (Port & Van Gelder, 
1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Ward, 2002; Kelso, 1995).  In order to lay out this 
descriptive  vocabulary,  we  brieﬂy  consider  a  simple  iterative  dynamical 
system,  surely familiar to many readers,  that illustrates  a  number of these 
geometric metaphors.  Consider a function F(x) that maps real numbers onto 
real numbers by iteration: F2(x) is given by F(F(x)), and F3(x) by F(F(F(x))), etc. 
The logistic map is given by the equation
F(x) = μ x (1 – x).
The time dimension  is here represented by progressive iteration of the real 
value x into the function F, scaled by μ.  The iterative process in this simple 
equation illustrates  both  stability,  meta-stability,  and  transition into chaotic 
behavior.  For example, when μ is between 0 and about 3.5, iteration of F(x) 
from any starting point of x will settle into stable attractor states – namely, the 
value of Fn(x), as n becomes very large, stabilizes on one or more particular 
precisely-repeated values.  These values are termed attractors in the logistic 
map’s dynamics.  As μ approaches about 3.6 or so, the logistic map exhibits 
chaotic  behavior,  where  there  is  no  stable  attractor  state,  and  its  series  of 
values  can  superﬁcially  appear  random.    One  way  of  representing  the 
transitions in state space of this system is through a phase plot, shown in Fig. 
6.1. By tracking the value of x at each iteration, we can visualize the trajectory 
of the system from some random initial x into its attractor states (Fig. 6.2).  
The  logistic  map  is  used  extensively  in  textbooks  on  dynamical 
systems.  Its curiosity lies in the rich complexity that emerges from iterating 
such a simple equation.  In fact, the same issues considered for discerning the 
145nature of the logistic map are a concern for innumerable systems of practical 
and  theoretical  interest.   A  wide variety of pure and  applied  mathematical 
techniques  can  be  used  to  study  these  systems.   Nevertheless,  it  is  not 
uncommon that these methods can be outstripped by a system’s complexity.   
A  speciﬁc  technique  available  to  overcome  such  limitations,  around  for 
decades and gaining much attention of late, is termed symbolic dynamics, and 
offers a means of simplifying analysis (e.g., early on, Morse & Hedlund, 1938; 
see Devaney, 2003 and Williams, 2002 for review).  A system’s dynamics can be 
rendered symbolic by carving partitions or regions into its phase space, and 
assigning a unique numeric state or label to that partition.  As the dynamical 
system’s state changes in time, this trajectory is transformed into a sequence of 
emitted symbols corresponding to partitions in the space.  Take, for example, 
the logistic map.  We can represent its phase space as in Fig. 6.3, and divide the 
plot  into two intervals, I0  = [0,  ½] and  I1 =  (½, 1].   When  iterations of the 
system enter the ﬁrst interval, the symbol “0” is output, and likewise “1” for 
the second.  The dynamics of the logistic map may therefore be represented by 
a  sequence  of  1’s  and  0’s,  indicating  its  approximate  position  in  these 
partitions at each iteration.
At  μ  =  2.9,  the  system  quickly  descends  onto  a  particular  stable 
attractor state at approximately x = 0.65.  The symbol sequence generated by 
this system is extremely simple – “1111…”.  The system in fact never leaves 
this interval, never passing the threshold into the other, and therefore emits 
the symbol  “1” for any subsequent iteration once Fn(x) reaches its attractor.   
However, when μ = 3.55, for example, the map ﬂuctuates for a bit and then 
reaches eight distinct and perfectly repeated attractors.   Once it reaches this 
meta-stable state, while tracing the transitions across intervals I1 and  I0, this 
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the notation (01110111)n  or even (0111)n.   Contained  in this  simple sequence 
rule  is  the  original  dynamics:  Transitions  between  eight  separate  attractor 
states. 
The above example is deliberately simpliﬁed for the sake of introducing 
rudimentary dynamical  systems  and  symbolic  dynamics.  The  logistic  map 
affords  this  simpliﬁcation.   The  strategy of employing  symbolic  dynamics, 
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  Figure 6.1: A phase-plot for the logistic map.  Provided  is above 0 
and below 4, the system lives within the interval of [0, 1].  In other 
words, given its current value of x at time t, its subsequent iteration, 
time t + 1, will be on this line (here with μ  = 3.9).however, is somewhat  more complex  in  most  contexts.  Symbolic  dynamics 
rapidly served to help explore chaotic dynamical systems in more theoretical 
contexts (see Williams, 2002, for a review).  In a further simpliﬁed example, we 
can  straightforwardly introduce what this application entails.   Consider  an 
alphabet of N symbols that we might use in our partition of a system’s phase 
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x0 = 0.65
Fn = 0.76
Fn = 0.56
Figure 6.2: In this “phase ﬂow” diagram, the logistic map moves 
into two stable attractors with μ = 3.1.  The system starts at x0 = .
65. As the x is iterated through F, it settles into two attractor states, 
approximately  .56  and  .76,  between  which  it  will  alternate 
indeﬁnitely.space, A = {0, …, N-1}, and  the space of all  possible sequences  constructed 
from this alphabet:
Σ2 = {S | S = s0s1s2…, and si 㱨 A}
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I0 I1
“0” “1”
Figure 6.3: The phase space of the logistic  map can be carved into 
two intervals.   Each time the system enters the interval, it outputs 
the symbol corresponding to that region (“0” or “1”). Here  μ = 3.9 
again.  Here, s0 is the ﬁrst symbol emitted by the dynamical system, and the sequence 
continues ad inﬁnitum.  The set Σ2 is the space of all such possible sequences.   
A  particular  system’s  dynamics  can  be  captured  by  shifting  its  inﬁnite 
sequence, S 㱨 Σ2, to the left, so that s0s1s2… → s1s2s3…, and the new sequence 
begins  at  the  next  emitted  symbol,  s1.  This  shift  operation  captures  the 
progression in time of emitted symbols, and is often represented by σ, so that 
S′  =  σS,  where s′i  =  si+1.   This  shift operation  can  act  as  a  mapping on  a 
continuous  space,  σ  : Σ2  → Σ2,  by specifying a  distance measure or metric 
between sequences, d(S, S′). In other words, the trajectory of a system can be 
represented in terms of an ordered set of inﬁnite symbol sequences, formed by 
progressive shifting.  
From  here,  a  means  of  exploring  dynamical  systems  involves 
demonstrating that the space of symbols Σ2 and its shift map σ have a certain 
geometrical  equivalence to a  dynamical  system’s  own  continuous  mapping 
and  the set  of  states  which  it  visits.   The famous  Smale horseshoe can be 
studied  through  partitions  of  its  phase  space  –  and  through  its  symbolic 
dynamics, it can be shown to have particular dynamical features (e.g., chaos; 
Medio &  Lines, 2001).   The logistic map has also been explored  through its 
symbolic dynamics.  Consider the case where the control parameter μ in F is 
larger than 4.  It is easy to see that most initial states will have Fn approaching 
–∞ as n gets larger.  Speciﬁcally, since x = .5 grants the product x(1 – x) its 
largest value (.25), any value for μ that is greater than 4 will take F outside the 
interval  [0,  1],  and  thus  at  the  next  iteration,  on  a  path  towards  inﬁnity.   
However, inspection of the phase plot for the logistic map in Fig. 6.4 reveals 
the simple observation that not all values of x take F out of [0, 1].  The set C of 
all values that avoid this escape, along with the function F, can be shown to 
150have this kind of equivalence with Σ2 and  σ, and allow certain conclusions 
about  the  properties  of  this  set:  Once  again,  the  map  F  on  C  is  chaotic 
(Devaney, 2003). 
These textbook examples of the theoretical and mathematical beneﬁts of 
symbolic dynamics merely scratch the surface of its recent role in the study of 
dynamical  systems. Recent excitement has instead  been concerned  with the 
extent  to  which  symbolic  dynamics  is  informative  about  more  complex 
systems through statistical  analysis of its output. Symbolic dynamics is thus 
intriguing because it offers structures of sequences that can be subjected to a 
wide variety of “tricks for predicting discrete stochastic processes” (Shalizi, 
2004a).  Such  statistical  analysis  has  offered  insight  into  complex  dynamic 
processes in a wide variety of ﬁelds, including astronomy, biology, chemistry, 
and computational linguistics (see Daw, Finney & Tracy, 2003, for a review).   
The  past  two  decades  have  also  seen  symbolic  dynamics  make  explicit 
connections between the study of digital computation and that of continuous 
dynamical systems (Crutchﬁeld, 1994).  
Symbolic  dynamics  also  has  the  interesting  property  of  sometimes 
exhibiting equivalence with the continuous system from which it originates.   
As long as a partition is adequately selected, analysis of the symbol sequences 
can actually be used to reconstruct the continuous dynamics of the original 
system.   A speciﬁc kind of partition, termed generating  partition, can in fact 
yield “approximately complete and precise descriptions of the system” (beim 
Graben,  2004,  p.  47).   Perfect  deﬁnition  of  a  generating  partition  requires 
knowledge  of the original  dynamical  system, but there exist techniques for 
approximating these demarcations (e.g., Davidchack, Lai, Bollt, & Dhamala, 
1999; Kennel  & Buhl,  2003).   Such generating partitions allow the symbolic 
151dynamics to be topologically equivalent to the original continuous dynamics 
(beim Graben,  2004;  Kitchens,  1998; Shalizi  & Albers,  in  press).   However, 
ﬁnding generating partitions  is very difﬁcult in systems  consisting of more 
than  two  dimensions  (Kennel  &  Buhl,  2003),  and  they  only  work  for 
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F(x)
F2(x)
Figure 6.4: The logistic map  phase plot with μ =  4.1.   A portion  of the 
phase space is outside the interval [0, 1], and points leaving will tend to -∞ 
through F iteration.  However, a set of points does not leave this interval, 
illustrated with one iteration of some value x (dotted  lines).   The initial 
value  x  becomes  F(x),  and  remains  in  the  [0,  1]  interval.   Symbolic 
dynamics allows investigation into the nature of these iterations that do 
not escape (see text for more detail).deterministic  dynamical  systems  (Crutchﬁeld  &  Packard, 1982).   Therefore, 
much of the practical applicability of symbolic dynamics may lie in iteratively 
reﬁned  approximations of generating partitions, rather than true generating 
partitions.  For example, non-generating partitions in symbolic dynamics have 
been used for describing the phase-space of bimanual rhythmic coordination 
(Engbert,  Scheffczyk,  Krampe,  Kurths,  &  Kliegl,  1998)  and  of  heart  rate 
variability (Kurths, Voss, Saparin, Witt, Kleiner  &  Wessel, 1995).   However, 
with  even  slightly  misplaced  partitions,  the  threshold-crossing method  for 
emitting symbol strings from continuous trajectories can very easily introduce 
severe compounded misrepresentations of the original continuous dynamics, 
i.e.,  grammatical  errors  in  the  symbol  sequences  (Bollt,  Stanford,  Lai, 
Zyczkowski,  2000,  2001).  Symbolic  sequences  from  more  complex  systems 
have therefore often been subject to more experimental or empirical styles of 
analysis (Daw et al., 2002).  
To  summarize,  there  have been  two  broad  areas  in  which  symbolic 
dynamics have made a clear impact.  In the ﬁrst, and ultimately its origin, it is 
explored  extensively  in  pure  theoretical  contexts  in  mathematics  to  study 
tractable systems.  In another, it has played a role in simpliﬁed descriptions 
and statistical analyses of more complex iterated mathematical processes, and 
even  in  application to dynamics  of complex  physical  systems.   It may,  we 
argue, offer something to cognitive science theory as well.  In the debate on 
representational  format,  symbolic  dynamics  could  make  headway  toward 
formalizing  theoretical  debate.  Current  discussion  on  symbolic  dynamics 
raises a number of important questions in this respect. We next consider these, 
and  then  introduce  some  reﬂections  on  future  directions  for  symbolic 
dynamics in cognitive science. 
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Dietrich  and  Markman  (2003)  actually  describe  something  very  close  to 
symbolic  dynamics  in  a  short  segment  of  their  paper  supporting  discrete 
representations.  They offer a number of properties that cognition must have, 
which  only  discrete  representations  endow.    One  of  these  properties  is 
compositionality:  Representations best explaining many cognitive processes 
must have component parts that are combined  (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988;  Marcus,  2001).   They  argue  that  any  representational  subsystem,  if 
continuous, can only have parts if there is some other system that discretely 
interprets its regions, and takes in discrete representations as input.  This is in 
fact a description of symbolic dynamics, though there are details to be worked 
out.   For  one,  the  resultant  symbols,  if  not  time-course  irrelevant,  might 
encode  the  original  dynamics  of  the  system,  as  mentioned  in  the  way  of 
generating partitions above.  This would mean an equivalence relation holds 
between the two systems, at least in the sense that the symbols carry some of 
the continuous information in the original dynamic subsystem.   Secondly, it 
has  been  demonstrated  recently  that  dynamical  systems  actually  do  have 
considerably  surprising computational  powers.   In  fact,  a  number of these 
properties  often  considered  hallmarks  of  discrete-symbolic  algorithmic 
processing can be approached with symbolic dynamics.
For  example,  one  such  property,  discrimination,  is  easy  to  achieve 
through  translation  into  symbol  sequences.   Multi-stable  one-dimensional 
dynamical  systems  can emit  symbols  pertaining  to any stable  point (and  a 
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output from that system.  This scenario may indeed be superior to verbalized 
discrete  theories  since symbolic  output from  an iterated  map  retains  some 
information about time.  For example, a meta-stable system that drifts slowly 
will  produce  symbol  sequences  with  long  strings  of  identical  symbols, 
indicating its inhabiting  of  some categorical  state.   The output  is  therefore 
discretely  representational,  but  also  reveals  patterns  of  change  in  time.   
Perceptual  state-space is of course not a  matter of  collapsing  over a single 
dimension  –  the  situation  becomes  very  complex  when  we  consider  the 
number of categories (symbols) that need to be represented, and the fact that 
our visual system, for example, is translation invariant, so whatever partition 
can deﬁne the symbolic output from visual to cognitive processes must exist in 
a very large number of dimensions.  A second problem concerns delineating 
the stages  at which  such  collapsing from continuous mappings to  discrete 
symbol strings occurs.   As mentioned, to account for continuous perceptual 
states moving into something akin to sets of sameness, there must be one or 
more stages of “analog-to-digital” (A-to-D) conversion.
Probably  the most  studied  and  established  property  that  dynamical 
systems exhibit through their symbolic dynamics is their digital computation – 
that a description of dynamical systems can take the form of explicating its 
information-processing  capacities  via  symbol  sequences.    This  feature 
approaches the well-known issue of systematicity, a property that many have 
argued  cognitive systems  must  have (especially human ones;  e.g., Fodor & 
Pylyshyn,  1988;  Hadley,  1994;  Marcus,  2001).   This  discussion  ﬁts  into the 
scope of symbolic dynamics in three ways.  First, it is possible to characterize 
the dynamics of a system through  computational  descriptive schemes.   For 
155example,  the classic  paper by Crutchﬁeld  and  Young (1989)  introduced  an 
approach to nonlinear dynamical systems that quantiﬁes their computational 
qualities.   Subsequent  research has pursued the extraction of such intrinsic 
computation from  nonlinear dynamical  systems, among other systems  (see 
Andrews,  2002;  Crutchﬁeld,  1994,  for  reviews).   Sought  after  qualities  of 
systematic  computation  urged  by  Hadley  (1994)  and  Fodor  and  Pylyshyn 
(1988)  may  very  well  be  encoded  in  the  edge-of-chaos  dynamics  of  even 
simple systems (Crutchﬁeld & Young, 1990).
The second way systematicity can ﬁt into symbolic dynamics is through 
exploring the ability of dynamic  systems to acquire formal  languages.   The 
system  that  learns  the  language  may  again  be  characterized  in  terms  of 
symbolic  dynamics.   For  example,  the  well-known  simulations  in  Pollack 
(1991) demonstrated that a neural  network can learn context-free languages 
and classify novel sentences from such grammars via a decision process akin 
to symbolic dynamics (see also Cleeremans et al., 1989 for related examples).   
More recently, Rodriguez, Wiles and Elman (1999) investigated a very simple 
recurrent network in its ability to learn deterministic context-free grammars.   
Networks that learned successfully performed a form of “counting” in their 
phase  space.   This  allows  successful  learning  of  the  context-free grammar 
without explicitly implementing a pushdown automaton.  Also, Tabor (2001) 
recently used a neural network model trained to predict sequences of symbols 
from four languages of differing levels of complexity (see also Tabor, 2000).   
Networks  trained  on  context-free  languages,  as  opposed  to  the  regular 
languages,  exhibited  edge-of-chaos  effects  (or  intermittency),  revealing  the 
kind  of  intrinsic  computational  qualities  outlined  in  other  nonlinear 
dynamical systems by Crutchﬁeld and colleagues (Crutchﬁeld & Young, 1989).
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this case, though the solution appears simplistic, the difﬁculty is in delimiting 
and  discovering  the nature of  the interface between continuous perceptual 
states and the resultant discrete cognitive informational  states that undergo 
algorithmic manipulation.  Resorting to this idealization, and thereby taking 
for  granted  straightforward  algorithmic  parlance  about  representations, 
requires  explication  of  A-to-D  conversions  between  high-dimensional 
continuous  perceptual  states  and  their  entryway into cognitive  processing. 
Although  the  above  review  suggests  the  continuous  dynamics  of  simple 
systems can already exhibit surprising computational qualities, it may be in 
the domain of this symbolic demarcation that debate between formats is best 
mitigated.   Following our discussion here of theoretical  issues in the use of 
symbolic  dynamics,  we  offer  some  sketches  of  the  ways  in  which  this 
mitigation might take place in computational models.
There are numerous  issues  with  both symbolic  dynamic  theory and 
application that are relevant to theoretical  frameworks in  cognitive science.   
We  introduce  three  of  these  issues  here,  and  elaborate  further  in  the 
subsequent sections of this article.  The ﬁrst issue concerns the consequences 
of generating partitions.   Some have argued  that the  equivalence  between 
symbolic dynamics (from a generating partition) and the continuous mapping 
from which it originated, renders moot the debate between continuous and 
discrete  states  in  the  mind  (Crutchﬁeld,  1998;  Shalizi,  2004b).    Though 
compelling at ﬁrst pass, the argument is  based  on simple, low-dimensional 
systems – ones whose consequences cannot be handily generalized to noisy, 
high-dimensional  (and  likely  highly  non-stationary)  dynamics  in  neural 
systems at the level of cognitive processing.  As a second issue, we consider 
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ﬁnding  appropriate  partitions  for  meaningful  symbolic  dynamics  (beim 
Graben,  2004).   This  has  direct  relevance to conceptualization  of  “error” in 
competence and performance, and the nature of language comprehension and 
production, among other cognitive processes.   The ﬁnal issue concerns how 
continuous  and  symbolic  dynamical  systems  function  in  tandem  during 
perception and cognition.   Presumably,  if discrete-symbolic descriptions are 
most suitable for “higher” cognition, then there must be some stage at which 
continuous dynamics of perceptual or “lower” cognition gets transmogriﬁed 
into interpretable symbolic states.  
4.1 Continuous-Symbolic Equivalence
As  discussed  above,  there  are  many  reasons  to study continuous  dynamic 
maps via symbol sequences.  An interesting fact for many such maps is that 
there exist generating partitions that emit symbol sequences exactly reﬂecting 
the original  dynamics  of the system.   This  has  led  some to argue  that the 
debate  concerning  discrete-symbolic  and  continuous-distributed 
representations is ill-posed (e.g., Shalizi, 2004b).  Since a dynamical system can 
be seen as identical with some symbolic dynamics, it might be inappropriate 
to  suppose  that  two  formats  of  representation  are  at  odds  when  they are 
mathematically  equivalent.  As  already  mentioned,  Crutchﬁeld  and 
collaborators  (Crutchﬁeld,  1994)  conceive  of  dynamics  as  inherently 
computational, and offer numerous techniques for generating computational 
machinery  from  symbolic  sampling  of  continuous  states  (e.g.,  ε-machines; 
Crutchﬁeld,  1994).    Elsewhere,  Crutchﬁeld  has  argued  that  supposing 
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the  intrinsic  computational  nature  of  dynamical  systems  themselves 
(Crutchﬁeld, 1998).
Early in Crutchﬁeld’s seminal paper (1994), he distinguishes between 
two  concepts  of  computation.   The  ﬁrst,  “useful”  computation,  refers  to 
speciﬁc  instantiations  of  input-output  mappings  in  some  computational 
architecture.    The  second,  “intrinsic”  computation,  concerns  the  basic 
capacities and limitations of a computational system, dynamical or otherwise.   
This involves exploration or speciﬁcation of information-processing capacities 
of  a  system,  without  reference  to  any  speciﬁc  “useful”  input-output 
accomplishment.   This perspective has led to extremely fruitful research on 
discovering  the  underlying  computational  aspects  of  nonlinear  dynamical 
systems.  For example, early work by Crutchﬁeld and Young (1989) sought to 
specify and  measure the complexity of minimal  stochastic  automata whose 
state transitions  (emitting symbols) embody the logistic map’s  dynamics  at 
differing values of μ (see also Crutchﬁeld & Young, 1990). 
There are,  however,  reasons  for remaining cautious  about  the direct 
implications  in  our  understanding  of  complex  cognitive  states.   An  in-
principle statement concerning the equivalence of continuous and  symbolic 
dynamics in systems is not sufﬁcient on its own to alleviate debate.  There are 
at least two related reasons for this.  First, relying on such equivalence neglects 
the very crucial and substantial details that debate on representational format 
carries.  A  rather  straightforward  one  is  the  kind  of  characterization  that 
symbolic and  distributed  formats  receive.   For example, Andy Clark (2001) 
characterizes  much symbolic  cognitive theory as  resting on representations 
whose contents are semantically transparent.  A classical computational theory 
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structures  that  they  compose.   These  representational  formats  are  highly 
“scrutable,”  their  signiﬁcance  in  a  system’s  computation  immediately 
accessible.    However,  systems  relying  on  probabilistic  and  distributed 
representations or states, such as connectionist systems, often rely on formats 
that are semantically opaque. For example, establishing the function of a hidden-
unit manifold  often  involves  detailed  statistical  analysis  of the hidden-unit 
activations under varying circumstances.  The resultant function may be very 
nonlinear and complex, and not easily describable through commonsensical or 
folk-psychological labels.  
For  this  reason,  simply  saying  that  the  two  kinds  of  descriptive 
machinery, continuous and symbolic, both serve the same functions actually 
skirts some substantive issues.  The debate concerns explanation in terms of 
speciﬁc kinds of computational mechanics – concretely identiﬁable words in 
our  “language  of  thought”  (Fodor,  1983),  or  some  other  more  or  less 
semantically  transparent  discrete  states.   These  are  pitted  against  models 
accounting  for  behavior  in  terms  of  distributed  representations  whose 
interpretations are less obvious, or perhaps “subsymbolic” (Smolensky, 1988).   
In  fact,  cognitive  science  has  already  had  a  number  of  battles  concerning 
whether these two systems are equivalent, or the second being just a special 
case of the ﬁrst,  and  so on (e.g., Fodor &  Pylyshyn, 1988; Lachter & Bever, 
1988).
The  second  reason  to  be  cautious  about  the  lesson  from  symbolic-
dynamic equivalence is that “useful” computation has been considerably less 
explored than “intrinsic” dynamics in the study of computational mechanics.   
Although the current accomplishments can only be described as some of the 
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systems  whose  complexity  can  match  a  level  of  description  needed  for 
understanding cognitive processes.  Van Gelder (1998) replies in this manner, 
remarking  that  when  “it  comes  time  to  model  the  complexities  of  real 
cognition—to publish in Psychological Review rather than Physica D—they 
may ﬁnd that the dynamics drops out of the picture, and the relevant story is 
cast entirely at the level of the emergent computation. Alternatively, they may 
ﬁnd (as have many dynamicists) that the computational aspects play second 
ﬁddle  to  the  dynamics”  (p.  13).   This  seems  to  misunderstand  what  is 
accomplished in symbolic analyses of dynamical systems: The descriptions are 
two sides of the same computational coin.  A more direct concern at present is 
whether meaningful partitions can be established.  As we approach a level of 
complexity  that  matches  what  is  accomplished  in  a  neural  substrate,  or 
proposed cognitive processes of multiple dimensions, the likelihood of ﬁnding 
generating partitions drops radically (see next section).  
So,  whether  or  not  we  embrace  the  equivalence  of  symbolic  and 
continuous dynamics through generating partitions, we are still left with some 
confusion.  Are the discrete symbolic states of our cognitive system available 
for scientiﬁc scrutiny, and the dynamics more complex (yet equivalent)? Or are 
discrete  symbolic  states  of  our  cognitive  system  inadequate  explanatory 
constructs, and we should reach for continuous dynamic descriptions of our 
mind/brain?   Churchland  (1992)  offers  discussion  relevant  to  these  more 
substantive issues in the domain of neural networks, and considers partitions 
of their hidden-unit state space that can reﬂect conceptual structure in human 
cognition.  Adopting a set of partitions, Churchland argues, “may sufﬁce for 
the  accurate  short-term  prediction  of  its  behavior,  but  that  knowledge  is 
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course of  time”  (p. 178).   We argue that, in the domain of  higher  levels of 
cognitive processing, this position has considerable merit, but is very much 
without consensus in the ﬁeld.  It is thus through these substantive issues that 
the two formats of representation stake their respective claims.
4.2 Epistemic Issues
Similar to Andy Clark’s (2001) distinction between transparent symbols and 
opaque distributed representations, Atmanspacher (2000) makes a distinction 
between epistemic and ontic types of description of chaotic systems.  An ontic 
description  is  exhaustive  concerning  the  dynamical  system  –  it 
comprehensively encapsulates the composition of the dynamics.  An epistemic 
description  is  framed  in  terms  of  knowledge  or  ignorance  of  an  observer 
evaluating  these  ontic  “states.”   Epistemic  descriptions  are  achieved  by 
evaluation of an observed or measured dynamical system, through statistical 
quantiﬁcation or characterization of it.  This terminology of ontic and epistemic 
can be used to frame the previous section’s discussion of equivalence through 
a generating partition.  The pure equivalence between a symbolic dynamics 
and  its  origin  map  can  involve only  ontic  descriptions  for  any  system  of 
sufﬁcient  complexity.   That  is,  urging  the  equivalence  of  some  symbolic 
dynamics  and  the  original  system  implies  a  kind  of  ontic  state  that  is 
inaccessible  to  us  as  observers.   Instead,  we  are  conﬁned  to  epistemic 
descriptions for complex cognitive systems.  In order for a chosen symbolic 
dynamics  to  adequately  explain  or  represent  the  cognitive  process  under 
study,  it  must  be  chosen  appropriately.   This  is  not  a  trivial  matter.   We 
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partition for a continuous map.
First, beim Graben (2004; beim Graben & Altmanspacher, 2004) argues 
that incompatible, but equally accurate, symbolic  epistemic descriptions are 
possible with multiple non-generating partitions.  This means that two sets of 
different symbolic dynamics may be equally adequate as formal descriptions 
of  the  original  dynamics,  yet  mutually  incompatible  with  one  another (cf. 
Quinean  indeterminacy:  Quine,  1960).   beim  Graben  (2004)  provides  an 
example of a Hopﬁeld network as a multi-stable dynamical system living in a 
space  of  many  dimensions  (Balkenius  &  Gärdenfors,  1991).   There  is  no 
generating  partition  for  this  space,  and  indeed  multiple  descriptions  via 
symbolic dynamics can  be  mutually  incompatible, while remaining equally 
good  (or  bad)  partitions  of  the  underlying  dynamical  system.   As  a 
consequence, non-generating partitions can provide “conceptual” descriptions 
of the continuous system, and there may indeed be many such descriptions. 
While  all  of  them  may  serve  as  formal  descriptions  at  a  symbolic-discrete 
level, they can be mutually incompatible with each other. Quine (1960) early 
on made very similar points concerning the study of linguistic  meaning by 
indicating that many equally good (or bad) rule sets can exist for translation 
from one language to another; yet these equivalent translation strategies may 
be mutually incompatible when compared directly (see also Moore, 1956, for a 
related classic theorem; Gauker, 2003).  It is crucial to point out that this is not 
merely a fact of further exploring the ontic description of the given system in 
order to select  the  better  of these incompatible symbolic  accounts.   In fact, 
Quine, and  beim Graben  and colleagues in symbolic  dynamics, reveal  that 
even  given  the  full  set  of  ontic  states  themselves,  there  are  still  mutually 
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they cannot be reliably adjudicated among.
A  second  issue  concerns  the  kinds  of  errors  that  result  from 
inappropriate  partitions.  Bollt  et  al.  (2001)  analyze  the  tent  map,  whose 
generating partition is known, and measure the topological entropy resulting 
from  shifts  of  that  partition  to  varying  degrees.    The  effects  of  shifted 
partitions  are  quite  drastic,  with  topological  entropy  being  affected 
immediately,  and  in  an  irregular  (non-monotonic)  fashion.   The  upshot, 
according to the authors, is that arbitrary partitions (e.g., Kurths et al., 1995) 
can result in “severe under-representation of a dynamical system” (p. 281).  It 
is  important  to  point  out  that  these  results  were  based  on  a  well-known 
deterministic and simple dynamical system.  The effects of noise (Crutchﬁeld 
&  Packard,  1982)  and  increasing  complexity  (Kennel  &  Buhl,  2003)  in 
degrading the ﬁdelity of the emitted symbolics are also well documented.
 The foregoing remarks on epistemic limitations on symbolic dynamics have 
two implications for current discussion.   First, they serve to underscore the 
points made in the previous section  on equivalence.   The possibility of the 
existence  of  a  generating  partition  is  not  sufﬁcient  to  dissolve  debate  on 
symbolic  versus  continuous  representation.   Instead,  the  epistemological 
limitations on more complex, noisy dynamical systems suggests that there is 
considerable room for debate concerning the adequacy of either continuous or 
symbolic accounts for some cognitive process.   Indeed, in most cases (if not 
all),  we do not  have sufﬁcient  knowledge of  the  ontic  conditions  of  some 
cognitive  process.   The  upshot  for  cognitive  science  is  that  continuous  or 
symbolic accounts are 1) highly unlikely to be resolved by mere recognition of 
equivalence,  and  2) are likely to offer differing amounts of  coverage of the 
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discover.
4.3 A-to-D Conversions
Despite these limitations, we argue that the promise of symbolic dynamics lies 
in  articulating  the  transition  from  dynamical,  continuous  descriptions  of 
perception, into the theoretical language of discrete, algorithmic processes for 
high-level  cognition.   Whatever  the  ontic  states  underlying  cognition,  our 
epistemic  descriptions  and  theories  ought  to  be  couched  in  structures  or 
processes  that  bear  causal  relationships  to  others,  and  ultimately,  to  our 
observable behavior.  If it is the case that some are discrete and symbolic, there 
must occur a transition into them from a continuous state-space of perceptual 
or early-cognitive processing.  These A-to-D conversions consist of collapsing 
the  continuous-distributed  representations  onto  discrete-symbolic  ones  that 
cause inherent information loss about the perceptual states feeding into them.   
However,  this  loss  may  be  merely  “lossy,”  as  in  image  compression 
algorithms,  where  the  resulting  compact  representations  still  carry 
information appropriate for cognitive processing.
The question is then not merely when this transmogriﬁcation occurs, but 
also what kind of information from continuous states do these discrete states 
need  in  order  to  account  fully  for  observable  behavior.   For  example,  in 
information-processing  accounts  of  cognition,  Miller’s (1982)  exploration of 
the concept of information “grain” provided an  early challenge to discover 
what kind of discrete representations there are: What level of “granularity” do 
discrete representations need to have to account for cognition.  For example, 
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Balota  (1991)  and  Spivey,  Grosjean,  and  Knoblich  (2005)  demonstrate  that 
dynamic response measures (e.g., force and velocity measures from a response 
bar or  continuously  recorded  computer-mouse  movements)  exhibit  graded 
properties  depending  on  the  continuous  strength  or  reliability  of  the 
information that produced the motor output.  In addition, a wide variety of 
eye-movement research  (reviewed above) suggests  that metabolically cheap 
movements such as saccades reveal  a decision process that does not appear 
perfectly  discrete.   These  studies  demonstrate  that  “echoes”  of  continuous 
information  states  can  be  observed  in  the  dynamic  properties  of  resultant 
responses.  The  discrete  states  that may  have  mediated  the  transitions  from 
sensors to effectors must carry at least some relevant information from early 
graded  states.   In other words, while reaction  time may reveal information 
about  the  decision  process  during  discrete,  algorithmic  processing,  the 
concomitantly  graded  manual  output  from  the  system  indicates  that  even 
when  these  discrete  decision  processes  collapse  onto  the  effectors,  there 
remains some ﬁne granularity.   
We can frame the situation simply by deﬁning an idealized “problem 
space” for some cognitive process.  The space may be maximally simple, from 
an  idealized  or  simulated  continuous  perceptual  space  into  one  or  two 
symbolic processes.  Here, A-to-D conversion performs a useful computation in 
the Crutchﬁeld sense, described above.  Whatever the intrinsic computational 
properties of the initial continuous perceptual space, the system of continuous 
representation feeding into discrete symbolic processing has an informational 
function in  a problem space of, say,  evolutionary relevance (for some such 
thing as reproduction, or running away from something that might eat you).   
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of perceptual information can be manipulated so as to output symbols feeding 
into some discrete process.  This idealized scheme may be suited for existence 
proofs of granularity of the A-to-D conversion to adequately account for such 
graded effects outlined above (see Churchland, 1992, for some early possible 
examples).
Symbolic  dynamics  offers  a  playground  in  which  this  conceptual 
problem can be formally explored.  Given a dynamical system living in a state 
space of m dimensions, a set of stable or meta-stable attractors can be explored 
via simulation.  Like perceptual processes, this dynamical system can feed into 
a separate system, described in a variety of ways (e.g., a Turing machine, or 
ﬁnite-state machine), that receives symbolic input via threshold-crossing in a 
partition carving that state space.  This collapse involves maximal loss: From 
m dimensions into 1 dimension of Q possible states deﬁning the partition.  Of 
course, for simple systems such as the logistic map (where m = 1), this collapse 
can  still  carry  the  original  dynamics,  and  entail  some  interesting 
computational properties.  As for higher-dimensional state spaces, there seem 
to be two ways that models of this kind  might begin to approach existence 
proofs  for symbolization of a  perceptual  space.   On  the simplest side, one 
might explore resultant algorithmic processing on symbolic output of just one 
dimension with Q regions of one partitioning.  These states may be numerous, 
or  reﬁned,  enough  to  carry  some  echoes  of  the  original  space.   Another 
possibility is to consider collapsing the state space of m dimensions into more 
than one partition.  The m-dimensional system may be collapsed onto an n-
tuple of  symbols, each  element of  which is  the output from some separate 
partition  that  uniquely  carves  the  state  space.   Exploration  of  this  system 
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levels of granularity in the various stages of perceptual-cognitive processing 
(that is, without considering feedback projections). 
There exist  a  number of  “useful”  computational  models  performing 
symbolization of this sort.  For example, the decision processes of Pollack’s 
(1990)  dynamical  recognizer  and  the  Hopﬁeld  network  of  Balkenius  and 
Gärdenfors  (1991) that implements non-monotonic  logics are two relatively 
early  models.   Recently,  Tabor  has  speciﬁcally  addressed  the learning and 
processing of  formal  languages by such  systems  (Tabor,  2000, 2001),  along 
with  beim  Graben  and  colleagues’  sophisticated  analyses  (beim  Graben, 
Jurish, Saddy, & Frisch, 2004).  These are just a few of the enticing invitations 
to employing  symbolic  dynamics  in  a  way we  recommend  here:  Devising 
existence  proofs  relating  the  stages  of  continuous-discrete  transitions  in  a 
simpliﬁed  problem  space  akin  to  cognitive  processes  and  their  output.   
Though  only  promissory  at  this  point,  symbolic  dynamics  may  make  it 
possible to reconcile both the dynamic and discrete descriptions of the states 
and processes underlying cognition.
5. Conclusion
We do not have full privileges in our access to the ontic states of our mind/
brain.  An inevitable fact about higher-order cognitive theories is that they are 
descriptive at a very coarse level  –  it is  currently an intractable problem to 
specify,  even  partially,  the  dynamics  underlying  neural  computation  in  a 
cognitive task of any nontrivial complexity (e.g., Uttal, 2001).   Nevertheless, 
for the majority of cognitive scientists, this daunting state of affairs does not 
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this  article,  we  have  limned  the  surface  of  a  framework  within  which 
competing theoretical  accounts of  representational  structures and  processes 
may have equal opportunity to contribute to our understanding of cognition.   
Symbolic dynamic investigations of idealized problem spaces may provide a 
common  arena  for  exploring  the  interplay  between  continuous-distributed 
and discrete-symbolic representational  accounts.   Moreover, as a framework 
for further discussion, it may help both representational formats overcome the 
limitations of time-course irrelevant descriptions of cognition.  Given a set of 
input  information  and  informational  goals,  symbolic  dynamics  offers  both 
informational  and  temporal  insight  into  the  transition  from  continuous 
perceptual  trajectories  into  more  or  less  ﬁne-grained  discretized  states  for 
higher cognitive  processes.   There  will,  of  course,  be  some conceptual  and 
technical obstacles in the way ahead, and we have considered a number of 
these above.  
Given  the  deep  epistemic  problems  experienced  by  all  theories  of 
cognition, and the complexity of the brain  onto which  they are imposed, it 
seems  we might  forever be conﬁned  to epistemic  descriptions  of  the ontic 
states of our cognitive system.   Regarding the state of the  art  in  cognitive 
science,  the  dispute  between  two  such  families  of  description,  discrete-
symbolic and distributed-continuous, thus seems just as  likely to be evenly 
conciliated  than  for  one  or  the  other  to  win  permanent prominence.   This 
article offers some further considerations of symbolic dynamics to contribute 
to  ongoing  debate  (see  also,  e.g.,  beim  Graben,  2004;  Goertzel,  1998).   
Mathematization  of  simpliﬁed  problem  spaces,  such  as  perceptual 
categorization or computation in “chaotic itinerancy” (Tsuda, 2001), may be 
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theoretical constructs – or, at least, a mutually supportive arena in which they 
can have a fair ﬁght.
It is perhaps  a striking illusion, at the physical  level, that there exist 
discrete states of the mind/brain.   This at least seems to be the case if you 
grant  that  the  substrate  is  in constant  motion, like  Heraclitus’s  river.   The 
illusion  is  nevertheless  difﬁcult  to  overcome,  because  our  phenomenology 
seems  to  be  in  an  inescapable  embrace  with  experiences  that  have  strict 
boundaries.  At the epistemic level, rather than the phenomenological level, it 
may  be  inevitable  that  boundaries  need  to  be  placed  around 
neurophysiological  complexity  to  construct  sufﬁciently  explanatory,  and 
tractable, theories of cognitive processes.  This becomes evermore troublesome 
when  one  considers  functional  redundancy and  feedback  loops  within  the 
substrate,  as  well  as  between  it  and  its  environment.   So while theoretical 
debate may continue concerning whether the mind is a system that imposes 
boundaries on a continuous information ﬂow, symbolic dynamics may offer a 
mathematical terrain in which these boundaries can be rigorously explored.
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Discussion: Matters of Fact and Units of Analysis
Resummary
Chapter  1  presented  the  history  of  the  preponderance  of  the  symbolic 
computing  metaphor  in  theories  of  cognition.  This  metaphor  provided 
justiﬁcation  for  separating  cognition  from  action,  thus  relegating  response 
dynamics  to  a  lesser  role  in  understanding  intelligent  behavior.  The 
evolutionary  thought  experiment  of  Braitenberg  recommended  a  different 
position on this issue: Thinking of cognition as increasingly complicated, but 
inherent,  perception-action  mediation.  This  strong  interpretation  of  the 
thought experiment suggests that response dynamics should reveal “echoes” 
of cognitive processing. The prediction was made that even in a higher-order 
process  such  as  categorization,  response  dynamics  might  reveal  aspects  of 
cognitive processing.
Chapters 2 to 5 substantiate this prediction. Chapter 2 revealed that in 
both  lexical  and  perceptual  modes,  animals  of  high  atypicality  drew  the 
manual responses towards a competing category, particularly if that category 
had  overlapping  features. Chapter 3  motivated  the modeling  endeavors  in 
Chapter  4,  which  demonstrated  that  the  response  dynamics  observed  in 
Chapter 2 could be generated by a system in which processing and responding 
interact  bidirectionally.  A  second  simulation  predicted  ﬁner-grained  effects 
observed in Chapter 5. Typicality gradients are reﬂected in response dynamics, 
and in fact, feature processing speciﬁc to lexical categorization was reﬂected in 
motor output.
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independent of speciﬁc models and  architecture  currently under dispute.  It 
was  argued  that  symbolic  dynamics  can  serve  as  an  arena  in  which  the 
frameworks of the discrete computer and continuous  dynamical  metaphors 
might be more evenly compared. Extensive discussion in that chapter argued 
that  substantive issues  in  cognitive science  could  be interestingly  explored 
using such a common descriptive system as symbolic dynamics.
The current, and concluding, chapter addresses what may come of this 
kind of theoretical debate from a more general philosophical perspective. The 
symbolic dynamics approach seeks to adjudicate between theories vying for 
the matters of fact of cognition. As discussed in the Chapter 1, frameworks in 
cognitive science aim to account for representation and processing as it is in 
reality  --  the  “end-of-discussion”  characterization  of  our  mental  inner-
workings. The next section discusses the potential outcome of such an aim. 
Are cognitive matters of fact attainable, and of what sort? The ﬁnal section of 
this  chapter  presents  a  perspective  on  explanatory  frameworks  that  is 
plurastic and pragmatic in nature. It is contended that the goals of cognitive 
explanation are in fact not to detail the matter-of-fact nature of the cognitive 
system -- but rather, to solve speciﬁc problems within particular substantive 
domains.  The  upshot:  Explanatory  frameworks  of  varying  natures  have 
varying forces of explanation and prediction. Those speciﬁc research problems 
are amenable to these forces of explanation on a case-by-case basis. When we 
have successfully solved  numerous problems, then it becomes interesting to 
bridge  these  explanatory  frameworks.  It  is  here  that  such  metatheoretical 
approaches like symbolic dynamics might not just “mitigate,” but integrate.
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Chapter  6  argues  for  the  use  of  a  neutral  mathematization  like  symbolic 
dynamics  to  discern  the  value  of  discrete  versus  continuous  explanatory 
frameworks. Symbolic dynamics, and other systems permitting comparison of 
one kind  of  representation  versus  another (e.g.,  hybrid  systems;  e.g.,  Sun, 
1997), are necessary given the inevitable limitations in the epistemic access to 
the ontic states of the cognitive system (see Chapter 6). 
Over time, “in the limit,” use of such descriptive machinery as symbolic 
dynamics may give way to a few possible theoretical outcomes. The simplest 
is that one framework will exhibit comprehensively superior accounts for the 
data.  For  example,  the continuous-distributed  framework may  become  the 
most  comprehensive  framework  within  the  competing  arena  of  symbolic 
dynamics.  Such  an  outcome  is  a  naively  hopeful  one.  First,  “in  the  limit” 
above must inevitably mean “after a very long period of empirical research,” 
because the  current  available  data,  in  the  various  subdomains  of  cognitive 
scientiﬁc  inquiry,  recommend  only  a  tempered  prediction  about  which 
framework might become comprehensive. As mentioned in Chapter 6, these 
two broad  frameworks  enjoy differing levels  of  success,  depending  on  the 
subdomain you consider. This will become particularly relevant below.
Another  problem  with  such  a  simple  theoretical  outcome  is  the 
extremely  hopeful  assumption  that  “in  the  limit”  cannot  mean  “after  an 
inﬁnite period of empirical  research”  -- that all  evidential eras will  involve 
competition between two competing frameworks. It is an assumption that a 
particular  (and  likely  lengthy)  period  of  time  will  pass  after  which 
comprehensive data coverage will be achieved. The history and philosophy of 
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further considered below.
Sorting out the matters of fact about the cognitive system will  likely 
remain  an  active  debate  for  some  time,  and  investing  in  the  one-winner 
outcome is merely hopeful at present. Nevertheless, if  one were pressed to 
decide on matters of fact, given the current (or any future) evidential situation, 
there  seem  to  be  three  prominent  possibilities.  These  three  philosophical 
positions  in  deciding matters  of  fact,  the  correct  “cognitive  ontology,”  are 
presented below. The ﬁrst, a kind of Quinean confusion, is that matters of fact, 
given  any  set  of  data,  will  never  be  determined  successfully.  The  second, 
through Cartwright’s reality toolbox, is that matters of fact are decided within 
each self-contained  subdomain of  cognitive science. The ﬁnal option is that 
consideration  of  low-level  processes  (upon  which  higher  levels  are  based) 
motivates the selection of one framework over another, particularly in view of 
the kind of evidence presented in Chapters 2-5 -- Spivey’s echoes.
Matter of fact #1: Quinean confusion
Imagine  you  could  survey  the  set  of  all  behavioral  data  accounted  for  by 
cognitive  frameworks.  These  data  would  include  facts  about  memory 
performance, recognizing words versus non-words, how attention is focused 
in experimental contexts, and so on. Each datum ought to be predicted and 
explained  by  a  successful  framework  (perhaps  in  the  way  that  either 
mechanism- or process-based explanations work; see Bechtel, 1998). Multiple 
frameworks  in  opposition  offer  different  sets  of  interrelated  theoretical 
structures and operations that generate predictions about behavioral data. For 
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representations that frame the cognitive system in terms of a digital computer 
metaphor  discussed  extensively  in  the  introduction.  In  this  sense,  the 
theoretical  framework  is  giving  us  a  “translation”  of  the  behavioral 
observations  into  deeper  theoretical  commitments.  These  commitments 
organize the observations, and generate expectations about future ones. 
Imagine  this  set  of  behavioral  data  is  expressed  purely  in  terms  of 
observables.  For  example,  one  datum  may  be,  “Participants  respond 
signiﬁcantly  faster  to  words  that  have  higher  frequency.”1 The  symbolic-
discrete  translation  of  these  data  may  look  something  like  the  following: 
“Memory for words is organized as a list of discrete lexical entries, ordered by 
frequency. The mind accesses this list by order when recognizing a word,” or 
something  of  that  sort.  “Memory”  and  “mind”  and  “access”  provide  the 
language  of  theoretical  constructs  and  processes  into  which  the  prosaic 
descriptions of the data will be translated.
There are two important perspectives from the philosophy of science 
that  apply  to  this  situation.  The  ﬁrst,  a  near  consensus,  is  referred  to  as 
underdetermination  of  theory by evidence.  The  second, more  controversial 
and from Quine (1960, 1970), is dubbed indeterminacy of translation. 
Underdetermination  of  theory  is  the  perspective  that,  given  any 
amount  of  data,  there  will  always  be  one  or  more  other  (possibly 
incompatible)  theories that also satisfy these data.  This  does  not entail  that 
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1  I  do  not  consider  the  problem  of  “theory-ladenness”  regarding  such 
observational  statements. It should be noted that the theory which lades the 
behavioral  data  may be one of a  folk psychological  nature,  or some  other 
scheme of current cultural forces guiding English descriptions.there  is  no  matter  of  fact  about  which  of  the  theories  is  correct;  it  is  an 
epistemological  problem, in that the structure  of scientiﬁc  theories and  the 
limitations of evidence give way to a continuous reﬁnement and ﬂexibility of 
individual theories to ﬁt that evidence. Theories have very comfortable wiggle 
room to account for potentially confuting ﬁndings. This may be particularly 
true of theories that do not enjoy full mathematization (Meehl, 1998). 
Given  our  set  of  behavioral  data,  and  some  tentatively  adopted 
theoretical translation, there will be one or more further cognitive frameworks 
that account for the same data, but offer constructs and processes that are not 
mutually  compatible.  Often,  certain  theoretical  virtues  or  constraints  are 
thought to apply to these frameworks, such as simplicity, comprehensiveness, 
novelty of predictions, and so forth. For example, van Gelder and Port (1995) 
feel  that,  all  things  being  equal,  dynamical  theories  serve  us  better  than 
connectionist  or  symbolic  accounts  because they involve a  continuous-time 
process, thus being more intuitive, and  often use fewer degrees of freedom, 
thus  being  simpler.  Intuitiveness  and  simplicity  are  two  such  virtues  or 
constraints on theory selection. The way these constraints apply turns out not 
to be very  obvious  -- for example,  a  fairly  ornate,  complex  theory will  be 
selected  over others  if  it  admits  of  the most  intuitive means of translating 
behavioral data. These virtues are not a guaranteed guide to overcome these 
problems (Putnam, 1973).
Indeterminacy, on the other hand, is a much stronger point about this 
theoretical translation of behavioral data. If one accepts the view that cognitive 
theories offer a  theoretical language into which behavioral  observations are 
translated,  then  this  situation  invites  application  of  Quine’s  so-called 
“argument from above” for the indeterminacy of  translation (Quine,  1970). 
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much stronger thesis: Not only is there underdetermination of scientiﬁc theory 
in  our  scenario,  but  in  fact,  there  is  no  matter  of  fact  about  which  of  the 
competing frameworks is correct -- given any and all possible behavioral data, 
one cannot adjudicate between competing theories because, even though they 
are not mutually compatible, they are “empirically equivalent.” Indeterminacy 
is thus the stronger statement that one cannot decide on which explanatory 
framework is the correct one, given any and all evidential scenarios. 
The  “argument  from  above”  works  like  this.  Imagine  translating  a 
foreign physicist’s theory into your own physical theory expressed in English. 
Both theories are underdetermined by available physical evidence -- but this 
underdetermination  is  compounded  by  the  ﬂexibility  of  translating  one 
language to another. In other words, the underdetermination is exacerbated by 
a  secondary  underdetermination  of  translating  the  foreign  language  into 
English (see Quine, 1970; Miller, 1998, for an elaboration and some issues with 
the  argument).  In  other  words,  we  have  the  ﬁrst  case  that  the  foreign 
physicist’s theory may be translated into, say, M other possible accounts for 
the  set  of  data  (underdetermination  #1),  but  it  cannot  be  certain  when 
translating this theory into another language such as English that the theory 
translates  into  the  same  original  account  out  of  those  accounts  available 
(underdetermination #2). 
In our case, most philosophers would not see our cognitive framework 
translation as anything more than the standard underdetermination problem 
(e.g.,  Chomsky,  1968;  Miller,  1998).  However,  details  in  Chapter  6  may be 
echoed here. There may be an in-principle equivalence between computation-
based and dynamics-based epistemic accounts for an ontic system. Given any 
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these two explanatory frameworks is “correct” is irrelevant at best, or a false 
question at worst: There is no “correctness” attached  to one over the other, 
because both  capture the  data adequately. However, while  the  systems are 
mathematically equivalent at root, their peripheral ontological commitments 
give “intuitively incompatible” systems. In other words, carving a state space 
into discrete partitions may motivate labelable regions that are not obvious if 
we  maintained  the  continuous,  dynamical  descriptions.  If  we  accept  this 
possibility,  then  the  situation  is  in  fact  not  just  underdetermined,  but 
indeterminate. 
This indeterminacy argument is less compelling than straightforward 
underdetermination.  But  in  either  case,  the  situation  regarding  matters  of 
cognitive fact are troublesome: Given all our behavioral data, there will likely 
always  be  theoretical  dispute.  There  may  be  a  matter  of  fact,  a  “correct 
cognitive ontology,” but it will not obtain.
Matter(s) of fact #2: Cartwright’s reality toolbox
Quinean confusion assumes that the matters of fact of nature are obtained by 
adopting one explanatory framework. Only when one theory reigns over the 
competition can it be said that we have discerned the way nature in fact is. 
There  is  a  surprising,  but  strong,  motivation  to  reject  this  fundamentalist 
assumption.  One  prominent  example  is  Cartwright  (1999),  who  presents 
arguments that the nature of the universe is multifarious -- given to a variety 
of “natures” and “capacities” that are not conﬁned to one theoretical system, 
but in fact many,  and  those many natures and  capacities are discovered in 
178varying contexts and subject matter. Each such system has rightful claim over 
the matters of fact of its relevant domain.
Cartwright  (1999)  contends  that  science  gives  us  a  patchwork  of 
theories  and  laws  that  uncover  the  natures  of  the  universe.  Her  detailed 
position  is  based  on  some  analysis  of  current  theories  in  physics  and 
economics, and a novel conceptual contribution to philosophy of science. First, 
she notes that even the most successful fundamental physical theories cannot 
help  us  in  situations whose conditions are drastically detached  from those 
which commonly support those fundamental theories. For example, consider 
letting a dollar bill get taken by the wind in an open area. Fundamental laws 
of  mechanics  cannot  predict  this  complex  scenario  --  it  is  of  “limited 
serviceability” (p. 27). Rather, the problem may get shunted into the realm of 
ﬂuid dynamics, which may “provide a practicable model.” (p. 27)
Cartwright  offers  some  novel  conceptual  devices  for  understanding 
how  science  works.  She  sees  science’s  ontological  toolbox  as  scientiﬁc 
experimentation -- physical models which arrange for measurement or other 
observation.  According  to  Cartwright,  scientiﬁc  experimentation  rigidly 
arranges parts of the world, and  the natures of these parts are discoverable 
through these arrangements. Cartwright gives the name nomological machine to 
this perennial setup, and “all  things being equal,” it is a system for reliably 
generating certain outcomes given its conditions. Laws, and other regularities, 
are  discovered  through  nomological  machines.  Nomological  machines  are 
thus the practice of designing rigidly controlled worldly circumstances, and 
accounting for the regularity seen therein. 
The nature of the universe is thus not unitary. Natures, plural, are what it 
instead exhibits. Cartwright shares two different fables of God and Saint Peter 
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creating our universe:
In the ﬁrst story, God is very interested in physics. He carefully writes out all 
of its laws and lays down the initial positions and velocities of all the atoms in 
the universe. He then leaves to Saint Peter the tedious but intellectually trivial 
job of calculating all future happenings, including what, if any, macroscopic 
properties  and  macroscopic  laws  will  emerge.  That  is  the  story  of 
reductionism.  Metaphysical  pluralism  supposes  that  God  is  instead  very 
concerned about laws, and so he writes down each and every regularity that 
his universe will display. In this case Saint Peter is left with the gargantuan 
task of arranging  the initial properties in the universe in some way that will 
allow all God’s laws to be true together. The advantage to reductionism is that 
it makes Saint Peter’s job easier. God may nevertheless have chosen to be a 
metaphysical pluralist. (p. 33)
Cartwright’s position is an explicitly metaphysical one (see also Harré, 1993). 
A similar view of scientiﬁc matters of fact can be achieved through historical 
and sociocultural  reﬂection (e.g., Dupré, 1993; Giere, 1999). A not-altogether 
unrelated debate in other realms of the philosophy of science is the extent to 
which theoretical constructs can be reiﬁed (e.g., van Fraassen, 1980; Hacking, 
1983; Churchland & Hooker, 1985). This debate motivates reﬂection on which 
constructs  are the real  matters  of  fact of our mind/brain -- what  cognitive 
structures and  processes will  be ascribed  neurophysiological  or some other 
genuine  reality  (in  the  history  of  psychology  and  linguistics,  this  has 
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2003; Fodor & Bever, 1965; Sapir, 1949). 
Cartwright’s  reality  toolbox  is  equally  applicable  in  the  case  of  the 
cognitive system. While many of these theses are intended to apply to science 
wholly,  and  often  to  physics  speciﬁcally  (e.g.,  Cartwright,  1999),  cognitive 
scientiﬁc  theories make a wonderful test case for this kind of philosophical 
position.  It  has become a hackneyed expression that the brain is  “the most 
complex entity in the universe” -- and whatever that might mean, it certainly 
implies  that  theories  of  differing  subject  matter,  admitting  of  distinctive 
nomological machines, are readily available in cognitive science.
The  creation  of  nomological  machines  in  psychological  science  is 
dependent entirely on the units of analysis selected for investigation. I offer a 
more  detailed  deﬁnition  of  unit  of  analysis  below.  But  for  now,  a  unit  of 
analysis can be considered, as it is traditionally, a categorical or continuous 
scale of measurement of behavior -- from neuronal ﬁring patterns, to Likert-
scale  ratings  in  a  survey  study.  The  unit  of  analysis  is  simply  the  set  of 
attended behavioral events that satisfy the chosen system of measurement. 
Consider  a  nomological  machine  using  a  unit  of  analysis  whose 
measured  behaviors  are  relatively  complex  (i.e.,  if  considered  in  terms  of 
underlying  brain  function):  When  a  human  participant  rates  the  value  of 
commodities  when  that  participant  has  a  status  of  owner  or  buyer  (e.g., 
Loewenstein,  1996;  Van  Boven,  Dunning,  &  Loewenstein,  2000).  The 
experimental scenario generates regularities in relative value ratings as high or 
low depending on certain carefully established conditions. The unit of analysis 
here is judgment,  and  it  comes to exhibit varying properties depending on 
complex socially relevant circumstances  (i.e., owners rate the value of their 
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psychological  nomological machine results in observations that give way to 
theories of “empathy gaps” that predict future patterns of social behavior in 
certain experimentally arranged settings. Moreover, as in Cartwright’s wind-
taken dollar bill scenario, it is in fact of long-standing concern whether or not 
such  social  behavioral  regularities  observed  in  laboratory  settings  are 
generalizable  to  broader  real-world  contexts  (e.g.,  Mischel,  1968;  Bem  & 
Funder, 1978; and more recently Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Conway, 1991). This 
is  unsurprisingly similar to the situation described  above with physics and 
ﬂuid  dynamics:  Are  the  fundamental  regularities  of  social  nomological 
machines applicable in contexts that violate their basic conditions -- such as in 
the complex sphere of real-world social behavior?
This same situation may be demonstrated across many units of analysis 
in  psychological  science.  For  example,  the  sometimes  fascinating  ﬁndings 
from  neuro-imaging  work  (e.g.,  Haxby,  Gobbini,  Furey,  Ishai,  Schouten,  & 
Pietrini, 2001) and whether they apply in broader theoretical and real-world 
contexts (e.g., Bub, 2000; Hassan, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, &  Malach, 2004), or 
local sentence-processing effects (e.g., Frazier, 1987) and whether they hold in 
rich  visual-world  contexts  (e.g.,  Tanenhaus,  Spivey-Knowlton,  Eberhard  & 
Sedivy,  1995).  Nomological  machines  are  thus  continually  reﬁned  and 
expanded. At each stage, they offer regularities that reveal  the multifarious 
nature of the psychological universe -- yet are reliant upon the conveniently 
established conditions at any stage of reﬁnement or expansion.
Cartwright’s reality toolbox recommends that these models reveal the 
natures of the human cognitive system. The “nature” of the cognitive system 
is  not inherently tied to one particular nomological  machine. Our cognitive 
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analysis selected. All these are valid models of the functioning of our mind/
brain.
Matter of fact #3: Spivey’s echoes
It would  be of little dispute to say that our behavior is guided by nervous 
system  functioning,  interacting  with  the  surrounding  stimulus  energy.  As 
Spivey and Dale (2004; see also Chapter 6) point out, both components of this 
closed  system  --  the  interplay  between  brain-environment  --  have  strictly 
continuous characteristics. For example, the structure and function of neurons 
have a  fractal  structure,  indicating  self-similarity at  any given  temporal  or 
spatial scale (Pellionisz, 1989; Teich, 1989). In addition, the nature of stimulus 
energies  impinging  on  the  cognitive  system  have  a  continuous  character 
(Gibson, 1979). 
Stopping  at  those  observations  offers  only  a  simple  reductionist 
solution to the matters of fact of cognition. Spivey and Dale (2004) go further 
in showing that continuity of this kind occurs even in higher-order cognitive 
processes, such as language. The topic of Chapters 2-5 was to reveal that there 
is  some  kind  of  continuity  between  categorization  and  response dynamics. 
This suggests  that  the matters of fact of the cognitive system involve some 
kind  of  continuous, dynamic  representation and  process.  Such  a process  as 
categorization thus reveals “echoes” of continuity, simply by focusing on the 
dynamic properties in the task, such as response dynamics. As in the fractal 
patterns  of  neural  structure  and  ﬁring,  fractal  patterns  in  higher-order 
processes  also  reveal  “echoes”  in  time-series  analysis  of  reaction-time 
183distributions (e.g.,  van Orden et al.,  2001;  Gilden, 2001). So the continuous-
distributed  framework  is  supported  also  by  the  character  of  higher-order 
cognitive processes.
A promising approach to showing that the matters of fact of cognition 
lie in  continuity is to use the continuous interplay between  processing and 
action as a litmus test, as exempliﬁed in Chapters 2-5. This has been illustrated 
with categorization (Dale et al., in press), spoken-word recognition (Spivey et 
al.,  2005), and  sentence processing (Farmer, Cargill,  Hindy, Dale, &  Spivey, 
2006). A  straightforward  problem with this  approach  is  that  it  has not yet 
gathered extensive evidence -- but work in this direction has even begun to 
show echoes of continuity in the processing of logical and moral assessment of 
sentences (McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, in preparation). 
A  second  problem  is  deeper,  and  holds  even  if  this  reﬂection  of 
continuity were evidenced through all  cognitive processes. While continuity 
may hold between the process and its output in situations where competing 
responses  are  available,  it may be that  dynamical  models  that capture the 
proposed  continuous  process  itself  are  unavailable.  This  presents  a  very 
important problem. A full account of a cognitive process would explain the 
variety of data on which it is based. For example, categorization behavior is 
guided by numerous constraints, such as prior knowledge or cultural domains 
(e.g.,  Burnett,  Medin,  Ross,  &  Blok,  2005;  Medin,  Ross, Atran,  Cox,  Coley, 
Profﬁtt,  &  Blok,  2005),  or  category-structure  constraints  (e.g.,  Murphy  & 
Medin, 1985). A full account of this cognitive process would thus account also 
for its various inner-workings. While a distributed-continuous account may 
not be far off for categorization (e.g., the scaled-up system of Love et al., 2004), 
models  for  such  processes  as  problem  solving,  moral  reasoning,  or  social 
184cognitive processes are not thoroughly attested (see, e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 
2005, for some ideas of how these models might proceed). 
Nevertheless, the litmus test reveals  an  echo of continuous  cognitive 
processing. Unfortunately,  it cannot guarantee that continuous  accounts for 
the  process  subjected  to  that  litmus  test  will  be  comprehensive  or  even 
available. But if one accepts that the echoes may reveal underlying matters of 
fact, then it follows that there exists a sufﬁcient and comprehensive dynamical 
account, somehow.
Summary reﬂections
None  of  these  outlooks  on  cognitive  matters  of  fact  have  full  acceptance. 
Which do you espouse? Quinean confusion suggests that we should continue 
to strive for matters of fact,  and  push theory selection continuously as our 
theories come closer to reality (but perhaps never reach it). Cartwright’s reality 
toolbox  argues  against  the  fundamentalist  assumption  that  one  theoretical 
framework  is  to  be  striven  for:  Each  theory or model  has  its  own  unique 
contribution  regarding matters  of  fact.  Finally,  Spivey’s  echoes  serve as  an 
enhanced  kind  of  reductionism --  the  low-level  continuity  of  the  nervous 
system along with evident continuity at higher levels suggests already that the 
continuous-distributed  framework  ought  to  be  accepted  as  the  cognitive 
matter of fact.
Quinean  confusion  and  Cartwright’s  toolbox  are  not  actually 
incompatible with Spivey’s echoes. One might argue that underdetermination 
does  not  preclude  rejection  of  whole  families  of  theories.  In  that  case, 
continuous-distributed theorists may argue that the underdetermination now 
185applies  only  to  competing  continuous  models,  with  the  whole  family  of 
discrete  ones  rejected  as  unsuccessful.  We  can  say the same in the case of 
Cartwright’s  metaphysical  pluralism:  For  example,  continuous-distributed 
theorists  may make the metatheoretical  (but  also empirical)  prediction  that 
those  natures  or  capacities  will  come  to  exhibit  continuous  and  dynamic 
properties, rather than discrete-symbolic ones. Nevertheless, some argue that 
even ancient systems rejected long ago could be revamped to ﬁt modern data, 
and  appear  more  respectable  to  modern  eyes,  such  as  non-Copernican 
schemes  for  the  solar  system  (Paul  Thompson,  personal  communication, 
University of Toronto, 2000; see also Quine & Ullian, 1978; for a relevant yet 
far  more  interesting  illustration  of  such  an  epistemological  process,  see 
Rokeach, 1964). Perhaps a compelling example from cognitive science is the 
perennial theoretical adjustment to generative grammar (Chomsky, 1965, 1986, 
2000).  In  this  theoretical  evolution,  not  only  are  the  details  of  the  system 
reworked so as to preserve core theoretical principles while capturing novel 
data  --  the  framework  has  come  to occasionally “shield”  itself  from  other 
psychological  data  by  concocting  convenient  dichotomies  or  conceptual 
schemes (e.g., as described above with I- and E-language). 
Another important  point  is  that  Cartwright’s  perspective  on  models 
does not result in outright rejection of older ones that were successful in now 
“obsolete” nomological machines: “But that does not stop you from admitting 
that a crowbar is rigid, and, being rigid, is rightly described by Newton’s laws; 
or that the solar system is composed of a small number of compact masses, 
and, being so composed, it too is subjected to Newton’s laws.” (p. 48)
Each recommendation for matters of fact is fairly radical in its broad 
assumption that the goal of science is to uncover the nature(s) of the universe, 
186and  that scientiﬁc  success is measured  by access  to  that  nature  or natures. 
Consider a fourth approach to cognitive matters of fact, one that at ﬁrst pass 
might seem naive and obscurantist, but can be formulated into a thorough and 
perhaps  enlightening  perspective:  Matters  of  fact  don’t  matter.  The  next 
section limns the surface of such a metatheoretical approach.
Units of Analysis: Integrative Pluralism
John Dewey is  described  by  Hilary Putnam  (2006) as  a  prime mover of  a 
potential  pragmatic  “third  enlightenment.” The ﬁrst, says Putnam,  was the 
Socratic and Platonic questioning of the nature of ethics and knowledge and 
its basis in Hellenic deities: “How do you know whether X is good because 
Zeus urges it, or that Zeus urges X because it is good?” The second, called the 
Enlightenment commonly, is the 17th century movement for scientiﬁc, ethical, 
and  social  “Reason.” The third  is  what Putnam describes  as a  “critique of 
criticisms.” The third enlightenment urges an endless stepping back from the 
systems  and  solutions  to  all  problems  (a  set  whose  members  include  both 
“factual” and  “ethical” problems), and  “intelligently” critiquing them. As  a 
“meta-critical” framework, this approach recommends a constant questioning 
of our  systems  of  knowledge,  in the  hope  of continuously  modifying and 
advancing them. 
In the realm of scientiﬁc knowledge, Dewey and Bentley (1948) lay out 
a  broad  epistemological  framework  for  identifying  observable  variables, 
rendering them  with labels or names, and  specifying the interrelationships 
among them in scientiﬁc explanation. As we choose these labels and concoct 
187explanations, paired  with this hope for epistemological progress, they argue for 
some strong desiderata:
The status of observation and the use of reports upon it are to be tentative, 
postulational, hypothetical. This condition  excludes all  purported materials 
and  all  alleged ﬁxed principles  that are  offered  as providing  original  and 
necessary “foundations”...The aim of observation and naming  adopted is to 
promote  further  observation  and  naming  which  in  turn  will  advance  and 
improve. This condition excludes all namings that are asserted to give, or that 
claim to be, ﬁnished reports on “reality.” (p. 113)
This  perspective  on  scientiﬁc  knowledge  is  directly  related  to  cognitive 
explanation. In fact, Dewey and Bentley spend considerable time mulling over 
the  observables,  names,  and  systems  of  psychology.  Their  overall 
epistemology holds that a transactional understanding of systems is the fullest 
kind, and what science strives for. Transaction is distinguished from two other 
forms  of  understanding  exempliﬁed  in  the  history  of  western  scientiﬁc 
thinking: self-action and inter-action. The former seeks understanding of how 
our observables are self-guided -- that worldly entities from rocks to rock stars 
are self-moving, guided by their own independent underlying rules. The latter 
sees these entities as still independent, but importantly interacting in a system. 
Newtonian  mechanics  is  such  an  example  of  how  entities  and  their 
interrelationships can be explained. Transaction takes this further. The entities 
and  their  relationships  cannot  be  considered  real,  separate  things  unto 
themselves,  but  are rather inherently intertwined in our understanding.  This 
includes the entailment that the scientist, the knower herself, is part of this 
188system: “One can easily ‘think of’ a world without a knower, or perhaps even 
of a knower without a world to belong to, and to know...[but a] ‘real world’ 
that has no knower to know it, has, so far as human inquiry is concerned...just 
about  the  same  ‘reality’  that  has  the  palace  that  in  Xanadu  Kubla  Khan 
decreed.’ (p. 142)
A defense of this epistemological system will not be made here. Instead, 
it  can be argued  that an application of this self-reﬂective system can cast a 
critique on how we talk about  cognitive processes  with  a foundationalist’s 
fervor. Dewey’s and Putnam’s (2006) pragmatic approach to science and ethics 
frames these epistemological systems in terms of problems of knowing, and they 
forcefully argue that progress in these problems is possible. This can be true 
without  even  beginning  to  concern  ourselves  with  the  supposed  overall 
character of cognition  -- which, it could  be argued, is not ever  part of the 
problems anyway. 
For  one,  cognition  is  not  a  “natural  kind.”  What  we  refer  to  as 
“cognition”  is  a complex  assemblage of  neuro-behavioral  units  of  analysis, 
and  the conditions under which  they are studied.  There are many ways of 
specifying units of measure for the behavior I am engaged in right now as I 
type this. For example, you might attach an electromyogram to my arm and 
digits and continuously track my movements from key to key.  Instead, you 
might  install  some  software  on  this  computer  to  capture  each  explicit 
keystroke -- including the  sequence  of backspaces  (there have been many). 
You  might  record  the  ﬁnal  product  of  these  keystrokes  --  this  electronic 
document  is  such  a  data  set.  Through  this  ﬁnal  product,  you  might 
characterize  the  sentence  structures  by  analysis,  or  the  character  of  entire 
paragraphs. The units thereby become larger, in both space and time.
189You could also describe the conditions in which this behavior occurs at 
varying levels of space and time. You could track the previous keystroke as a 
condition for the next, a relatively transient condition. You could measure my 
caffeine intake, my level of hunger, or other physiologically-relevant persistent 
conditions.  Even  more  persistent  conditions  are my  history  and  skill  with 
keystrokes,  or  even  further,  my  parents’  proclivity  for  keystroking  and 
whether there is any relevant heritability in their motor contributions to me. 
Such  conditions  can  be  considered  for  each  unit  of  measure  we  choose. 
Complexity in space and time in the units we measure is compounded by the 
range of conditions we specify and relate to those units. And here we are just 
discussing keystroking. I engage in all kinds of behavior you might measure, 
in which this range of units and conditions holds.
The study of cognition starts here. Both the history, and the future, of 
cognitive science frames the selection of units and conditions. For example, 
Ebbinghaus’ memory research supplied a vast and still-evolving framework 
for  memory  research.  Identifying  cognition,  as  a  whole,  with  universal 
characterizations,  “natural  kind”  descriptions,  such  as  computation  or 
information-processing (e.g., Dietrich, 1990; Fodor, 1993; Pylyshyn, 1984) is not 
where the questions and concerns of cognitive science lift off, nor necessarily 
get solved. For example, Fodor’s (1983) characteristically cloudy conceptions 
of “mental states” are relevant only to a small range of phenomena. He offers 
intricately structured arguments out of fairly unusable notions of mentality -- 
a beautiful Ferrari made of paper: great on paper, but not on the road. 
The  branches  of  psychology,  or  cognitive  science,  pursue  problems 
relevant to differing assortments of units and conditions. These problems are 
begot  as  much  by  a  branch’s  history  as  by  principled  assessment  of  the 
190composition  of  cognition. Each  subﬁeld  of psychology has  its  own unique 
intellectual  history.  Any  subﬁeld,  such  as  psycholinguistics  or  memory,  is 
historically  “bound,”  or  “enmeshed,”  in  an  array  of  goals  and  questions 
regarding  certain  units  of  analysis  and  conditions.  As  mentioned  above, 
Ebbinghaus  shaped  an  early  science  of  memory,  framing  the  problems  of 
memory  in  terms  of  certain  behavioral  units  of  measure  (“recall”  and 
“recognition”)  in  the  context  of  particular  experimental  conditions 
(memorization  stages  and  the  nature  of  their  stimulus  items).  Subsequent 
reﬁnement of this problem seeks new ways of organizing the sources of recall 
and recognition (speciﬁc biographical events -- episodic memory; or errors of 
memory in thematic recall -- false memory research). Research questions about 
memory, enmeshed still in the behavioral units identiﬁed by Ebbinghaus, have 
been extended into real-world investigation of memory behavior -- ecological 
memory (e.g., Neisser & Winograd, 1995). As discussed further below, modern 
brain  technologies  permit  these novel  labels and  proposed  processes  to be 
identiﬁed with particular regions of our brain. Each subsequent modiﬁcation 
to the problems, still in some ways very much shaped by Ebbinghaus’ original 
formulations, has this historical ﬁngerprint.
Similarly, the science of linguistics serves as an almost perfect example 
of this historical underpinning, with step-wise modiﬁcation of questions and 
problems.  Chomsky  provided  strong  normative  remarks  on  the  goals  of 
linguistic  science.  This  normativity  ensnares  methods  and  any  relevant 
evidence  got  from  them.  For  example,  Chomsky  urged  and  still  does  an 
understanding of language acquisition  from the perspective of an idealized 
and  full-ﬂedged  adult  speaker-hearer,  largely  on  a  basis  of  grammatical 
intuitions.  The science of  linguistics continues in  this  vein,  while questions 
191and problems of psycholinguistics have framed them differently -- questions 
of process and not just structure have led to a new history, and a new set of 
problems. 
One  could  assert  from  these  observations  that  matters  of  fact  or 
“natures” play second-ﬂute in the actual practice of psychological  scientists. 
Solutions to problems better describe how psychological  science progresses. 
Given the ﬂexibility of behavioral unit selection, the sheer complexity of the 
human  brain,  and  the  vastly  important  role  for  a  complex  environment, 
solutions to these problems come in a variety of forms -- we should expect a 
plurality  of  explanatory  schemes,  rather  than  adopting  a  fundamentalist 
assumption regarding cognitive matters of fact. 
However, within any given problem set (based on particular units of 
analysis, e.g., reaction time in the problem of sentence processing), there will 
inevitably be  substantive debate. But this  debate unfolds  in  these  problem 
spaces. The very large and multifarious set of problems psychology addresses 
cannot be recast wholesale in terms of one or another such scheme.  Yet these 
problem  spaces  do overlap. In  other  words,  diverse psychological  units  of 
analysis  and  their  conditions  deﬁne  problems  that  bear  important 
relationships. This has invited extensive debate within cognitive science, but 
not  enough  integration.  Chapter  6  has  she  some  light  on  how  seemingly 
disparate  descriptive  or  explanatory schemes  might  be  integrated  through 
novel conceptual or technical advances.
What problem set was considered in Chapters 2-5? The unit of analysis 
selected was continuously measured motor output, and the problem was the 
time  course  of  one  possible  process  (the  categorization  process)  and  its 
relationship to this response dynamics. In this particular sphere, it seems that 
192the continuous perspective offers the correct solution to this problem. That is, 
when  we  have  selected  a  continuous  temporal  measure,  the  best 
characterization of the resultant behavior is one that sees a continuous ﬂow of 
inﬂuence from cognition  into action.  But  this  does  not  solve  any problems 
about how categories are formed, or how they are mulled over before issuing 
action. Chapters 2 to 5 have discussed some examples of theories that seek a 
solution to this, different, problem. The theory best accounting for this may be 
one that bears a strong theoretical relationship to the kind of continuity urged 
for here. But it might not -- and after a period of time in which another theory, 
of a seemingly distinct quality, holds reign, we may wish to seek another kind 
of dialectic to integrate understanding within broader domains. Pugilism can 
become unproductive. Instead, this dialectic would be based instead on this 
“pragmatic enlightenment”: We can stand back, and with such tools as those 
presented  in  Chapter  6,  consider  ways  in  which  continuous  and  non-
continuous theories can relate.
Nevertheless,  when  we  pay  close  attention  to  the  time  course  of 
behavior,  it seems  that the eyes  and  the limbs  show  concomitant  variation 
much  like  the  underlying  processes  that  guide  them.   With  this  unit  of 
analysis,  in  this  particular  problem  space,  “cognition”  and  “action”  seem 
intricately  intertwined.
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